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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**THE CHANGING APPLICATION OF NORMS TO
FOREIGN POLICY IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS: AN
ALLIANCE BASED ON "SHARED VALUES AND
INTERESTS"**

by

Jon R. Gabrielson

June 2000

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JAPAN RELATIONS: AN ALLIANCE BASED ON “SHARED VALUES AND
INTERESTS”**

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

On 17 April 1996 President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto announced the *U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century*. The Declaration stated that the U.S.-Japan relationship in the post-Cold War era is based on “shared values and interests.” The values “shared” are listed in the Declaration: “the maintenance of freedom, the pursuit of democracy, and respect for human rights.” These values, or norms, have different meanings in the United States and Japan. The varied interpretations of these norms are investigated to determine their actual contribution to the U.S.-Japan relationship.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 17 April 1996 President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto announced the *U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century*. The Declaration stated that the U.S.-Japan relationship in the post-Cold War era is based on “shared values and interests.” The values “shared” are listed in the Declaration: “the maintenance of freedom, the pursuit of democracy, and respect for human rights.” These values, or norms, have different meanings in the United States and Japan. To determine the different meanings, the historical intellectual tradition is traced in both countries. The traditions of idealism and realism in the United States are found to be comparable to the traditions of progressivism and traditionalism in Japan. Emphasis is placed on the distinct orientation of norms in Japan so that a reasonable comparison and contrast with the United States can be performed. A survey of major historical examples of the application of norms in policy is conducted for both countries. Four distinct applications of norms to policy are introduced in the survey: moral idealism, moral prudence, moral uncertainty, and moral skepticism.

A theoretical framework based on Donald Nuechterlein’s concept of the national interest is employed to measure the relative contribution that norms made to foreign policies of the United States and Japan in four major turning points for the relationship in the 20th century. The model asserts that all countries have four basic interests that are universal in nature: defense interest, economic interest, world order interest, and ideological interest. Policy is developed as decisionmakers assign one of four different

intensity levels to these interests: survival, vital, major, and peripheral. This thesis focuses on the ideological interest component of foreign policy in U.S.-Japan relations.

Four major turning points for the U.S.-Japan relationship in the 20th century are presented as case studies: The Washington Conference/Shidehara Diplomacy, The Neutrality Acts/China Invasion, The Occupation Reverse Course/Yoshida Doctrine, and The Nixon Shocks/Comprehensive Security. For each of the cases a discussion is provided on preconditions, events, ideals and interest, and evaluation and outcome. Particular attention is placed on identification of the normative component of the policies represented in the turning points. The results showed that interests were the dominant factor in policy development, but norms demonstrated an impact that varied in each of the turning points and showed cyclical characteristics over the broader period examined. The four categories of norms applied to policy were observed through their correlation to the successive periods examined. Moral idealism, moral prudence, moral uncertainty, and moral skepticism are all present in U.S. and Japanese foreign policy. A cyclical progression of these four categories is discovered and parallels are subsequently drawn between the security environments of the 1920s and the 1990s.

Foreign policy options for the United States and Japan are analyzed using the four categories of moral applications. Commonly discussed policy options are used, and correlations are found to the four applications. Likely future policies are discussed in the light of the recurring nature of the moral applications to policy.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States-Japan alliance relationship will soon enter its fiftieth year in standing. It is a relationship that has endured many security crises, survived significant criticism, evolved slowly with the times, and remained relevant in the international security environment. However, a series of changes in the post-Cold War era has begun to call the relationship into question, and this questioning is likely to increase as the upcoming anniversary leads scholars and policymakers to take a closer look at the relationship.¹

Changing Security Environment: With the end of the Cold War an increase in global level stability was accompanied by an increase in regional level instability that had been superseded by major power tensions since the pre-World War II period. This shift is notable in Northeast Asia where traditional rivalries are manifesting themselves. Whether a “Clash of Civilizations” is in progress is significantly debated.² At minimum, it is apparent that a clash among the local powers is underway and that it is producing friction which is being felt at the global level.³ A variety of regional tensions remain unresolved and are characterized by an uncertain future: the South and North Korean stalemate, Russian-Japanese Kuril Islands issue, Chinese-Japanese Diaoyutai/Senkaku

¹ President Ronald Reagan’s 1985 declaration that “There is no relationship more important to peace and prosperity in the world than that between the US and Japan” has become a frequently repeated sentiment in post-Cold War America. Observers question the validity of these conceptualizations because of the apparent low-priority the U.S. places on Japan in this period. Reagan is quoted in Buckley, Roger. *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) x.

² Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1996.

Islands issue, and the Chinese-Southeast Asian South China Sea issue. If the potential for conflict rises, it becomes more likely that the United States-Japan alliance could be strained by regional events. The future holds great uncertainty for this alliance.

Changing Japanese Behavior: Throughout much of the 1990s Japan originated and cooperated in numerous initiatives to redefine the country's overall security role. Significant events in 1999 and 2000 demonstrate that this trend of change is continuing.⁴ The Government's commissioning of a Constitutional Review Committee signifies a shift away from avoidance of the issue by commencing the first official study into the possibility of amending or reinterpreting the Constitution. Changes could potentially include creation of a military out of the format of the Self Defense Force (SDF.) The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) pursuit and firing on North Korean spy vessels was the first time shots had been fired by Japan since the Second World War. The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) attempt to reduce host nation support for U.S. forces in Japan indicates a possible transition from the country's past strong commitment to provide financial support. Prime Minister Obuchi's aggressive schedule of foreign policy activity in 1999 was marked by numerous overseas trips attempting in particular to poll the Southeast Asian nations for trends in the region. This was a change from the country's internal focus on its economic crisis that characterized most of the 1990s.⁵ The

³ There is discussion that the United States has begun to shift its attention away from Europe to Asia. See Ricks, Thomas E. "The Pentagon's Shift in Focus." *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*. (12 June 2000): 6-8.

⁴ Uriu, Robert M., "Japan in 1999: Ending the Century on an Uncertain Note," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XL, No. 1, (January/February 2000): 140-150.

⁵ For a Japanese viewpoint on the period see Tanaka, Akihiko, "Japan's Security Policy in the 1990s," in Funabashi, Yoichi, ed. *Japan's International Agenda*. (New York: New York University Press, 1994) 28-56.

political debate over Japan's interpretation of its national identity began to shift further from its past interpretation of itself as a "civilian power" toward reinterpretation as a "normal nation."⁶ This signals the continued slow development of a redefinition of Japan's understanding of its role in world affairs.⁷

Changing Interpretation of the Alliance: During the Cold War the relationship was primarily oriented toward the common security interest of containing the Communist threat. Although the United States fashioned Japan in its own idealistic image during the postwar Occupation, accompanying interests played the lead role in supporting the relationship during the Cold War. When the Soviet threat diminished, the relationship had to find a new reason for being.⁸ The U.S.-Japan relationship made this transition and redefined itself as being oriented toward "shared values and interests."

On 17 April 1996 President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto announced the *U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century*. The Declaration's conclusion includes the concept that is the subject of this study: "...the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the three legs of the U.S.-Japan relationship-security, political, and economic-are based on *shared values and interests* and rest on the

⁶ This trend is observed by Shironitta, Tokuko, and Tsuneo Watanabe, "Japan Outlook: Struggle for Change," *CSIS Japan Watch*, (March 2000). Available [Online] <<http://webu6102.ntx.net/japan/japanwatch/jw0300.html>> [13 April 2000].

⁷ BBC World Service aired an in-depth report on changing attitudes in Japan over the country's future direction on 24 and 25 June 2000. MP Tanaka Makiko, daughter of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, was quoted as saying, "Change does come from the top and only the country's leaders can make that happen." Excerpts are available at Horsley, William. "Voting For The Future." *BBC World Service Assignment* (24 June 2000). Available [Online] <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/highlights/japan.shtml>> [24 June 2000].

⁸ In a 1998 conference between the American Asia-Pacific Center and the Japanese Defense Research Center, the participants that "the alliance appears to be suffering from a weakening sense of purpose." This observation came after the major attempts to shore up the alliance in the 1990s. See Johnstone, Christopher B., "The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Searching for a New Rationale," *Report from the Third Conference on U.S.-*

mutual confidence embodied in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their strong determination, on the eve of the twenty-first century, to build on the successful history of security cooperation and to work hand-in-hand to secure peace and prosperity for future generations.”⁹ The “shared values” are identified earlier in the Declaration,

For more than a year, the two governments conducted an intensive review of the evolving political and security environment of the Asia-Pacific region and of various aspects of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. On the basis of this review, the President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their commitment to *the profound common values that guide our national policies: the maintenance of freedom, the pursuit of democracy, and respect for human rights*. They agreed that the foundations for our cooperation remain firm, and that this partnership will remain vital in the twenty-first century.¹⁰

Because of these changes and other developments beginning in the 1990s, there is consensus among most observers that a transformation in Japan is underway, but significant disagreement about why it is occurring, how it is taking place, and where it is headed.¹¹

Norms and Change as Tools for Analysis: The common values, or norms, identified by the Joint Declaration will be the primary implements that are used to understand the changes in the U.S.-Japan relationship addressed above. However, freedom, democracy, and human rights are understood very differently on opposite sides

Japan Security Relations. Available [Online] <http://www.apcss.org/Report_US-Japan_98.html> [14 June 2000].

⁹ U.S. Department of State International Information Programs. U.S. Commitment to Security in the Asia-Pacific. U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century. Available [Online]: <<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/japnsc13.htm>> [5 June 2000]. Italics added.

¹⁰ Ibid, italics added.

¹¹ Green, Michael J. “State of the Field Report: Research on Japanese Security Policy.” NBR Publications: AccessAsia Review: Vol. 2, No. 1. Available [Online] <<http://www.nbr.org/publications/review/vol2no1/essay.html>> [13 December 1999].

of the Pacific Ocean. An explanation of the different constructions that these ideals have is necessary to properly understand the changes taking place. These norms will be employed as the yardstick to measure the changing normative contribution to the ideals and interests that combine in foreign policies. In addition, the thesis will attempt to determine the degree to which norms really “guide” foreign policies in the United States and Japan.

Political scientist Peter Katzenstein provides a sense of what norms are and how they affect behavior:

Norms can affect behavior both indirectly and directly. Since norms are typically nested in one another, their effects are often indirect. Norms have direct effects by defining collectively shared standards of appropriate behavior that validate social identities. They provide, in the language of Ann Swidler, a tool kit of world-views. They are prefabricated action channels that establish links between the values individuals hold and the problems they seek to solve. Norms shape behavior by offering ways to organize action rather than specifying the ends of action. They create habits of interpretations and repertoires of practice grounded in experience. Styles of action thus are typically more persistent than the ends which individuals or groups seek to attain. In the words of Robert Smith, “certain elements, constructs, principles and styles seem to be enduring. At the very least, they seem to recur.”¹²

Although analyses based on norms seek to identify recurring patterns, they also attempt to understand how norms are applied differently over time, and thus have a dynamic element. As Katzenstein notes:

I do not view culture as a child of deep continuities in history, as do those who interpret Japan as a “consensus culture” or a “peace-loving country.” Rather than invoke history as the autonomous creator of particular aspects of culture, we should be able to point to political processes by which norms are contested and contingent, politically made and unmade

¹² Katzenstein, Peter J. *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996) 19. Katzenstein also explores a similar approach in an edited volume of comparative studies, Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

in history.... Nevertheless, through a specific politics...Japan has in recent decades maintained a collective identity first acquired in the 1950s, and that particular identity does deserve that description....

I also reject the contrary and equally apolitical view of culture as the product of large historical discontinuities. Many liberals, especially in Japan, argue that Japan's pacifism, its nuclear "allergy," is a natural outcome of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Relatedly, some realist explanations of national security argue that "history" can be reduced to the effects of large shifts in the international balance of power....I believe such a view of the relation between history and culture is uninteresting as long as it fails to specify the *political mechanisms* by which the purported transformation took place. *For it is not large historical discontinuities themselves, that leave their imprint on entire polities; it is memories of and beliefs about those events as interpreted and reinterpreted by political actors.*¹³

In short, national ideals have two parts: static, enduring national values reflected in the national identity of each country and a dynamic, transient element that reflects differences in how these ideals get interpreted and applied over time. These two parts will be seen in four archetypical series of events in historical U.S.-Japan relations. Each event triggered a debate about the role of norms in foreign policy-a "political process" which transformed the role of norms until the next event. It is also important to look at the U.S.-Japan relationship from a broad historical perspective in order to reach for a better understanding of the cycles of change and continuity that have characterized this relationship in the past.¹⁴ By understanding historical patterns, the significance and direction of current changes becomes clearer. As political scientist Kenneth Pyle notes:

¹³ Katzenstein, Peter J. *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996) 2. Italics and emphasis added.

¹⁴ For a detailed analysis of cyclical and generational views of U.S. history see Strauss, William and Neil Howe. *The Fourth Turning: An American Prophecy*. New York: Broadway Books, 1997. The authors assert that the principles developed for the context of U.S. history can be applied to understand the history of other countries as well. Charles Doran also applies "power cycle" theory in to U.S.-Japan relations in Doran, Charles F., "The United States, Japan and the Tides of History," in Hosoya, Chihiro and Tomohito Shinoda, eds. *Redefining the Partnership: The United States and Japan in East Asia*. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1998) 217-240. For an observation of cycles of trade relations between the United States and Japan see Yamamoto, Mitsuru, "Beyond the Pressure-Response Cycle," in Iriye, Akira and Warren I. Cohen, eds. *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World*. Lexington, KY: The

In times of upheaval, it is useful to study history. Such study does not enable us to make predictions, but *history gives us a broader perspective on change underway than does our remembrance of the immediate past. It sensitizes us to the relentless influences that forces of culture, values, and geopolitics exercise even in times of rapid change.* Looking at the present upheaval from the perspective of modern Japanese history, we can discern in it *a classic pattern of conservative political change that has many precedents* in the 150 years of modern Japanese history.¹⁵

Journalist Funabashi Yoichi also sees a recurring pattern of change in Japan, particularly in the area of borrowing versus adaptation in modernization, and Asia versus the West in outlook:

Japan's modernization process has been like the swing of a pendulum, first swinging toward the West, then back to indigenous and culturally familiar Asia. Japan's soul-searching effort to define its proper self-image in the world and Asia is still haunted by legacies of past swings.¹⁶

The study of four archetypes of U.S.-Japan relations in history will look for this “classic pattern” and the “pendulum swing” from the perspective of norms.¹⁷ It will identify a pattern of constants and trends in U.S.-Japan relations that shows cyclical characteristics. When this is complete, understanding of the present relationship will be in its proper context, and projection into the future can be done with greater assurance.

A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This thesis seeks to understand the changing nature of the normative component in the United States-Japan security relationship. The three “shared values” articulated in

University Press of Kentucky, 1989) 223-230. For a brief observation of broad cycles in U.S.-Japan relations see Nester, William R. *Power across the Pacific: A Diplomatic History of American Relations with Japan.* (New York: New York University Press, 1996) 1-2.

¹⁵ Pyle, Kenneth B. *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era.* (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1996) 147-48. Italics and emphasis added.

¹⁶ Funabashi, Yoichi, ed. *Japan's International Agenda.* (New York: New York University Press, 1994) 11. Italics and emphasis added.

the 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration will be used throughout for this normative component. Cycles of change and continuity will be identified while examining the normative component in the relationship. To this end, the thesis addresses the following questions:

1. How do ideals impact U.S. foreign policy issues? What is the applicable tradition of ideals in the United States?
2. How do ideals impact Japanese foreign policy issues? What is the applicable tradition of ideals in Japan?
3. Is there a systematic way to understand the comparative contribution of ideals and interests to foreign policy issues?
4. What has been the historic balance between ideals and interests in U.S. and Japanese foreign policy?
5. What does the tradition of ideals and their recent application suggest for the present and for future U.S. and Japanese security policies? How will ideals and interests be approached in the future in each country?
6. How will the present and future security policies impact the alliance relationship? Is the alliance really based on “shared values and interests?” Is there an appropriate way to balance ideals and interests for the alliance?

¹⁷ Cyclical characteristics of Japan have also been observed in the area of nationalism by Yoshino Kosaku. See Yoshino, Kosaku. *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological Enquiry*. London: Routledge, 1992.

B. ARGUMENTS

This thesis seeks to establish how ethics in the foreign policy debate in the United States and Japan will influence the future direction of the security relationship. In the process, this thesis makes the following contentions:

1. The three ideals of freedom, democracy, and human rights are commonly interpreted in the United States as civil liberties, rule of law, and the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Observers have generally argued that these norms should have one of three roles in U.S. foreign policy: little or none at all, prudent application, or widespread use.
2. The three ideals of freedom, democracy, and human rights are understood differently in Japan. Close approximations in Japan are the esteemed values of harmony, “rule by consensus”, and the responsibilities of duty, honor, and role. Japanese debate has centered less on the place of these norms in foreign policy than it has on who Japan is in the international environment.
3. Every nation has four basic interests that must be assessed in the local context, namely: defense of homeland, economic well-being, favorable world order, and promotion of values. These interests can take one of four intensity levels depending on the situation. An interaction of external and internal factors combines to form the policy response, which is ultimately based on an evaluation of the ideals and interests present in an issue.
4. The United States has approached the policy balance of ideals and interests by emphasizing interests during the Cold War and shifting toward

an increased role for ideals in the post-Cold War. The United States has demonstrated significant swings in policy between idealism and realism through four categories of applied morals that will be introduced. Japan has approached the policy balance of ideals and interests by focusing on its interest demands particularly during the Cold War and is presently demonstrating uncertainty over the balance of ideals and interests. Japan has also demonstrated significant swings in policy between idealism and realism through four categories of applied morals, but in a peculiarly Japanese fashion. In the Japanese case, the swings between idealism and realism take the form of an introverted to an extroverted foreign policy as Japan seeks to balance the forces of traditionalism and progressivism within its society.

5. U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s and 1990s has swung toward moral idealism. Although this may continue for a brief time, there are strong undercurrents of moral skepticism developing. Japanese foreign policy in the same period has been characterized by extroversion, but a display of introversion may not be far off. The probable future United States and Japan security policies will remain mostly the same as today with incremental changes in the near term. In that environment, ideals and interests will be balanced much as they are at present.
6. Future U.S. and Japanese foreign policies will be driven mostly by external security crises or economic shocks, with internal dynamics shaping the particular policy response. The alliance relationship will not

be significantly impacted until one of these crises comes to pass, despite the post-Cold War emphasis on ideals in the U.S.-Japan relationship. The alliance is primarily based on shared interests while shared values are secondary. Ideals and interests must be prudently balanced, and national identity must be cautiously interpreted in order to maintain peace and security through the alliance.

C. RELEVANCE

This thesis is relevant to ongoing research in the field of U.S.-Japan relations and it provides value added in two areas. First, it complements regional studies on Japanese security policy by drawing from and building on topics discussed in that area. Second, it represents an application to a specific country of the continuing United States debate over the relative importance of ideals and interests in foreign policy. The U.S. debate needs to be complemented by an understanding of the relative importance of ideals and interests in the country that is the object of the U.S. foreign policy.

In his “State of the Field Report: Research on Japanese Security Policy,” Michael Green noted “divergent views among specialists regarding Japanese rearmament.”¹⁸ He also identified Japan’s policy of comprehensive security as an area “ripe for reexamination or original research.”¹⁹ This thesis will attempt to weigh the divergent views on Japanese security policy by approaching it from the perspective of the ideals and interests policy balance. Also, by looking at the changing ideals and interests policy

¹⁸ Green, Michael J. “State of the Field Report: Research on Japanese Security Policy.” NBR Publications: AccessAsia Review: Vol. 2, No. 1. Available [Online] <<http://www.nbr.org/publications/review/vol2no1/essay.html>> [13 December 1999].

¹⁹ Ibid.

balance in Japan, this study will attempt to look at the development of comprehensive security, and future trends for it, based on a theoretical framework.

With the end of the Cold War, the old debate over ideals and interests in foreign policy that dominated much of the early Cold War national security dialogue came back to life. In the current discussion, there are generally two extremes of internationalism and neo-isolationism. These viewpoints are largely polarized over the ideals and interests policy balance. Internationalists advocate a dominant role for ideals whereas neo-isolationists stress the primary importance of interests.²⁰ This study will look at how the balance developed in U.S. security policy toward Japan and where it is going.

D. METHODOLOGY

The thesis methodology is a case study application of existing theory on the concept of the national interest. It modifies existing theory by focusing on norms and their recurring impact on foreign policy. Four major series of historical events are selected as cases of the changing ideals and interests composition of the foreign policies of the United States and Japan. Historical analysis is then performed using the theory in order to build a pattern of constants and trends that allows for a better understanding of the present and future. The theory used here was designed for policymakers to systematically develop policies that integrate national ideals and interests. Emphasis in this thesis will be placed on the theory's component of ideals that contribute to the policymaking process. The study seeks to test the theory in the light of actual experience in the United States-Japan security relationship. For test data, the thesis relies primarily on secondary source historical material. The level of analysis looks to the international

security system level for external stimuli to the United States and Japan and then to the level of leadership and the public for internal shaping of specific policy responses.

E. ORGANIZATION

Chapter II will investigate the U.S. understanding of the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights. It will start by asking whether norms should even have a place in foreign policy. Next, the Western tradition of norms in policy will be developed. The important debate over morality in foreign policy will be surveyed. Highlights of modern U.S. examples will be presented as a precursor to the analysis following in the rest of the thesis. The chapter will conclude that these norms are enduring national values which are a part of an unchanging national identity that contributes to policy formulation.

Chapter III will investigate the Japanese understanding of the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights. It will start by examining whether norms in the Western sense even exist in Japan. Next, the Japanese tradition of norms in policy will be developed. The important national discussions over Japanese identity will be looked at for their contribution to policy. Highlights of modern Japanese examples will be presented as a precursor to the analysis following in the rest of the thesis. The chapter will conclude that these norms are enduring national values which are a part of an unchanging national identity that contributes to policy formulation.

Chapter IV will introduce a theoretical framework from which the alliance will be viewed. A theory will be presented which will allow a systematic evaluation of the

²⁰ Nye, Joseph S. Jr. *Ethics and Foreign Policy*. (Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1985) 1-3.

comparative contributions of ideals and interests in foreign policy. It will conclude by using this theory to present a modern example of the historical tradition of morality in foreign policy for both the United States and Japan. The variables used in this theory are very similar to the components of the Japanese comprehensive security concept. As a result, application of this theory to policy cases before and after the debut of this security concept will enhance understanding of the security concept and its roots.

Chapter V uses the theoretical framework to look at the alliance from the perspective of both the United States and Japan at each of the four major turning points in the historical relationship from the 20th century.²¹ For each turning point it will conduct analysis by discussing preconditions, events, ideals and interests, evaluation and outcome. The application of the theoretical framework to major turning points in U.S. and Japanese foreign policy reveals a dynamic element in the three norms composing national identity and demonstrates the shifting balance of ideals and interests in foreign policy.

Chapter VI will look at the present and future foreign policy situations for the United States and Japan. For the United States, it will introduce the outside forces of regional security threats and challenges to overall US security. For Japan, it will introduce the outside forces of security threats from North Korea and China as well as an uncertain relationship with the United States. In both cases, the normative policy contribution will be explained as a national identity combination of the enduring, static national values and the transient, dynamic way they are interpreted over time. When

²¹ For a more elaborate development of the concept of “turnings” in history see Strauss, William and Neil Howe. *The Fourth Turning: An American Prophecy*. New York: Broadway Books, 1997.

trends and constants in Japanese security policy are seen in this light, future directions in the countries' respective policies can be discussed.

Chapter VII will conclude the thesis. The overall ethical contribution of ideals to foreign policy will be summarized. Comments will be made on the use of a systematic matrix to formulate policy using the ideals and interests balance. Recommendations will be provided to conduct foreign policy in a way that recognizes the reality of a changing balance of ideals and interests within policy.

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II. IDEALS AND INTERESTS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

A. UNITED STATES AND THE THREE VALUES

Freedom, democracy, and human rights are terms that are common to most Americans. These values have a tradition of involvement in U.S. foreign policy that is rooted in an even greater Western legacy of grappling with the place of ideals and interests in politics. The United States has dealt with this issue in different ways over time but these ideals have had an enduring impact on U.S. policy. Their perseverance is contingent upon the fact that they are integral concepts to the founding of the United States and that they consequently have become ingrained into the national psyche. These ideas are showcased on national holidays such as Memorial Day and the Fourth of July.²² This is significant because those holidays observe the sacrifices made by the U.S. armed forces in the past. The ideals discussed here have mobilized society in times of national crisis. In a similar sense, the U.S. flag has traditionally been the object of civic reverence

²² The closest approximation in Japan to these patriotic American holidays include: *Kenkoku kinenbi*, or National Foundation Day, observed in honor of the first emperor's enthronement, Jimmu Tenno dated as early as 660 B.C. *Kenpo kinenbi*, or Constitution Day, observed in honor of the enactment of the Constitution. *Tenno Tanjobi*, or Emperor's Birthday, observed in honor of the Heisei emperor. Holidays observing the birthdays of the Meiji emperor, *Meijisetsu*, and Showa emperor, *Tenchosetsu*, were changed to Culture Day, *Bunka no hi*, and Green Day, *Midori no hi*, in Japan's postwar era in honor of Japan's greenery and cultural prosperity. The emperor's birthday is the most visible demonstration of patriotism as flag-toting Japanese flock to the Imperial Palace to catch a glimpse of the emperor and wave at him. See *Japan: Profile of a Nation, revised edition*. (New York: Kodansha America Inc., 1999) 514-515.

in a way that is unlike other countries.²³ The words of the Pledge of Allegiance are indicative of the ideals that are attached to the flag.²⁴

For these ideals to be represented in foreign policy though, they must have a tangible element that demonstrates the principle being applied. Most Americans can articulate at least a vague concept of what these ideals connote. *Freedom* brings out the sentiment, “I can do whatever I want,” and it communicates a crude understanding of the concept of liberty. What this really refers to then is the civil liberties that are delineated in the Bill of Rights. The First Amendment to the Constitution is particularly notable:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.²⁵

Democracy is associated with “free and fair” elections and the right to vote. At another level this addresses representative government and the rule of law based on the Constitution. An excerpt from Article VI is illustrative:

This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land;

²³ Although the emperor's status was transformed by the renunciation of his divinity and 1946 Constitution of Japan, he remains the object of highest civic reverence in Japan. John Dower explains the Japanese calendar's orientation around emperor reign periods and its significance for Japanese society in, Dower, John W. *Japan In War & Peace: Selected Essays*. (New York: New Press, 1993) 1-3.

²⁴ According to CRW Flags Inc., “The Pledge of Allegiance was written by Reverend Francis Bellamy for use at the dedication of the World's Fair Grounds in Chicago on October 21, 1892. The wording was slightly altered in 1923 and 1924 by the First and Second National Flag Conferences. It was officially designated as the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag by Congress in 1945. The words ‘under God’ were added in 1954 in a law signed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.” The pledge is as follows, “I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” See CRW Flags Inc. *The Pledge of Allegiance*. Available [Online] <<http://www.crwflags.com/allegiance.html>> [20 June 2000].

²⁵ U.S. Department of State International Information Programs. United States History Basic Documents and Writings. *The Bill of Rights*. Available [Online] <<http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/funddocs/billeng.htm>> [15 June 2000].

and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.²⁶

Human rights have received more emphasis in recent history than in the past, but their foundation was laid early when the Declaration of Independence stated that, “We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain *unalienable Rights*, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness....”²⁷ The notion of “rights” in general has even developed a life of its own in America as people frequently assert their “rights” in all sorts of situations. In this light, rights act as a means to the end of freedom.²⁸

In sum, for citizens of the United States the three ideals of freedom, democracy and human rights are embodied in the forms of civil liberties, rule of law through representative government, and the unalienable rights. The application of these ideals to foreign policy is significantly contested by policymakers and academics. Rightly or wrongly, these are the ideals that are most frequently exhibited by U.S. foreign policy.

The Western tradition has a long history of wrestling with the issue of ideals and interests in policy.²⁹ The earliest tradition attempted to perform prudent application of

²⁶ U.S. Department of State International Information Programs. United States History Basic Documents and Writings. *The Constitution*. Available [Online] <<http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/funddocs/consteng.htm>> [15 June 2000].

²⁷ U.S. Department of State International Information Programs. United States History Basic Documents and Writings. *The Declaration of Independence*. Available [Online] <<http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/funddocs/deceng.htm>> [15 June 2000]. Italic added.

²⁸ For a general perspective on human rights and the U.S-Japan relationship see Iriye, Akira, “Changing U.S. Perspectives on Human Rights,” and Aruga, Tadashi, “U.S.-Japanese Relations, Democracy and Human Rights Issues in Asia,” in Hosoya, Chihiro and Tomohito Shinoda, eds. *Redefining the Partnership: The United States and Japan in East Asia*. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1998) 159-194.

²⁹ Mark Amstutz provides a brief overview of the issues involved in the debate over morality in foreign policy in Amstutz, Mark R. *Christian Ethics and U.S. Foreign Policy*. (Grand Rapids, MI: Academic Books: 1987) 17-36.

norms to policy. Out of it came a fragmentation that developed slowly over time creating the two main general strands of applied policy ethics in post-Renaissance Western history: idealism and realism.

B. ETHICS AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE TRADITION

The role of ethics within foreign policy is an issue that has been divisively contested in the United States by much of the academic and policymaking community since the time of the First World War. While many policymakers are not familiar with the philosophical traditions behind much of the debates, their political presuppositions emanate from the legacy that was developed by many eminent thinkers throughout Western history. Most of the practical discussion in the 20th century debates made an effort to define the nature of American power and the ways in which it should be used. At a more theoretical level the discussion has revolved around the relationship between morality and politics, ultimately dealing with questions about human nature.³⁰ This debate has tremendous importance in the United States because it has provided its participants with a way in which to see the world and act in it. It has set an agenda upon which academics must frame their arguments and officials must base their policies. A look at the development of this debate over morality in foreign policy will show the different approaches on the issue and lead to a framework from which to understand the relative contributions of ideals and interests in foreign policy.

The modern debate owes a great debt to an intellectual legacy left by a number of scholars throughout history. Their thoughts and theories provide important milestones that are still referenced when discussing morality and foreign policy. They will be briefly

summarized here to provide background for those who may be unfamiliar with the roots of U.S. policy. The oldest tradition is that of “normative prudence.” From it the schools of idealism and realism developed which then produced four discrete approaches to U.S. foreign policy in the 20th century: moral idealism, moral ideology, moral skepticism, and moral uncertainty. This survey will create a linkage from the Western worldview to the practice of U.S. foreign policy.

1. The Normative Prudence Tradition

The earliest proponent was the Greek philosopher Aristotle, who discussed politics as an extension of ethics. Aristotle was the founding father of the prudence tradition, a group of scholars that tries to apply practical wisdom to the ethical dilemmas of foreign policy.³¹ Political scientist Alberto Coll describes the prudence tradition, or “normative prudence” as having two hallmarks:

First, it recognizes the considerable difficulty of translating ethical intentions and purposes into policies that will produce morally sound results. Theorists and practitioners of statecraft sometimes consider prudence to be the virtue that enables its possessor to introduce moral goals into the stubborn and less-than-hospitable realities of international politics...The second hallmark of the tradition is the emphasis it places on the statesman's character. Character is seen as a key component in the ability to act morally in the political world...This focus on character makes the prudence tradition distinctive. While writers about prudence recognize the power of political philosophy and conceptions of morality, they affirm that the statesman's character and his habits of decision-

³⁰ Weigel, George. *Idealism Without Illusions: U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1990s*. (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1994) 2.

³¹ Although the prudence tradition has diminished over time it is still visible in modern history. See for example Hariman, Robert. *The History of Prudence in the Twenty-First Century*. 28 August 1999. Available [Online] <<http://zeus.ia.net/~poroi/current%20texts/hariman.htm>> [21 June 2000].

making and action are central to the concrete fulfillment of notions of the good.³²

The Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas later continued in the tradition of Aristotle by defining prudence as the chief virtue among his four cardinal virtues. British statesman Edmund Burke maintained this legacy with the belief that prudence is the standard of all virtues, and that it was to be used by the statesman as a mediator between principles and particulars.³³

2. The Realist Tradition

Two opposing schools developed in Western history that branched off from the prudence tradition. They are the realists and idealists. While there were isolated examples of these two approaches in the past, they cannot be described as a coherent tradition until they were established in the bifurcation in scholarship that took place in the Renaissance.

Whereas the normative prudence tradition seeks a virtue-based balance of ideals and interests, the realist tradition removes virtue and swings the balance in favor of interests. Realists are characterized by such men as Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. They separated morality from politics and viewed politics as the higher priority when weighed against morality. Consequently, they redefine prudence “as a skill of discerning the course of action that best serves one’s self-interest... (it) is equated with caution, stealth, and the successful quest for survival at all costs; its guiding norm is the

³² Coll, Alberto. “Prudence and Foreign Policy,” in Cromartie, Michael. *Might and Right After the Cold War: Can Foreign Policy Be Moral?* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1993) 5-6. Italics added.

³³ John Bolton presents Edmund Burke as an enduring model of prudence for the post-Cold War era in Bolton, John R., “The Prudent Irishman,” *The National Interest*, (December 1997). Available [Online] <http://www.britannica.com/bcom/magazine/article/0_5744_219924_00.html> [9 June 2000].

survival of the self or a particular political community, with few, if any, restraints on the range of means allowed for pursuing this end.”³⁴

3. The Idealist Tradition

The other tradition that branched off from normative prudence is that of idealists who believe that morality has a place in politics. Whereas the realist tradition removes the prudent’s virtue and swings the balance in favor of interests, idealist swings the balance in favor of ideals. Because they generally draw morals from ethical systems of absolutes, morality is seen as more important than politics when the two come into conflict. Influential thinkers in this tradition include Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke. Whereas in realism prudence is seen as simple self-interested pragmatism, idealists see prudence as an attempt to sacrifice principles. It risks bringing the ideals of morality into the realm of relativism and situational ethics.

4. The Traditions in American Thought

Of the three traditions, the normative prudence tradition has not had a strong following in the United States because of the division of knowledge that began in the Western intellectual tradition with the Renaissance from the 14th to the 16th centuries. A strong polarization between realism and idealism existed by the time the American Founding Fathers considered issues of political philosophy in creating the United States. The realism-idealism contrast in the United States is compounded by the fact the nation has a very high sense of exceptionalism. In the United States this sense came in large part from the early Puritan settlers’ Biblical mandate articulated by the first governor of

³⁴ Coll, Alberto. “Prudence and Foreign Policy,” in Cromartie, Michael. *Might and Right After the Cold War: Can Foreign Policy Be Moral?* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1993) 7. This definition is closer to President George Bush’s frequent usage of the term during his presidency.

the Massachusetts Bay Colony, John Winthrop: “For wee must consider that wee shall be as a citty upon a hill. The eies of all people are uppon us.”³⁵ In the realm of foreign policy, the United States was proud during its early history that it did not play European-style “power politics.” The U.S. drive to fulfill the “manifest destiny” is a case of applied American exceptionalism resulting in a missionary-type undertaking. A consciousness of superiority is evident in the United States from this example. This exceptionalism amplified the tension between realism and idealism that grew in direct proportion to the amount of contact the United States had with the outside world.

The United States’ attempt to synthesize the realism-idealism dialectic and exceptionalism modality is the immediate factor that contributes to the debate over morality in U.S. foreign policy. Regardless of whether the United States selects realism or idealism as a political philosophy in a given case, the policies generated from that foundation would be conducted in an exceptional way. Realism combined with exceptionalism dictates that the United States be an inward looking society that is only conservatively involved in world affairs from a distance. In this case the United States attempts to avoid being polluted by the “savage” and lawless international environment. On the other hand, idealism combined with exceptionalism dictates that the United States

³⁵ James Chace identifies the continued relevance of these traditional American ideals in Chace, James. *The Dilemmas of the City Upon a Hill*. World Policy Institute. 1997. Available [Online] <<http://www.worldpolicy.org/chace2.html>> [16 June 2000]. Excerpts of John Winthrop’s *City Upon a Hill* can be found at Weisenfeld, Judith. “Religion and Social Constructions of Race,” Excerpts of John Winthrop *City Upon a Hil*. Available [Online] <<http://www.columbia.edu/~jw40/winthrop.html>> [10 June 2000].

be a progressive society that is actively involved in the world, promoting itself as a model to other nations.³⁶

C. ETHICS AND FOREIGN POLICY: APPLICATIONS IN U.S. HISTORY

The issue of morality in foreign policy became relevant in the United States with its transition to “great power” status in the Spanish-American War.³⁷ Prior to that time, foreign policy was a comparatively small priority for American policymakers and the public. Following the completion of the “manifest destiny” within the continental United States, the nation acquired an increased awareness of world events at a time sometimes known as “the Golden Age of Imperialism.” In the Spanish-American War, the United States brought a means of military power and a motive of mixed agendas into combat. Upon defeating Spain, the United States announced its arrival on the world stage.

The continuing debate over morality in foreign policy has its present roots with this series of events where ideals and interests came together in policy. The geopolitical interest of having a competitive presence in Asia to support the China “Open Door” policy and the need to have a Mahanian forward-based naval forces was accompanied by ideals. This conflict was motivated by ideals including a type of Just War Theory proportionate response expressed in the sentiment “Remember the Maine!” and President William McKinley’s appeal to “take them all and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and

³⁶ For a discussion of the “American National Style” of foreign policy see Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. *America’s Foreign Policy Since World War II*. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998) 8-18.

³⁷ Dudden, Arthur Power. *The American Pacific: From the Old China Trade to the Present*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 78-111.

civilize and Christianize them.”³⁸ After the successful defeat of Spain and travels of the Great White Fleet, the United States experienced a sort of reflective afterglow period until the First World War.

The three ideals of freedom, democracy, and human rights have significant precedent in the history of U.S. foreign policy. The political process that is used to define the national interest and then develop policy involves a complex interaction between the public and government.³⁹ Although the President holds the primary duty of making foreign policy, the Congress maintains important appropriation and oversight responsibilities, particularly the “advise and consent” role of the Senate.

Public opinion also plays an important but supporting role in the formulation of foreign policy.⁴⁰ Public opinion has a tendency to drive swings between periods of activism and passivism in the promotion of ideals through foreign policy.⁴¹ While the President has the leading role in foreign policy, the public shapes the way in which international issues are interpreted and policies are carried out. The interaction between

³⁸ British poet Rudyard Kipling’s idea of the “White Man’s Burden” was also taken up by Governor General William Howard Taft in order to help “our little brown brothers.” See Library of Congress. *America at the Turn of the Century: A Look at the Historical Context*. Available [Online] <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/papr/mckamcen.html> [12 June 2000].

³⁹ Destler, I.M., “Political Change in the United States and Its Impact on U.S.-Japan Relations,” in Hosoya, Chihiro and Tomohito Shinoda, eds. *Redefining the Partnership: The United States and Japan in East Asia*. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1998) 29-42. For a more structural view of the impact of internal politics on foreign policy see Cowhey, Peter F., “The politics of foreign policy in Japan and the United States,” in Cowhey, Peter F. and Matthew D. McCubbins. *Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 203-225.

⁴⁰ For an overview of the impact of public opinion see Brewer, Thomas L. and Lorne Teitelbaum. *American Foreign Policy: A Contemporary Introduction*. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1997) 160-186.

⁴¹ Wesley Bagby addresses the correlating U.S. foreign policy traditions of isolation and expansion as well as the frequent emphasis on democracy in Bagby, Wesley M. *America’s International Relations Since World War I*. (New York: Oxford University Press: 1999) 11-17.

external world events and internal domestic processes will determine which aspect of the national interest will be emphasized at a given time.

Foreign policies in U.S. history are commonly attached to a given president's name, such as in the case of the Monroe Doctrine. Those presidents that have established a place for morality in foreign policy have adopted the three ideals under study. In the process they have carried on the traditions of idealism and realism by addressing the four basic interests of defense of homeland, economic well-being, favorable world order, and promotion of values; each president achieving a different balance between the interests. Their applications of the Western intellectual traditions will be characterized as moral idealism, moral prudence, moral skepticism, and moral uncertainty. These categories show a general correlation to the traditions of Western thought.

These categories are used to illustrate the cyclical nature of the foreign policies' moral content and place particular emphasis on the public mood behind the respective policies. The categories create a cyclical pattern of trends and constants for morality in policy that is listed here in the order of sequence observed. *Moral idealism* is the application of norms in an excessive and ostentatious manner. It is commonly accompanied by argument in society over which morals should be applied in policy. At some point, policymakers and the public become frustrated with the inability to realize these norms through foreign policy and enter a stage of *moral skepticism*, choosing not to promote norms through foreign policy. This stage of moral skepticism then unravels to where there is a crisis because of the unraveling of the moral order that previously held consensus. Out of the crisis emerges a new moral consensus and *moral prudence* where morals are applied in foreign policy through an unpretentious but assertive manner. After

the new moral order has been in existence for a time, it begins to be questioned. This creates new cross currents in society and a condition of *moral uncertainty* where norms are applied in varied ways consecutively within policy. As the moral uncertainty intensifies it gives way to a resurgent *moral idealism* in foreign policy that is highly vocal, but not representative of a consensus in society.

In sum, the brief definitions following will be used throughout the thesis. Moral idealism is defined as the excessive or exaggerated application of morals to a situation, this sometimes occurs when morals are used as an ideological justification for self-interested actions in policy. Moral prudence is defined as the use of morals in an assertive yet unassuming way in policy. Moral skepticism is defined as the rejection of a place for morals in policy. Moral uncertainty is a special case where morals play an inconsistent role in policy: in this situation, moral application in policy frequently alternates between the other three options within a relatively short amount of time. These categories of moral application in policy will be grouped in the following two sections according to their correlation with traditions in Western thought.

1. The Idealist Perspective Applied

The shock of the First World War sparked a discussion about the nature of international relations and the role that American power should have within it. The discussion came to be dominated by an elite known as the liberal internationalists. Ethicist Robert McElroy identifies three areas where liberal internationalists saw that morality could influence foreign policy: through domestic public opinion, in the “courtroom of world opinion” represented by the League of Nations, and in the

consciences of individual national leaders.⁴² President Woodrow Wilson at the Versailles Treaty was on the leading edge of this intellectual trend; in the terms of this study, he demonstrates the concept of “**moral idealism**” where norms are given an excessive place in policy and are used to justify actions.⁴³ His Fourteen Points with the centerpiece League of Nations became the main institutional vehicle in which liberal internationalists placed their hope. In doing so they sought a large place for morality within politics. They intended for international politics from that point on to be subject to the moral norms that were embodied in the Fourteen Points.⁴⁴

President Wilson consequently has earned the reputation as the most moralistic of U.S. presidents in foreign policy. Wilson frequently sponsored the ideal of democracy in foreign policy. In April 1917 President Woodrow Wilson presented his “War Message” to Congress with the famous proclamation following:

The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.⁴⁵

⁴² McElroy, Robert W. *Morality and American Foreign Policy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 8.

⁴³ University of San Diego. History Department Page. *The Versailles Treaty*. Available [Online] <<http://history.acusd.edu/gen/text/versailles treaty/vercontents.html>> [13 June 2000].

⁴⁴ U.S. Department of State International Information Programs. United States History Basic Documents and Writings. *The Fourteen Points Speech*. Available [Online] <<http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democracy/51.htm>> [15 June 2000].

⁴⁵ Brigham Young University. World War I Document Archive. *President Woodrow Wilson’s War Message*. Available [Online] <<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1917/wilswarm.html>> [11 June 2000]. Italics added.

In his 1918 victory proclamation, Wilson declared it America's 'fortunate duty to assist...in the establishment of just democracy throughout the world.'⁴⁶ He also frequently spoke of the importance of extending the "blessings of liberty" to the rest of the world.

Gilbert Murray, president of the League of Nations Union, typifies the liberal internationalist sentiments in 1929 when he wrote:

The apologists for war...get their minds badly confused because they continue to speak of war as if it were an element of human nature, like strife or fear or ambition...The war which is formally renounced in the Pact of Paris and practically guarded against in the covenant of the League of Nations is not an instinct, it is a form of state action. It is not an element of human nature, it is part of a political programme. It is no more an instinct, or an element in human nature, than the adoption of the income tax.⁴⁷

These scholars thought that the ways and structure of the old international system based on force was evil, and that because human nature was basically good, men could be trained through education and new institutions so that states would not resort to war as a policy. This thinking and the awareness of the world's increasing interdependence led to the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, or the Pact of Paris.⁴⁸ This treaty was signed in order to renounce war as an option for national policy. Alfred Zimmern of Oxford University typified the popular thought of the day: "The Industrial Revolution and the consequent interdependence of the parts and peoples of mankind have already changed the conditions of political activity. The problems of the modern world are no longer local, but large-

⁴⁶ Bagby, Wesley M. *America's International Relations Since World War I.* (New York: Oxford University Press: 1999) 12.

⁴⁷ Murray is quoted in McElroy, Robert W. *Morality and American Foreign Policy.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 6.

scale, no longer concerned with the broils and prejudices of neighbors, but with forces which, in the vast sweep of their influence, affect millions of men in all parts of the globe.”⁴⁹ For these intellectuals, interdependence leads to increased cooperation among nations and the beginnings of a form of international morality that can be harnessed to prevent war.⁵⁰

McElroy summarizes liberal internationalism with four important claims they made about the place of morality in foreign policy:

They claimed that relatively clear international moral norms existed that could guide state decision makers in pursuing just policies. *They argued that* domestic public opinion could serve as the effective moral constraint upon the actions of state decision makers. *The internationalists advanced a view of human nature that* stressed rationality and community, rather than conflict and the drive for power. *And they believed that* World War I and the democratization of the West had created a radically new situation for international relations in which morally based precepts of state action could be effectively enforced by international public opinion and the community of nations. The politics of nations was for the internationalists a malleable thing that was capable of being patterned, albeit imperfectly, according to an effective moral order.⁵¹

President Harry Truman is an example of “moral prudence” through his application of American ideals in a way that was not characterized by the sort of overbearing and superiority for which Wilson was known. As a Democrat, Truman rose to power largely under the influence of liberal internationalist ideas. He became Vice-President to Roosevelt shortly before he assumed the duties as President upon

⁴⁸ Yale University. The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School. *The Kellogg-Briand Pact*. Available [Online] <<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/kbpact/kbmenu.htm>> [10 June 2000].

⁴⁹ Zimmern is quoted in McElroy, Robert W. *Morality and American Foreign Policy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 6.

⁵⁰ For a post-Cold War perspective of idealism see Callahan, David. *Between Two Worlds: Realism, Idealism, and American Foreign Policy After the Cold War*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994.

Roosevelt's death in April 1945. He oversaw the dropping of the atomic bomb, the ending of the war, and the subsequent massive demobilization. As evidence grew that a "cold war" was developing, Truman hoped that he could work with the Soviet Union in the postwar period but he was not as optimistic about these prospects as Roosevelt appeared to have been.

A U.S. diplomat to the Soviet Union, George Kennan, sent the February 1946 "Long Telegram" analysis of the Soviet Union to the State Department and concluded that the Soviets intended to expand and needed to be opposed on all fronts. This and the following "Mr. X" article published in *Foreign Affairs* were realist analyses designed for course of action policy planning. As a crisis developed in Greece and Turkey, Truman responded with a concept that was somewhat different in the March 1947 "Truman Doctrine." Truman shifted the United States from a former policy of isolation to one of active involvement combating communism around the world. Truman appealed to Congress' sense of the importance of American ideals when he made his speech:

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world-- and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.

⁵¹ McElroy, Robert W. *Morality and American Foreign Policy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 12-13.

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.⁵²

While Truman was clearly influenced by the actual events that appeared to threaten U.S. national interests at the time, his subdued application of U.S. ideals in the form of freedom were a marked difference from the morally skeptical isolation of the prewar period. The Truman Doctrine, the following Marshall Plan for European recovery, and the NSC-68 communist “containment” strategy were all morally prudent expansions beyond Kennan’s concept and the traditional isolationist strategy of the United States.⁵³

2. The Realist Perspective Applied

Effective criticism of liberal internationalism began as early as 1932 when scholar-theologian Reinhold Niebuhr published *Moral Man and Immoral Society*. Niebuhr characterized liberal internationalism as idealism, and he rejected its positive evaluation of man’s intrinsic nature.

Man is insecure and involved in natural contingency; he seeks to overcome his insecurity by a will-to-power which overreaches the limits of human creatureliness. Man is ignorant and involved in the limitations of a finite mind; but he pretends that he is not limited. He assumes that he can gradually transcend finite limitation until his mind becomes identical with the universal mind. All of his intellectual and cultural pursuits, therefore, become infected with the sin of pride. Man’s pride and will-to-power disturb the harmony of creation.⁵⁴

⁵² Fordham University. The Internet Modern History Sourcebook. *The Truman Doctrine*. Available [Online] <<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1947TRUMAN.html>> [12 June 2000].

⁵³ Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. OECD’s Origins. *The Marshall Plan Speech*. Available [Online] <<http://www.oecd.org/about/Marshall/index.htm>> [11 June 2000]. Mount Holyoke College. Ruth C. Lawson Professor of International Politics Webpage. *NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*. Available [Online] <<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-1.htm>> [09 June 2000].

⁵⁴ Niebuhr is quoted in McElroy, Robert W. *Morality and American Foreign Policy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 13.

Despite Niebuhr's criticism of idealism in foreign policy, he asserted that with the aid of much critical thinking, morals should have a place in foreign policy: "Politics will, to the end of history, be an area where conscience and power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their tentative and uneasy compromises."⁵⁵ These ideas set the stage for a vigorous attack on idealism following the Second World War.⁵⁶

Hans Morgenthau set the terms for the upcoming great debate on morality and foreign policy with the publishing of his *Politics Among Nations* in 1948.⁵⁷ Morgenthau came out of the German political tradition of realpolitik, which aimed to create policies based on practical and material factors rather than on theoretical or ethical objectives. His central premise is that man's quest for power is the driving factor in political environments, but unlike Niebuhr, he does not start from a Judeo-Christian theological basis of sin. Furthermore, Morgenthau finds that there is a fundamental clash between power and ethics that complicates the effort to define the relationship of morality to foreign policy.⁵⁸

Despite this, Morgenthau also sees a place for ethics in policy. The decisionmaker must have a good understanding of the nature of power and seek to choose the policy of lesser evil through the use of the "national interest:" "The national interest

⁵⁵ Niebuhr is quoted in McElroy, Robert W. *Morality and American Foreign Policy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 16.

⁵⁶ Thompson, Kenneth W. *Schools of Thought in International Relations: Interpreters, Issues, and Morality*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996) 89-110.

⁵⁷ Russell, Greg. *Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of American Statecraft*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990.

⁵⁸ Finn, James. "Morality and Foreign Policy," in Cromartie, Michael. *Might and Right After the Cold War: Can Foreign Policy Be Moral?* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1993) 39.

of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, and national security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and of its institutions.”⁵⁹

Morgenthau considers the “national interest” to be a moral effort for two reasons:

The first flows from the obligation that all nations have to protect their own citizens from harm. Since the international system is a world of conflict and competition in which any nation that practices altruism does so at the expense of its own citizens, altruism by nation-states is an immoral act that violates the trust that their citizens put in them. The second root of the moral obligation to follow the national interest arises from the fact that the mutual pursuit of the national interest is the only genuine way of promoting peace and order within the international system...⁶⁰

Morgenthau’s conceptualization of the national interest and the place for morality demonstrate the degree of difference to which political scientists see a role for morality. Because Morgenthau disagrees with morality in policy as formulated by idealists, he assigns the national interest a positive moral quality of its own. This concept of the national interest in actuality rejects the idea of morality as it is more commonly understood in society. As a result, use of the national interest as explained by Morgenthau will be described here as “**moral skepticism.**”⁶¹ In the moral spectrum that is being developed here, morally skeptical policies are those that see the least use for principles or norms. Moral skepticism in U.S. foreign policy comes the closest to the common European practice of realpolitik.

⁵⁹ Morgenthau is quoted in McElroy, Robert W. *Morality and American Foreign Policy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 26.

⁶⁰ McElroy, Robert W. *Morality and American Foreign Policy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 27.

⁶¹ Ernest LeFever draws similar distinctions between moral categories through the use of different terminologies. He describes moral idealism as *soft moralism* and moral skepticism as *hard moralism*. See LeFever, Ernest W. *The Irony of Virtue: Ethics and American Power*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998) 53.

It is ironic that the idealism of President Franklin Roosevelt was circumscribed to a policy of moral skepticism during the 1930s. Although he often spoke peace and isolation because of the popular sentiment, he privately foresaw the apparently inevitable threat posed to the United States by the growth of totalitarianism in the world. Public opinion was strongly in favor of remaining isolated from the growing conflicts of the Eurasian landmass. After the Japanese invasion of China, Roosevelt made the October 1937 "quarantine speech:"

It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading. When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a *quarantine* of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.⁶²

The ambiguity of the suggested "quarantine" and the context of the speech suggested that Roosevelt was "testing out the water" to see if public opinion was shifting. It was not, and Roosevelt was unable to make his more idealistic proclamations until it became more and more apparent that the United States would become involved in the war. At that time Roosevelt began to shift away from his more realist rhetoric and policy by placing more emphasis on ideals in policy; his promotion of freedom is a case in point. The advancement of the "four freedoms" was announced in January 1941, and it became part of U.S. foreign policy thereafter:

In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.

The first is freedom of speech and expression -- everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way -- everywhere in the world.

⁶² Texas A & M University. Index to Speeches by Roosevelt. *Quarantine the Aggressor*. Available [Online] <<http://www.tamu.edu/scom/pres/speeches/fdrquara.html>> [11 June 2000].

The third is freedom from want -- which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants -- everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear -- which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor-- anywhere in the world.⁶³

A fourth option for applying morality becomes apparent because of the varied application of ideals that policymakers employ in actual policy. Statesman George Kennan has even espoused apparently contradictory understandings of the relationship between the national interest and morality at different points in time and argued from different starting points.⁶⁴ On one occasion he argued that the United States has a moral obligation "as a political society to our own national ideals, and through these ideals to the wider human community of which we are in ever increasing measure a part."⁶⁵ On another occasion, he argued that the national interest has no moral component. "The interests of the national society for which government has to concern itself are basically those of its military security, the integrity of its political life, and the well-being of its people. These needs have no moral quality."⁶⁶ Kennan's vacillating view of the role of morality in foreign policy will be characterized here as an example of "**moral uncertainty**".

⁶³ ShoptheNet Public Library. The American History Section. *The Four Freedoms*. Available [Online] <<http://www.shopthenet.net/publiclibrary/AmericanHistory/roosevelt1.html>> [13 June 2000].

⁶⁴ Paul Nitze played a similar role to Kennan by addressing ethical issues in foreign policy from the viewpoint of a policymaker. See for example, Nitze Paul H. "The Recovery of Ethics," in Thompson, Kenneth W., ed. *Moral Dimensions of American Foreign Policy*. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994) 51-74.

⁶⁵ Kennan is quoted in McElroy, Robert W. *Morality and American Foreign Policy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 27.

⁶⁶ Kennan, George F. "Morality and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 64, no.2 (Winter 1985/1986): 205-218. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1985.

Moral uncertainty will be shown to be a peculiar case of morality in foreign policy. Moral uncertainty cannot be clearly categorized as part of the traditions of idealism or realism because it is characterized by alternations between the two. It is especially common when the national leadership thinks it has a general consensus on the direction it is headed, but then finds out that the public is going in a different direction. The resultant policy has a moral quality that is determined mostly by the policymakers but then is impacted by developing cross currents in society. Periods of moral uncertainty are characterized by swings back and forth between policies of varied moral persuasion. For example, a period of history with no fundamental changes in the security environment could be characterized by policies that shift between moral idealism and moral skepticism. In this sense, alternating policies of moral idealism and moral skepticism would occur in the context of a period of moral uncertainty.

President Jimmy Carter is an example of the tradition of liberal internationalism that demonstrates the case of moral uncertainty.⁶⁷ President Carter represented the rapid return swing of the pendulum of morality in foreign policy during a period of shifting moral foreign policies and significant cross currents in public opinion about the place of morals in policy.⁶⁸ Carter became president immediately after the Nixon and Ford administrations when Henry Kissinger had senior responsibilities in the making of foreign policy. Nixon and Kissinger, in particular, were the target of much criticism for

⁶⁷ For a discussion of the Carter foreign policy see Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. *America's Foreign Policy Since World War II*. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998) 187-210.

⁶⁸ Ernest Lefever similarly refers to the late 1960s as a period of "moral confusion," in the essay "Morality Versus Moralism in Foreign Policy," and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. elaborates, "The Vietnam war was first widely justified on moral grounds and is now widely condemned on moral grounds" in the essay "National Interests and Moral Absolutes." Both essays are found in Lefever, Ernest W. ed. *Ethics and World Politics*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972.

their moral skepticism and resultant amoral foreign policy. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, however, had been much more aggressive in their application of morals to foreign policy. Carter reasserted a prominent place for morals in foreign policy through his advancement of human rights. This quick return swing demonstrates the moral uncertainty of this period. This moral uncertainty is especially evident in public opinion at this time through an address that Carter made to the nation about “energy security.” Carter’s failed attempts to lead and formulate a successful energy policy caused him to conclude that there was a “crisis of confidence” existing in the nation that is evidence of moral uncertainty:

The threat is nearly invisible in ordinary ways. It is a crisis of confidence. It is a crisis that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will. We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our Nation.

The erosion of our confidence in the future is threatening to destroy the social and the political fabric of America....

We are at a turning point in our history. There are two paths to choose. One is a path I've warned about tonight, the path that leads to fragmentation and self- interest. Down that road lies a mistaken idea of freedom, the right to grasp for ourselves some advantage over others. That path would be one of constant conflict between narrow interests ending in chaos and immobility. It is a certain route to failure.

All the traditions of our past, all the lessons of our heritage, all the promises of our future point to another path, the path of common purpose and the restoration of American values. That path leads to true freedom for our Nation and ourselves.⁶⁹

The Carter Administration launched an attack against the amoral character of the foreign policy conducted under the leadership of President Nixon and Henry Kissinger. Carter found that a policy focused on human rights was particularly appropriate in the

Cold War period of détente that was underway.⁷⁰ It was not universal, however. Carter's chastisement of the South Korean leadership over this issue, on the one hand, was accompanied, on the other hand, by close relations with Iran in spite of similar problems. This moral uncertainty took place in the intellectual environment of national shellshock caused by the failure of the Vietnam War. The human rights policy received broad support throughout the country perhaps because of the low commitment of moral courage that was required of the nation in comparison with the Vietnam War. However, there was still a sense of withdrawal in public opinion that made this a period of moral uncertainty in U.S. history.

The foreign policies of these four presidents are good examples of the varied contribution ethics makes to policy. They also demonstrate the relevance of the U.S. tradition of ideals including freedom, democracy, and human rights. The four recurring types of morality in U.S. foreign policy--moral idealism, moral prudence, moral skepticism, and moral uncertainty--are products of a political process in which the views of the policy elites and public opinion interact to form policy. The policy elites frequently dominate the moral character of the resultant policy with the public lagging behind or influencing the policy's effectiveness once it is in place. In situations of strong public moral sentiment, the policymakers sometimes bend to the will of the people and shape the policies accordingly. In addition to the examples provided above, the four

⁶⁹ Texas A & M University. Index to Speeches by Carter. *The Crisis of Confidence*. Available [Online] <<http://www.tamu.edu/scom/pres/speeches/jccrisis.html>> [9 June 2000].

⁷⁰ U.S. Department of State International Information Programs. United States History Basic Documents and Writings. *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*. Available [Online] <<http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/51.htm>> [15 June 2000].

types of morality in policy will become apparent in the four major turning points from the 20th century in U.S.-Japan relations.

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III. IDEALS AND INTERESTS IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

A. JAPAN AND THE THREE VALUES

Freedom, democracy, and human rights are terms that are not common to most Japanese. They are values that are commonly understood differently in Japan than in America if they are understood at all.⁷¹ There are two reasons for this: the first is these concepts progressed the furthest in Western philosophical/religious thought and institutions;⁷² the second is the Japanese tradition of adapting foreign things to a new form that is distinctly Japanese.⁷³ Although there are points in Japanese history that show the beginning of a foundation for these ideals, those movements never developed indigenously to the degree that is understood in the very broadly accepted modern definition of these ideals.⁷⁴ The Allied Occupation of Japan following the Second World War forced Japan to accept these values and to institutionalize them.⁷⁵ Because these ideals do not carry the same transcendent quality that they do in the United States, it is

⁷¹ For a discussion of see Pempel , T.J. "Democracy in Japan," in Garby, Craig C. and Mary Brown Bullock, eds. *Japan: A New Kind of Superpower?* (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994) 17-34.

⁷² Sakaiya, Taichi. *What Is Japan?: Contradictions and Transformations.* (New York: Kodansha America, Inc., 1993) 63.

⁷³ Funabashi, Yoichi, "Introduction: Japan's International Agenda for the 1990s," in Funabashi, Yoichi, ed. *Japan's International Agenda.* (New York: New York University Press, 1994) 5-6.

⁷⁴ Shibusawa, Masahide., "Japan's Historical Legacies: Implications for its Relations with Asia," in Grant, Richard L., ed. *The Process of Japanese Foreign Policy.* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1997) 25-36.

⁷⁵ The three values are particularly in evidence in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty officially ending the war and occupation. See Taiwan Documents Project. Treaties. *Treaty of Peace with Japan.* Available [Online] <<http://newtaiwan.virtualave.net/sanfrancisco01.htm>> [15 June 2000].

critical to examine the appropriate values in Japan that hold approximately the same significance.⁷⁶

The concepts in Japan that best correspond to the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights are harmony, “rule by consensus” through representative government, and the combined responsibilities of duty, honor, and role.⁷⁷ These ideals resonate in Japan in a way that roughly correlates to their counterparts discussed in the context of the United States. They are ones that all Japanese are familiar with, although they may not necessarily be conscious of them.⁷⁸

The concept of *harmony* connotes a social state of agreement characterized by the lack of conflict in relationships. The importance of harmony is described in the AD 604 Seventeen Article Constitution, a document derived from imported Chinese Confucian values that serves a Magna Carta-like role in Japan:⁷⁹

Harmony is to be valued, and an avoidance of wanton opposition to be honored. All men are influenced by class-feelings, and there are few who

⁷⁶ For an overview of U.S.-Japan contrasts see Emmerson, John K. and Harrison M. Holland. *The Eagle and the Rising Sun: America and Japan in the Twentieth Century*. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1988) 19-28.

⁷⁷ Harmony is translated as *wa*. The processes that exemplify consensus in Japan include *nemawashi* and *ringisei*. Duty, honor, and role can be interpreted as the Japanese concepts of *giri/ninmu, sonkei, and yakuwari/sempai-kohai*. Responsibility is *sekinin*. For a brief discussion of Japanese social ideals see *Japan: Profile of a Nation, revised edition*. (New York: Kodansha America Inc., 1999) 505-509. For additional cultural factors in Japan see Krooth, Richard and Hiroshi Fukurai. *Common Destiny: Japan and the United States in the Global Age*. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1990) 3-10.

⁷⁸ In an interview, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kono Yohei discusses these values and their balance with interests in Japanese policy: “The concepts of freedom, democracy, and basic human rights, which have underpinned the development of Japan, are now widely prevalent throughout the world. Japan, for its part, welcomes such developments while at the same time stresses the importance of respecting diversity of values and cultures, and ensuring coexistence of such values and cultures in the international community.” See Berthier, Serge., “A (Not So) New World Order,” Interview with Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yohei Kono. *Asian Affairs*, No. 9, (Autumn 1999). Available [Online] <<http://www.asian-affairs.com/asianaffairsjp.html>> [28 May 2000].

⁷⁹ Nakamura, Hajime, “Consciousness of the Individual and the Universal Among the Japanese,” in Moore, Charles A., ed. *The Japanese Mind: Essentials of Japanese Philosophy and Culture*. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967) 145.

are intelligent. Hence there are some who disobey their lords and fathers, or who maintain feuds with the neighboring villages. *But when those above are harmonious and those below are friendly, and there is concord in the discussion of business, right views of things spontaneously gain acceptance. Then what is there which cannot be accomplished!*⁸⁰

Harmony thus achieves such a high status in Japan that it approaches becoming a person's chief aim.

The next ideal is *rule by consensus* through representative government.⁸¹ Two ideas that are central to the American understanding of democracy—the rule of law and free-and-fair elections—have only more recently emerged in Japan and thus play a less important part in their understanding of democracy. As shown with the Seventeen Article Constitution, Japan does have a basis in its early history for the rule of law, but it never developed in the all-important legalistic way that occurred in the West. Law in Japan aspired to prevent conflict through interpersonal harmony while in the West it aimed to resolve conflict. Rule by consensus is a method that has existed throughout Japanese history to one degree or another. Consensus in Japan involves the participation of groups in decisionmaking processes. Shōtoku also idealized the principle of consensus in Article Seventeen of the Seventeen Article Constitution:

Decisions on important matters should not be made by one person alone. They should be discussed with many. But small matters are of less consequence. It is unnecessary to consult a number of people. It is only in the case of the discussion of weighty affairs, when there is a suspicion that

⁸⁰ Washington State University. World Civilizations. *The Japanese Constitution*. Available [Online] <<http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/ANCJAPAN/ANCJAPAN.HTM>> [15 June 2000]. Italicics and emphasis added.

⁸¹ The terminology “rule by consensus” is used for parallel with the American case. Consensus and the importance of the group is more fully developed in Nakane, Chie. “Criteria of Group Formation,” in Lebra, Takie Sugiyama and William P. Lebra. *Japanese Culture and Behaviour: Selected Readings, Revised Edition*. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986) 171-187.

they may miscarry, that one should arrange matters in concert with others, so as to arrive at the right conclusion.⁸²

Building and maintaining consensus in groups while preserving an atmosphere of harmony is a fundamental value in Japanese society.

The final value includes the *combined responsibilities of duty, honor, and role*. Just as the protection of human rights is a means to the end of freedom in the United States, in Japan these responsibilities are seen as the primary means of accomplishing the end of harmony. The responsibility of duty is best understood as the repayment of debts to people in the different social groups with which one interacts. Some of these debts are limited and can be repaid, thus fulfilling the duty, while others are unlimited. Article Three of the Seventeen Article Constitution typifies the importance of the value of *duty*:

When you receive the Imperial commands, fail not scrupulously to obey them. The lord is Heaven, the vassal is Earth. Heaven overspreads, and Earth upbears. When this is so, the four seasons follow their due course, and the powers of Nature obtain their efficacy. If the Earth attempted to overspread, Heaven would simply fall in ruin. Therefore is it that when the lord speaks, the vassal listens; when the superior acts, the inferior yields compliance. *Consequently when you receive the Imperial commands, fail not to carry them out scrupulously.* Let there be a want of care in this matter, and ruin is the natural consequence.⁸³

The responsibility of *honor* is well encapsulated in the traditional *bushido*, or way of the warrior.⁸⁴ In a work of samurai writing the author stated, “I serve my master, not from a sense of duty, but out of a *blind love of service*; I hold my master dear simply

⁸² Washington State University. World Civilizations. *The Japanese Constitution*. Available [Online] <<http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/ANCJAPAN/ANCJAPAN.HTM>> [15 June 2000]. Italics and emphasis added.

⁸³ Washington State University. World Civilizations. *The Japanese Constitution*. Available [Online] <<http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/ANCJAPAN/ANCJAPAN.HTM>> [15 June 2000]. Italics and emphasis added.

⁸⁴ Basic principles of *bushido* can be found in the traditional *Bushido Shoshinsu*, or bushido for beginners.

because he is dear to my heart above everything else, not because he is kind to me or provides for my living.”⁸⁵

The last responsibility is that of *role*.⁸⁶ Individuals and groups must recognize their hierarchical place with respect to others.

Let every man have his own charge, and let not the spheres of duty be confused. When wise men are entrusted with office, the sound of praise arises. If unprincipled men hold office, disasters and tumults are multiplied. In this world, few are born with knowledge: wisdom is the product of earnest meditation. *In all things, whether great or small, find the right man, and they will surely be well managed: on all occasions, be they urgent or the reverse, meet but with a wise man, and they will of themselves be amenable.* In this way will the State be lasting and the Temples of the Earth and of Grain will be free from danger. *Therefore did the wise sovereigns of antiquity seek the man to fill the office, and not the office for the sake of the man.*⁸⁷

The importance of this idea is demonstrated at the personal level by the ubiquitous trading of business cards throughout Japan. This happens promptly, once people make contact, as a means to determine the other person's place in relation to others. Once someone recognizes their role, it provides them with a context and a plan on how to interact with other group members.

In sum, for citizens of Japan the three ideals of freedom, democracy, and human rights are most closely embodied in the forms of harmony, rule by consensus through representative government, and the combined responsibilities of duty, honor, and role. Japan's external foreign policy at the national level shows similar characteristics to these

⁸⁵ Furukawa, Tesshi, “The Individual in Japanese Ethics,” in Moore, Charles A., ed. *The Japanese Mind: Essentials of Japanese Philosophy and Culture*. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967) 232.

⁸⁶ A *role*-oriented study is provided by Finn, Richard B., “Japan's Search for a Global Role: Politics and Security,” in Hunsberger, Warren S., ed. *Japan's Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect*. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997) 113-130.

internal societal norms. The application of these ideals to foreign policy is highly contested in Japan but in a way that is different from the United States. Japanese ideals are applied to foreign policy in a more dialectical fashion that avoids the confrontational zero-sum characteristics of decisionmaking in the United States. Japan does not have the long history of dealing with issues of ethics and foreign policy that is found in the West. This is primarily due to Japan's character as an island-nation with relatively little contact with the outside world for most of its history.

B. IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE TRADITION

The role of ethics within foreign policy in Japan is an issue that never manifested itself in the sense of the discussion in the United States. Like American policymakers, many Japanese policymakers are not familiar with the philosophical traditions behind many of their debates, but their assumptions derive from the tradition of many esteemed thinkers in Japanese and Asian history. The philosophical tradition in Japan that policymakers draw on implicitly in debating foreign policy has to do with national identity and purpose.⁸⁸ In particular, the traditional debate in Japan has centered on a national “self-concept” of Japan as open and adaptive versus Japan as closed and inflexible.⁸⁹ This dialectic has immense significance in Japan because it has provided its participants with a way in which to see the world and act in it. It has set an agenda upon

⁸⁷ Washington State University. World Civilizations. *The Japanese Constitution*. Available [Online] <<http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/ANCJAPAN/ANCJAPAN.HTM>> [15 June 2000]. Italic and emphasis added.

⁸⁸ Soeya, Yoshihide, “Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives,” in Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) 228-229.

⁸⁹ Sakaiya Taichi discusses this issue in terms of “selective adoption from foreign countries.” See Sakaiya, Taichi. *What Is Japan?: Contradictions and Transformations*. (New York: Kodansha America, Inc., 1993) 206-208.

which academics must frame their arguments and officials must base their policies. The following section shows the development of this debate over identity in foreign policy using the U.S. categories and adapting them for use in the Japanese context. This will lead into a framework from which to understand the relative contributions of ideals and interests in foreign policy

The variation between the U.S. and Japanese debates is explained by the difference in the foundational worldviews between the two countries. This difference must be understood in order to properly frame foreign policy issues in both countries. The United States was founded on religious and philosophical ideals in the modern Western tradition and therefore, the highest commitment in society is to principles. As a result the United States frequently weighs foreign policy actions morally and debates whether they are just or unjust. Ambassador Okazaki Hisahiko captures the difference between the United States and Japan: “Your country was built on principles. Japan was built on an archipelago.”⁹⁰ Japan uses an adapted Asian tradition where ideals come more from social tradition and continual group interaction and therefore, the highest commitment in society is *to* society.⁹¹ As a result, Japan applies its own ideals to foreign policy and more commonly debates foreign policy as an accurate representation of the country’s national identity and its role in the world. Although historians and political scientists debate the “uniqueness” of Japan, Huntington cannot be far off when he

⁹⁰ Buckley, Roger. *Japan Today*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) vi.

⁹¹ Christopher, Robert C. *The Japanese Mind*. (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1984) 55.

declares, “Japan is a civilization that is a state.”⁹² These comments go a long way in explaining the peculiarities of Japan.

The modern debate owes a great debt to an intellectual legacy left by a number of scholars throughout history.⁹³ Their thoughts and theories provide important milestones that are still referenced when discussing identity and foreign policy. They will be briefly summarized here to provide background for those who may be unfamiliar with the roots of Japanese policy. The first tradition was based on ideas from early and pre-historical Japan. From this legacy came two loosely defined intellectual schools of progressivism and traditionalism. Progressivism in Japan corresponds to idealism in the United States, and traditionalism in Japan corresponds to realism in the United States. In Japanese foreign policy of the 20th century, four approaches to incorporating ideals in policy were discernable. They approximate the four discrete approaches described for U.S. foreign policy in the 20th century: moral idealism, moral prudence, moral skepticism, and moral uncertainty. The U.S. terminology and classifications will be used while keeping in mind the different moral underpinning of Japan. This survey will create a linkage from the Japanese worldview to the practice of Japanese foreign policy.

1. The Indigenous Tradition: Roots of Progressivism and Traditionalism

The primary cause of the debate on national identity is this overriding commitment to society. The relatively high degree of homogeneity in Japanese society results in a high degree of uniformity in thought and conformity in action. These factors

⁹² Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1996). 44.

⁹³ Sajima, Naoko, “Japan: Strategic Culture at a Crossroads,” in Booth, Ken and Russell Trood, eds. *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1999) 69-73.

create a widely shared set of values, feelings, and meaning that together compose an “integrated ideal” for Japan. This integrated ideal is so pervasive and institutionalized into the Japanese mind that for most people these concepts are subconscious, understood, and unquestioned. Many Japanese have a difficult time articulating social ideals in Japan until they have had a significant opportunity to look at Japan from the outside. Ironically it is this same rigid social commitment to the group that also makes Japanese society extremely flexible. When Japanese society shifts course there is no anchor of absolute principle holding it back because the society itself is the absolute.⁹⁴

In a classic of cultural anthropology, Ruth Benedict’s 1946 work, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* captures the essence of the difficulty Westerners have in understanding Japan in her introduction. While Benedict’s work has been significantly debated, her observation is worth quoting at length:

During the past seventy-five years since Japan’s closed doors were opened, the Japanese have been described in the most fantastic series of “but also’s” ever used for any nation of the world. When a serious observer is writing about peoples other than the Japanese and says they are unprecedently polite, he is not likely to add, “But also insolent and overbearing.” When he says people of some nation are incomparably rigid in their behavior, he does not add, “But also they adapt themselves readily to extreme innovations.” When he says a people are submissive, he does not explain too that they are not easily amenable to control from above. When he says they are loyal and generous, he does not declare, “But also treacherous and spiteful.” When he says they are genuinely brave, he does not expatiate on their timidity. When he says they act out of concern for others’ opinions, he does not then go on to tell that they have a truly terrifying conscience. When he describes robot-like discipline in their Army, he does not continue by describing the way the soldiers in that Army take the bit in their own teeth even to the point of insubordination. When he describes a people who devote themselves with passion to Western learning, he does not also enlarge on their fervid conservatism. When he writes a book on a nation with a popular cult of aestheticism

⁹⁴ According to Sakaiya Taichi, “right and wrong are relative values.” See Sakaiya, Taichi. *What Is Japan?: Contradictions and Transformations*. (New York: Kodansha America, Inc., 1993) 117-118.

which gives high honor to actors and to artists and lavishes art upon the cultivation of chrysanthemums, that book does not ordinarily have to be supplemented by another which is devoted to the cult of the sword and the top prestige of the warrior.

All these contradictions, however, are the warp and woof of books on Japan. They are true. Both the sword and the chrysanthemum are a part of the picture. The Japanese are to the highest degree, both aggressive and unaggressive, both militaristic and aesthetic, both insolent and polite, rigid and adaptable, submissive and resentful of being pushed around, loyal and treacherous, brave and timid, conservative and hospitable to new ways. They are terribly concerned about what other people will think of their behavior, and they are also overcome by guilt when other people know nothing of their misstep. Their soldiers are disciplined to the hilt but are also insubordinate. When it became so important for America to understand Japan, these contradictions and many others equally blatant could not be waved aside.⁹⁵

Another important difference between the United States and Japan takes the discussed commitment to society a step further and yields the progressive-traditional contrast that is critical for application in this study. The United States' foundation on principles results in a primarily utopian society where the ideal is located in the future. Japan's foundation on relationships results in a primarily traditional society where the ideal is located in the past. Nowhere is the difference illustrated better than in the preambles to the 1789 U.S. and 1889 Meiji Constitutions. The U.S. preamble reads, "*We the people, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.*" The Japanese preamble reads,

Having, by virtue of the glories of Our Ancestors, ascended the Throne of a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal; desiring to promote the welfare of, and to give development to the moral and intellectual faculties

⁹⁵ Benedict, Ruth. *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture.* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989) 1-3.

of Our beloved subjects, the very same that have been favoured with the benevolent care and affectionate vigilance of Our Ancestors; and hoping to maintain the prosperity of the State, in concert with Our people and with their support, We hereby promulgate, in pursuance of Our Imperial Rescript of the 12th day of the 10th month of the 14th year of Meiji, a fundamental law of State, to exhibit the principles, by which We are to be guided in Our conduct, and to point out to what Our descendants and Our subjects and their descendants are forever to conform.

The rights of sovereignty of the State, We have inherited from Our Ancestors, and We shall bequeath them to Our descendants. Neither We nor they shall in future fail to wield them, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution hereby granted...

*Our Ministers of State, on Our behalf, shall be held responsible for the carrying out of the present Constitution, and Our present and future subjects shall forever assume the duty of allegiance to the present Constitution.*⁹⁶

The utopian and traditional contrast is compounded by the fact that Japan also has a very high sense of exceptionalism.⁹⁷ Anthropologists commonly attribute strong exceptionalism to cultures that are “island nations.” In Japan the drive to be a “divine nation centered on the Emperor” is a pertinent example of this characteristic. Although Prime Minister Mori’s remarks shortly after his relief of Prime Minister Obuchi have been variously interpreted, they still indicate the degree to which these ideas are closely held.⁹⁸ This sense in Japan can be traced as far back as the nation’s earliest cultural

⁹⁶ Harvard University. Johnathan Dresner Homepage. *The Meiji Constitution*. Available [Online] <<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~jdresner/meiji.txt>> [15 June 2000]. Italics added.

⁹⁷ Tamamoto, Masaru., “Japan’s Search for Recognition and Status,” in Hunsberger, Warren S., ed. *Japan’s Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect*. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997) 3-14.

⁹⁸ Frank Ching expresses concern that “It would be funny if it weren’t so serious. Yet another conservative Japanese leader has appeared on the scene who seemingly questions the historical record of Japan’s behaviour” in Ching, Frank. “Japan Still Avoids Its Past.” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (22 June 2000): 23. Available [Online] <http://www.feer.com/0006_22/p36.html> [24 June 2000]. For a Japanese view see Iitake, Koichi. “The story behind Mori’s ‘divinity’ remark Shinto as Japan’s soul.” *Asahi Evening News* (2 June 2000). Available [Online] <<http://www.asahi.com/english/asahi/0602/asahi060201.html>> [6

documents, the AD 712 *Kojiki* (Records of Ancient Matters) and the AD 720 *Nihongi* (Chronicles of Japan).⁹⁹ These documents described a variety of subjects including Japanese mythology, history, government, and traditions. They particularly attempted to establish Japan as a unique entity that was distinct from the more cosmopolitan China. Similarly, they were used in tandem with the Taika Reforms beginning in AD 646 that were designed to consolidate centralized power behind the growing influence of the *tenno* (emperor). A consciousness of superiority is evident in Japan from these examples. This exceptionalism amplified the tension between traditionalism and progressivism that grew in direct proportion to the amount of contact Japan had with the outside world. This tension mirrors the development of realism and idealism in the United States.

The earliest well-documented thinking about ethics in policy in Japan took place during the Yamato state period from the 4th to the 8th century. This period set the stage for a common theme in Japanese history: the adaptation process of foreign things to Japanese purposes. The oldest major examples are the institutions of Confucianism and Buddhism, which were adopted from China and Korea during those countries' interaction with Yamato Japan. These systems received official sanction under one of Japan's early "Founding Fathers," Shōtoku Taishi (574-622). Prince Shōtoku served in the Yamato court and authored the Seventeen Article Constitution.¹⁰⁰ The Constitution

June 2000]. For an American perspective see Barr, Cameron W. "Japan's foot-in-mouth Mori stays course." *Christian Science Monitor* (6 June 2000). Available [Online] <<http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2000/06/06/p6s2.htm>> [6 June 2000].

⁹⁹ The Internet Sacred Texts Archive. *The Kojiki* and *The Nihongi*. Available [Online] <<http://www.sacred-texts.com/shi/index.htm>> [15 June 2000].

¹⁰⁰ Shōtoku's fusion of Shintoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism was a model of adaptation that would be repeated often in Japanese history. After some following adjustments, the synthesis he achieved later became known as the *ritsuryō* system. Sakaiya, Taichi. *What Is Japan?: Contradictions and Transformations*. (New York: Kodansha America, Inc., 1993) 112.

predominantly elevated Confucian virtues except for the 2nd Article, which appealed to the listener to follow the ways of Buddhism. The Prince is one of the most revered early historical leaders of Japan because of the advances he led in government, culture, and technology at a time when Japan consciously emulated Chinese culture and values. On government his views are comparable to those of Aristotle, in that he saw *moral* politics as ideal rather than *power* politics.¹⁰¹ The Yamato period subsided and was followed by Nara and Heian Japan from 710 to 1192, which are together sometimes referred to as “classical Japan.” A flowering of culture took place during the period that resembles the events of the Western Renaissance. New strands of ideas and institutions developed in different directions. The viewpoints of traditionalism and progressivism arrived as a recurring theme at this time in Japanese history.

The Japanese attempt to synthesize the traditionalism-progressivism dialectic and exceptionalism modality is the immediate factor that contributes to the debate over national identity in Japan.¹⁰² Traditionalism dictates that Japan be a strongly conservative society that is closely attached to the past. Progressivism dictates that Japan be a highly advanced society that is keeping up with the times and moving into the future.

¹⁰¹ Kōsaka, Masaaki, “The Status and the Rold of the Individual in Japanese Society,” in Moore, Charles A., ed. *The Japanese Mind: Essentials of Japanese Philosophy and Culture*. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967) 246.

¹⁰² For a discussion of Japanese intellectual history and the themes of tradition and progress see Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi, ed. *Modern Japanese Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 1. The Japanese concept of *henka*, or change, represents a different understanding of change in Japan: steady, incremental change of tradition is followed by major, sweeping change that transforms what was formerly progressive to a new place in tradition through the adaptation of foreign concepts.

Exceptionalism dictates that Japan demonstrate its achievement and uniqueness in the world, thus, forcing it to choose between traditionalism and progressivism.¹⁰³

2. The Traditionalist Tradition

Traditionalism in Japan is associated with almost anything that is considered indigenous.¹⁰⁴ The *Shinto* (the way of *kami*) belief system is an exemplary case of this.¹⁰⁵ The beliefs that are most commonly cited are the emperor's divine character, his unbroken chain of rule since creation, and his descent from the sun-goddess,¹⁰⁶ Amaterasu. The belief system's main contribution to the nation is a metaphysical groundwork upon which other knowledge builds and actions result.¹⁰⁷ It provides particular emphasis in the area of origin and meaning through the collection of creation myths in the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*. This orthodoxy in Japan has ebbed and flowed over time but it has been strongest throughout history when the country was inward looking. The belief system has generally fallen out of favor since Emperor Hirohito was directed to renounce his divinity following the Second World War.

Traditionalism in Japan is also commonly associated with an assertive, strong central government figure. The transition in the late Yamato period is illustrative. Prince

¹⁰³ Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro made a statement in 1997 that portrays the dialectic of ideals between traditionalism and progressivism in Japan: "What do I think the ideal image of Japan should be? Ours is a nation that prizes the best of its traditions and history, that treasures peace and liberal democracy, small government and international contributions." Buckley, Roger. *Japan Today*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) vi.

¹⁰⁴ For an overview of the traditional/progressive correlation to a regional/global foreign policy in Japan see Mendl, Wolf. *Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interests*. (London: Routledge, 1995) 1-13.

¹⁰⁵ Kami means "mystical," or "divine;" the generally sacred or spiritual powers and especially the various native and local gods or deities.

¹⁰⁶ For a thorough overview of the development of religion in Japan see Kitagawa, Joseph M. *Religion in Japanese History*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

Shōtoku died in 622 before his progressive ideals of Confucian government became fully adapted. His son and family were killed in 643 by the powerful Soga clan who soon discovered that the nation was threatened by conflict in China and Korea. In 645 the Soga clan was overthrown by Prince Nakano Oe who restored the traditionalism of the imperial family and established a centralized government with the strengthened *tenno* at its head. The two forces of pressure to reform from within and security threat from without created this conservative revolution “from above” that foreshadowed other major historical turnings in Japan.¹⁰⁸

3. The Progressivist Tradition

Progressivism in Japan is associated with almost anything that is considered foreign. Outside ideas and institutions often make Japan uncomfortable until it has the opportunity to adapt whatever it is to a distinctly Japanese character. Once this process is completed and sufficient time has past, the formerly foreign concept is considered Japanese. This contextualization took place in the development of Buddhism in Japan. Several of the concepts that are most commonly cited include “the three treasures” which are esteemed by Prince Shōtoku in the Seventeen Article Constitution: the Buddha, the law of *Dharma* (the fundamental doctrine of Buddhism), and the *Sangha* (the community of believers).¹⁰⁹ Buddhism’s main contribution to the nation is provision of a theological framework with meaning, morality, and destiny, which supplemented Confucian secular

¹⁰⁷ Carmody, Denise L. and John T. Carmody. *Eastern Ways to the Center: An Introduction to the Religions of Asia*. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1992) 146-171.

¹⁰⁸ Duus, Peter. *Modern Japan*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998) 85-102.

¹⁰⁹ New schools of Buddhism multiplied in Japan as time passed but the “three treasures” remain as generally accepted common core beliefs. The schools’ growth and diversification is somewhat analogous to the development of Orders within Catholicism or denominations within Protestantism.

ethics. This worldview is secondary to Shintoism in Japan, but it has ebbed and flowed over time and been the strongest throughout history when the country was outwardly aware. Buddhism was fully adapted to the Japanese context during the Nara period; afterward, it achieved an indigenous character that ensured its protection for most of Japanese history. The belief system has somewhat increased in popularity since the time it was outlawed before and during the Second World War.

An example of progressivism is found in Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582) during the Azuchi-Momoyama, or Warring States period. Japan at that time was a collection of autonomous fiefdoms. He was the first leader to attempt unification of Japan during the country's early medieval period. The most significant step he took was the destruction of the main Buddhist monastery near Kyoto. Buddhism had grown to where it became a force for conservatism through its influential policymaking role. Oda was also notable for his accommodation of Westerners. Merchants and missionaries began to visit Japan during the period, and Oda welcomed the Christians and was interested in their teaching. He also traded significantly with the new visitors, particularly for weapons. Oda was assassinated by several of his followers before he was able to unify the country. He was a victim of the traditional resistance to change in Japan and became a model for many political assassinations that followed.

C. IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY: APPLICATIONS IN JAPANESE HISTORY

For most of its history, Japan controlled the rate of change in its society. European merchants and missionaries raised Japan's awareness to the potential conflict between traditionalism and progressivism, but it was Commodore Matthew Perry's

“opening of Japan” that turned this dilemma into a crisis. Japan continues to face this dilemma and has dealt with it in an identifiable pattern of national identity as traditionalism or as progressivism. Although they are used in Japan, the terms “conservative” and “liberal” do not do justice to these concepts because of the words’ different connotations in Japan. For purpose of comparison, progressivism and traditionalism will be seen as parallel with idealism and realism in the United States.

The traditional approaches of identity and policy became relevant for Japan in the area of foreign policy during the Russo-Japanese War. Similar to the Spanish-American War for the United States, the Russo-Japanese War marked the arrival of Japan as a “great power.”¹¹⁰ Except for the crisis response required after Commodore Perry’s arrival, foreign policy was a relatively unimportant issue for Japan before this time. Japan’s awareness of the world had increased rapidly since the 1868 Meiji Restoration. The Japanese military passed its first test in the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, but the country sought an increase of its rightful role in the region. Ideals and interests came together in the policy that led to war with Russia. Japan had a geopolitical interest of securing its flanks against imperialist encroachment and an economic interest in locating more resources to fuel its growth. Japan’s ideals at the time were characterized by the common slogan, “rich nation, strong army.” The strong sense of Japan assuming its proper role is evident here. Imperial Japan had achieved great success by modernizing the country in almost a single generation. After Japan’s success against Russia, it experienced a period of strong growth that was followed by tough choices between traditionalism and progressivism in foreign policy.

The three ideals of harmony, rule by consensus, and the responsibilities of duty, honor, and role play an important part in shaping Japanese foreign policy that has significant precedent in Japanese history. For example, in a preface to the 1999 Government of Japan *Diplomatic Blue Book*, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Koumura Masahiko communicates the sense in which the responsibility of role is a factor in Japanese foreign policy:

In the ever-changing international community, diplomatic efforts by Japan to realize its national interests are becoming more and more complex and wide-ranging. As such, *Japan must indicate anew its determination and capability to fulfill a role befitting a country which bears a responsible position in the international community*, in order to ensure the stability and prosperity of the world as a whole, which is indivisible from its own security and prosperity.¹¹¹

The political process that is used to define the national interest and then develop policy involves a complex interaction between the public and government. There are many general similarities between the process in the United States and Japan, but differences arise in the details. In particular, the actors are very similar, but the role they play is somewhat different.¹¹² The major differences include the distribution of power, the mechanics of the policymaking process, and the structure used to make policy. Even though the Prime Minister and his cabinet hold the primary duty of making foreign

¹¹⁰ Beasley, W. G. *The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic and Social Change Since 1850*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) 146-158.

¹¹¹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1999 *Diplomatic Blue Book*. Available [Online] <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1999/index.html>> [16 June 2000].

¹¹² Shinoda, Tomohito, "Japan's Political Changes and Their Impact on U.S.-Japan Relations," in Hosoya, Chihiro and Tomohito Shinoda, eds. *Redefining the Partnership: The United States and Japan in East Asia*. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1998) 43-58. Additional analyses of internal Japanese dynamics are available in Berger, Thomas U., "Alliance Politics and Japan's Postwar Culture of Antimilitarism," and Howell, W. Lee., "The Alliance and Post-Cold War Political Realignment in Japan," in Green, Michael J. and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999.

policy, the Diet maintains important appropriation and oversight responsibilities.¹¹³ Additionally, the Prime Minister and cabinets change more often than the Executive Branch does in the United States; foreign policies in Japan's parliamentary system generally have not shifted as significantly upon a change in government as in the United States' fixed term system. Additionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its bureaucracy hold significant influence over the direction of foreign policy.¹¹⁴ Public opinion also plays an important, but supporting, role in the formulation of foreign policy.¹¹⁵ Like the United States, public opinion has a tendency to drive swings between periods of activism and passivism regarding foreign policy; these swings correspond to the trends of progressivism and traditionalism in Japan.¹¹⁶ While the Prime Minister has the leading role in foreign policy, the public shapes the way in which international issues are interpreted and policies are carried out. The interaction between external world events and internal domestic processes determines which aspect of the national interest will be emphasized at a given time. New directions in foreign policy in Japan have most often taken place as a consequence of events in the outside world; events within Japan would then determine the nature of the response. Wolf Mendl provides an apt description of Japanese foreign policy:

¹¹³ Baerwald, Hans H., "The Diet and Foreign Policy," in Scalapino, Robert A., ed. *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) 37-54.

¹¹⁴ Fukui, Haruhiro, "Policy-Making in the Japanese Foreign Ministry," in Scalapino, Robert A., ed. *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) 3-35. A good institutional explanation is also provided by Calder, Kent E., "The Institutions of Japanese Foreign Policy," in Grant, Richard L., ed. *The Process of Japanese Foreign Policy*. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1997) 1-24.

¹¹⁵ Watanabe, Akio, "Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs: 1964-1973," in Scalapino, Robert A., ed. *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) 105-146.

The concept of the direction of foreign policy should not be taken to mean tactical manoeuvres in pursuit of some carefully defined and overriding objective, such as leadership of an East Asian bloc, domination of the global economy, the creation of a particular world order or some other grand design. Instead, the idea of steering the ship of state through the uncharted seas of international relations is a more accurate reflection of Japanese thinking about the conduct of foreign policy. Another metaphor would be the progress of a portable shrine (mikoshi) during a festival. Policy, like the carriers of the mikoshi, moves forward and backward. It lurches from side to side and occasionally lands in a ditch, but its general direction is not in doubt. From this one may infer that while Japan is aware of its potential as a major actor in world affairs, its policies remain uninformed by a very clear concept of the kind of region or world order which it wants to shape.¹¹⁷

Foreign policies in Japanese history are not commonly attached to an individual's name, but are labeled using different special terms and phrases to describe the policy such as in the case of comprehensive security. The periods that established a place for morality in foreign policy adopted the three ideals under study. In the process they have carried on the legacy of progressivism and traditionalism by addressing the four basic interests of defense of homeland, economic well-being, favorable world order, and promotion of values; each period achieving a different balance between the interests. The subcategories of moral idealism, moral prudence, moral skepticism, and moral uncertainty will be employed as well using the Japanese context of morals described in this chapter. The explanation of Japan's different moral context allows these distinctions to be made. Usage of these four terms will then lend to a comparison and contrast of characteristics of U.S. and Japanese foreign policy during the four major turning points.

¹¹⁶ Sakaiya Taichi describes these swings as the "struggle between modern civilization and Japanese tradition." See Sakaiya, Taichi. *What Is Japan?: Contradictions and Transformations*. (New York: Kodansha America, Inc., 1993) 133.

¹¹⁷ Mendl, Wolf. *Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interests*. (London: Routledge, 1995) 159-160. Italic added.

1. The Progressivist Perspective Applied

Perry's visits to Japan were the stimulus for the first crisis in modern Japan where the forces of conservatism and progressivism came into conflict. The Tokugawa shogunate had ruled Japan during the Edo period through a decentralized, military-led feudalism since the early 1600s. The patterns of the Edo period became strongly entrenched because of the peace and prosperity they promoted. When the outside "barbarian" threat of Commodore Perry risked this old order, a progressive response developed to answer this threat. The refrain to "honor the emperor" and "expel the barbarian" was the slogan to rally the opposition against the shogunate. Their appeal was essentially a call to restore harmony in Japan.

The use of moral idealism to justify proposed courses of action was characteristic during the period. Traditional shogunate leaders also sought to "smash the barbarians whenever they come in sight," but were unwilling to make the political concessions toward the imperial rule that was impending.¹¹⁸ Political domains, such as Choshu, that were distant from Edo provided most of the resistance to the shogun. These groups proposed a "union of court and shogunate." Traditionalists attempted to placate the rising movement with phrases like, "eastern ethics, western science," but were unable to stop what was set in motion.¹¹⁹ The strengthening progressive forces in Japan were ultimately victorious through the Meiji Restoration in 1868.

¹¹⁸ Fairbank, John K., Reischauer, Edwin O., and Albert M. Craig. *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, Revised Edition.* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989) 486.

¹¹⁹ Storry, Richard. *A History of Modern Japan.* (New York: Penguin Books, 1983) 94-120.

The charged atmosphere of moral idealism during the Meiji Restoration subsided with a brief resurgence during the 1877 Satsuma Rebellion led by Saigo Takamori.¹²⁰ The next several decades were characterized by modernization and consolidation of the new order under Imperial Japan. Upon the turn of the century, Japan found itself increasingly surrounded by imperialist powers. The 1900 Boxer Rebellion in China allowed Russia to advance into Manchuria; Germany and Great Britain increased its influence in mainland China; and the United States was busy in the Philippines and on the periphery of China. Under the more moderate influence of moral prudence through such progressive slogans as “rich nation, strong army” and “increase in production and promotion in industry,” Japan again aimed to assert itself for an increased role as an important power.

A progressive first step was taken in 1902 when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was established. British support allowed Japan to be more confident and assertive of the role it sought, particularly with respect to Russia. In 1904, Japan attacked Russian forces in Manchuria. When the Russian fleet arrived in the area, Admiral Togo Heihachiro led a famous naval engagement defeating the Russians in the Tsushima Strait. Japan was successful against the Russian army ashore in Manchuria as well. The United States agreed to mediate a peace settlement under President Theodore Roosevelt’s leadership. The result was the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth.¹²¹ The prevailing attitude of moral prudence and the heavy losses suffered in the conflict caused the population to be upset at

¹²⁰ Borthwick, Mark. *Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998) 127-139.

¹²¹ Brigham Young University. World War I Document Archive. *The Treaty of Portsmouth*. Available [Online] <<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914m/portsmouth.html>> [11 June 2000].

the lack of concessions received in the treaty. A new harmony had been achieved, but it was one that would not be sufficient for Japan. The progressive leadership that brought Japan into the war was particularly incensed at the lack of indemnity Japan was awarded.

2. The Traditionalist Perspective Applied

A progressive concept of Japan bloomed under the open “Taisho Democracy” of the 1910-1920s. The concept of *kokutai* (national polity) was forwarded by scholars to explain the nature of Japan in terms of the emperor, Confucian values, and Japanese virtues. The early progressive definition of the term even created tension with the Meiji Constitution by placing the emperor as a subordinate to the state. A traditional conceptualization developed in the 1920s in response. The intellectual cross currents evident demonstrate moral uncertainty over the identity of Japan at this time. The strong moral idealism of militarism in the 1930s had its roots in this period of moral uncertainty during the Taisho Democracy.

Rapid swings between traditionalism and progressivism occurred during this era. Traditionalism dominated Japanese foreign policy before and during the First World War. Japan had risen to the level of the most powerful imperialist state involved in Asia.¹²² Japan again attempted to assert itself to consolidate its role on the mainland when China sought the return of the former German sphere in the Shantung province. Japan aggressively responded with the 1915 “Twenty-One Demands” that asked for anything from renewed influence in Manchuria to virtual annexation of all of China. China was forced to submit to a majority of the demands. The traditionalists became more assertive during World War I by declaring war against Germany and directly seizing German

territories on the mainland and increasing its grip on Manchuria. That this period was immediately followed by the progressive “Shidehara diplomacy,” despite any major change in the security environment, demonstrates the moral uncertainty of Japan during the 1920s.

When the Meiji oligarchs and politicians were unable to sustain the success of the Taisho Democracy into the 1930s, a drive for traditional reform came from the military. The involvement of the military in politics marked the lines of the impending conflict between traditionalism and progressivism. Arguments to preserve the national polity with a different meaning became common as the military increased in influence. Scholars argued over the meaning of the national polity, and the traditional view prevailed before the Second World War. This view held that Japan was a “family state” where all were descended from a common imperial ancestor. This secular ideology was merged with religious myth to form State Shinto, the official belief system of prewar Japan. This traditionalist movement attempted to preempt progressive development through militarism and driving the country into war. This was accomplished through the formation of a new harmony to replace the European spheres of influence, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS).

GEACPS was clearly an assertion of the ideal of the responsibility of role, where Japan saw its place in the hierarchy as being on top of the regional order. The subsequent Japanese defeat and American occupation saw the development of what has come to be known as the Yoshida Doctrine, named after the popular Prime Minister Yoshida

¹²² Murphey, Rhoads. *East Asia: A New History*. (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1996) 287-305.

Shigeru.¹²³ The foreign policy of the postwar period was characterized by moral skepticism and the absence of assertive ideology from the prewar era. Because of the lost war, Japan now saw itself at the bottom of the international hierarchy, with its work for recovery set before it. The Yoshida Doctrine thus placed Japan in a position of complete dependency on the United States for military defense. National energy was focused on the country's economic interest. Yoshida's foreign policy was morally skeptical in that Japan was completely dependent on the United States for its defense. This allowed Japan to focus on national recovery through economic growth. Although his policies were contested early on in his service as Prime Minister, consensus formed and the policy of moral skepticism took root.

Japanese history suggests that it is not as prone as the United States to using morality in the Western sense as a justification or a guide for its foreign policy. Japan's use of morals in foreign policy takes place in a distinctly Japanese context of morals that include harmony, consensus, and the responsibilities of duty, honor, and role. Claude Buss had these insightful words to say about these apparently enigmatic characteristics of Japan:

They have lived with the kind of society and government they desired, at times near anarchy and at times with the near police state of the Tokugawa era. Sometimes they have been content with the isolation of their own island empire; and at other times they have indulged in orgies of copying and adaptation. They have selected as they chose from the Confucianism and the Buddhism of the Asian continent, and later from the ways of the West. Their number-one interest has been to preserve their "divine land" and way of life. International relations were useful only as they contributed to the security and welfare of the nation and its people.¹²⁴

¹²³ Pyle, Kenneth B. *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*. (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1996) 23.

¹²⁴ Claude A. Buss, *Pacific Security*. ed. Jane Miller Chai, November 1998. Draft pending publication.

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IV. THE NATIONAL INTEREST: FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The term “national interest” has become so commonplace in the discussions of both academics and politicians that it has become devalued. Since the Second World War the national interest was variously defined by a multitude of scholars seeking to advance their interpretation while at the same time it was used by a host of politicians to justify foreign policies of their choosing. The national interest also was explained by numerous observers to include varying degrees of moral content. Both extremes were vigorously argued. At one extreme, to assert that the national interest has no ethical component is self-defeating. This is because the party making that assertion is, in the process, making the implicit assumption that within their ethical system it is *right* for the national interest to have no moral content and *wrong* for it to be otherwise. For this reason the national interest will hold the moral content of whomever has the responsibility for defining the national interest. At the other extreme, a national interest driven by a single moral concern with no room for any self-interest will be self-defeating as well. This type of principled policy carried to its logical extreme conclusion becomes a moral crusade that will at some point threaten the other very basic security duties of the government. To avoid the circular tendencies of these two pitfalls, this thesis seeks an appropriate way to understand and interpret the relative contributions of morals, or ideals, to the national interest.

The formulation of the national interest is a very different process in the United States and Japan. In the United States, the role is preponderantly fulfilled by the Executive and Legislative branches of government. In Japan’s case, the very concept of

nation has a different meaning. Whereas in the United States the concept of nation is associated with a multiethnic “tossed salad” that can be prepared in many ways, in Japan the concept of nation has more the form of a monoethnic “miso soup” that is more or less the same, regardless of who makes it. Like the United States, Japan’s national interest is primarily defined by the government. Despite conspiratorial charges of “Japan, Inc.” and “iron triangle,” Japan has a policymaking process that does involve many groups while maintaining a heavy reliance on the bureaucracy.

A. NATIONAL INTEREST DEFINED

It is necessary to establish a definition of the national interest in order to have a common point of reference in this study. This definition will become the foundation for a systematic evaluation of the comparative contribution made by ideals to a given foreign policy. The definition and interpretation will be balanced enough in scope that it avoids the policy extremes of moralism and cynicism. Political scientist Donald Nuechterlein offers such a concept in his 1979 article “The Concept of ‘National Interest’: A Time for New Approaches.” In the article, he introduces national interest as “...the perceived needs and desires of a sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states which constitute its external environment.”¹²⁵ He also supplies an accompanying model to understand national interest and complements it with a matrix found in Table 1. He states, “The matrix comprises four basic national interests that are applicable to all

¹²⁵ Nuechterlein, Donald E. “The Concept of ‘National Interest’: A Time for New Approaches.” *Orbis* (Spring 1979): 75.

sovereign states and four levels of intensity (i.e., the stakes) that all states believe to be involved in specific international issues.”¹²⁶ The four basic national interests are:

1. Defense of homeland
2. Economic Well-Being
3. Favorable World-Order
4. Promotion of Values.

The four levels of intensity are:

1. Survival
2. Vital
3. Major
4. Peripheral

<i>Basic Interest at Stake</i>	<i>Intensity of Interest</i>			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland
Economic well-being
Favorable world order
Promotion of values

Table 1. National Interest Matrix.

Nuechterlein elaborates on the national interest by making several important assertions that distinguish his approach from that of Morgenthau discussed earlier. First, he addresses the national interest as “*perceived* needs and desires” and implies that the national interest is more than an amoral objective reality; it also carries with it the

¹²⁶ Ibid, 75.

subjective element of *perception* that takes place in the policymaking process. By discussing “needs *and* desires,” he postulates that in a sense, the national interest is a combination of national “requirements” *and* national “wants.” From this it follows that not all components of the national interest are equal. Priorities must be set because a nation cannot have everything it wants. When faced with external competing interests the nation will be required to compromise at times.

Second, the national interest is defined in terms of sovereign states with respect to other sovereign states in the external environment. Despite the present acceleration of trends in globalization and companion transnational security threats, the sovereign nation-state is still the primary actor in international relations. Herein lies the present dilemma faced by many nations; they generally employ a traditional state-centric definition of national security to problems that are less and less caused by state-centric threats.

Finally, Nuechterlein addresses the external environment so that the national interest can be separated from the public interest, which appropriately deals with the internal environment. This also implies that the national interest represents the interests of the nation as a whole, and that it is more than a simple summation of various sub-national interests.

To augment Nuechterlein’s more rational view of national interest, scholar Frank Teti’s definition is supplied: “The national interest is the protection and advancement of the country’s national identity.”¹²⁷ This definition will particularly illuminate Nuechterlein’s ideological component of the national interest, which is the emphasis of

this thesis. This analysis asserts that the national identity has an enduring core of ideals that is dynamically applied in different circumstances over time. In sum, this approach to national interest is a holistic one that allows for norms to have a place in policy while not monopolizing the policy, and it is also able to evaluate their relative involvement in policy formulation. By including the “Promotion of Values,” the model successfully navigates the twin hazards of a policy paralyzed by extreme moralism and extreme cynicism.¹²⁸

1. Components of National Interest

Defining national interest provides a philosophical groundwork from which to understand the place of ideals and interests in policy. The next essential step to make national interest a useful tool to this study is identification of the building blocks that compose the national interest. Nuechterlein refers to these “basic interests...as) those national needs that form the underpinning of national foreign policies.”¹²⁹ These basic interests compose the four rows of the matrix in Table 1. He lists the four basic interests as ones that are universally applicable to nations:

Defense interest: the protection of the nation-state and its citizens from the threat of physical violence by another country, and/or protection from an externally inspired threat to the national political system.

Economic interest: the enhancement of the nation-state’s economic well-being in relations with other states.

¹²⁷ Teti, Professor Frank. Notes from Seminar in the National Interest. Naval Postgraduate School. 2 November 1999.

¹²⁸ Lefever captures this balance in the statement, “there is no foreign policy, however, noble, which does not include ‘power politics’ or, however cynical, which does not include moral considerations.” See Lefever, Ernest W. *Ethics and United States Foreign Policy*. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986) 56.

¹²⁹ Nuechterlein, 76.

World-order interest: the maintenance of an international political and economic system in which the nation-state can feel secure and in which its citizens and commerce can operate peacefully outside their own borders.

Ideological interest: the protection and furtherance of a set of values which the citizens of a nation-state share and believe to be universally good.¹³⁰

Nuechterlein goes on to provide some guidance in the usage of these basic interests.¹³¹ First, the interests' order of appearance is not necessarily indicative of their relative priority in the greater national interest. However, the nation's ability to further the latter three interests is largely dependent on the successful accomplishment of the defense interest.

Second, none of the basic interests are mutually exclusive. A single interest cannot be independently pursued at the expense of the others. If this were done, the exclusive basic interest would at some point begin to threaten the other interests. At the other extreme, nations cannot place equal emphasis on all of the basic interests because of the limitations of the international system and resources available to effect policy goals. For these reasons, the national interest will often be formulated as a compromise with trade-offs between competing interests. He specifies, "The key point here is that sovereign states--particularly major powers--have interests that cut across all four categories listed above and compete for governmental attention and resources."¹³² The interaction between external world events and internal domestic processes will determine which basic interest will be emphasized at a given time.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid, 76-79.

¹³² Ibid, 77.

Third, each basic interest requires some special qualification. The defense interest refers specifically to homeland territorial defense. Importantly for this study, it does not include other nations where defense alliances are in place. The economic interest becomes particularly important when there is a condition of significant relative economic disparity between nations. The world order interest deals with both a wide variety of issues and institutions, but the "...prime objective of a world-order interest is to maintain a balance of power favorable to one's own feeling of security."¹³³ The ideological interest "...forms an important part of its national interest, perhaps not supported as strongly as the other three basic interests but nevertheless important in determining how the government reacts to international issues."¹³⁴

These basic interests are applicable to all nations, and they represent a methodical way to compare and contrast the ideals and interests of different nations in specific circumstances. Nuechterlein concludes that, "...the four national interests outlined here are dynamic factors conditioning the behavior of nation-states, and changes in priority among them are usually measured in years and decades, rather than in months."¹³⁵ The emphasis of this study is placed on the ideological interests' relative importance in certain policies.

2. Intensity of Interest

The next step in developing the national interest into a practical means to conduct this study is to look at the relative intensity of the various interests. This will add a

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid, 78.

quantitative side to the analysis by addressing the issue of how important each of the basic interests is. Nuechterlein defines four intensities to be used:

Survival issues: The very existence of the nation-state is in jeopardy, either as a result of overt military attack on its territory or from the imminent threat of attack should an enemy's demands be rejected. The key to whether an issue is one of survival, or a vital issue, on this scale of priorities is the degree to which there is an immediate, credible threat of massive physical harm by one state on another. By this definition, there probably are no economic, world-order or ideological interests that qualify. Only a defense interest, as defined above, would ever reach that level of intensity...

Vital issues: Serious harm will likely result to the state unless strong measures, including the use of conventional military force, are employed to counter an adverse action by another state or to deter it from undertaking a serious provocation. A vital issue may, in the long run, be as serious a threat to a country's political economic well-being as a survival issue. Time is the essential difference: a vital issue usually provides a government with sufficient time to seek help from allies, bargain with the antagonist or take aggressive countermeasures to warn the enemy that he will pay a high price if the political, economic or military pressure is not withdrawn. Unlike survival issues, a vital issue may involve not only defense interests but also economic, world order and, in some cases, ideological interests...

Major issues: The political, economic and ideological well-being of the state may be adversely affected by events and trends in the international environment which thus require corrective action in order to prevent them from becoming serious threats (vital issues). Most issues in international relations fall into this category and are usually resolved through diplomatic negotiation. It is when diplomacy fails to resolve such disputes that they can become dangerous: governments must then reconsider just how deeply their interests are affected by the event or trend in question. If, in the final analysis, a government is unwilling or unable to compromise on what it considers to be a fundamental question, it has implicitly ascertained that the issue is a vital one. On the other hand, if negotiation and compromise are deemed to be the best course of action, then the issue probably is a major one. Most economic problems between states are major, not vital, issues; the same is true of ideological interests, although states sometimes cloak other problems in ideological garb in an effort to mobilize public opinion at home and abroad. World-order interests are more difficult to compromise, however, because these usually affect a country's feeling of security.

Peripheral issues: The well-being of the state is not adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but the interests of private citizens and companies operating in foreign countries are endangered. Obviously, the large and powerful multinational corporations are usually given a higher priority by the parent country since their earnings and taxes have a significant effect on the economic well-being of the home state. Each nation-state makes its own determination on how greatly it values commercial enterprises operating abroad: for some, these companies constitute major issues of national interest; for others, they are only of peripheral importance.¹³⁶

Nuechterlein places particular importance on making a proper distinction between vital and major issues because the vital label is overused and is frequently applied to issues that are only of “major” interest. Vital interests are those for which a country is willing to fight.

3. Using the National Interest Matrix

The basic interest and intensity components are integrated into the national interest matrix. The matrix is the primary tool needed for evaluation of the overall national interest in a particular crisis or issue. Attention here will be paid to the ideological interest. Use of the matrix is virtually a one-step process. Because all four basic interests are at stake in all crises or issues to one degree or another, the user needs to determine how policymakers in the applicable nations prioritized the four basic interests. Nuechterlein provides the following guidance:

The interest matrix should be viewed as a guide to making wise policy choices in a systematic manner rather than as a sure means of finding the “right” answer. Key foreign policy decisions result from a process in which political leaders make subjective judgments based on their different perceptions of reality.¹³⁷

¹³⁶ Ibid, 79-80.

¹³⁷ Nuechterlein, Donald E. *America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Restructured World*. (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1991) 22.

The national interest matrix in this study is used to record the subjective judgments of national leaders on any given foreign policy issue.

Not only is this matrix useful for analysis of foreign policy, but it also captures much of the way policymakers themselves tend to think about foreign policy. For example, in President Clinton's 2000 National Security Strategy, entitled *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, U.S. national interests are categorized in a fashion that is similar to Nuechterlein's model in its identification of interest intensities:

Since there are always many demands for U.S. action, our national interests must be clear. These interests fall into three categories. The first includes *vital interests* - those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of our nation.... The second category is *important national interests*. These interests do not affect our national survival, but they do affect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live.... The third category is *humanitarian and other interests*. In some circumstances our nation may act because our values demand it.... The spread of democracy and respect for the rule of law helps to create a world community that is more hospitable to U.S. values and interests.¹³⁸

Similarly, Japan's concept of "comprehensive security," dominant since the 1970s, conceives of the country's security in terms of the four basic interests used in the matrix. In the 1999 Government of Japan *Diplomatic Blue Book*, a subsection entitled "The Diversification of National Power" documents the "major currents characterizing the international community on the eve of the 21st century."¹³⁹ One of the identified "currents" closely parallels the essence of Japan's concept of comprehensive security:

In the modern era, when the imperialist Great Powers were competing with each other, massive military force held major sway over diplomatic

¹³⁸ Clinton, William. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. December 1999. Available [Online] <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/nssr-1299.pdf>> [5 June 2000]. Italicics added.

¹³⁹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *1999 Diplomatic Blue Book*. Available [Online] <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1999/I-a.html#1>> [16 June 2000].

relations, but in the increasingly integrated international community since the end of the Cold War, *foreign policy is shaped by not only military force but also a number of other factors, including economic, technological and cultural strength.* While the reality of international politics today is that military force undoubtedly continues to play a certain role as a final resort in maintaining and restoring order, for diplomacy to produce national profit, it is becoming increasingly important for countries to enhance their international influence through a variety of strengths outside the purely military.¹⁴⁰

This overlay of Japan's security concept on Nuechterlein's matrix makes his model an easy way for Japanese to understand their security policy. Additionally, Japanese academics and policymakers closely follow Western security theorists and are generally knowledgeable about distinctions such as those made by Nuechterlein. Because Japanese are accustomed to perceiving their security using Western conceptualizations, the interest matrix is a natural way for Japan to conceive of its security. As both countries examine their policy directions, the matrix offers a very useful tool to decisionmakers in charting a course for their national interest and becoming conscious of the balance of ideals and interests in the policies chosen. The next section demonstrates the usefulness of the matrix by applying it to an instance of foreign policy decisionmaking: the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis.

4. Matrix Example: The 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis

Policymakers' perception of the interests at stake in the 1996 confrontation between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States over Taiwanese presidential elections are summarized in Table 2.

¹⁴⁰ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1999 *Diplomatic Blue Book*. Available [Online] <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1999/1-a.html#1>> [16 June 2000]. Italicized added.

<i>Basic Interest at Stake</i>	<i>Intensity of Interest</i>			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland	U.S. JAPAN
Economic well-being	U.S.	JAPAN
Favorable world order	U.S.	JAPAN
Promotion of values	U.S.	JAPAN

Table 2. The 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis.

a. Preconditions

The United States has had a relationship with Taiwan since 1949 when the PRC was established, with even earlier foundations from the prior Chinese Nationalist government on the mainland. During the Cold War, the United States developed national interests in Taiwan that still continue because of its separation from the Communist PRC. The dynamics of these interests have changed at times with such documents as the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, but the general U.S. concern for a free and independent Taiwan has endured. Japan also has some interest in Taiwan since it controlled Taiwan, then Formosa, from the Sino-Japanese War to the Second World War. Since then, Japan has always maintained a positive economic relationship with Taiwan, so much so that the Taiwanese are among the Asians least resentful of past Japanese militarist expansion.

b. Events

In the spring of 1996 the PRC scheduled military exercises to coincide with the period immediately preceding the Taiwanese presidential elections. A sense of alarm developed in the international community as reports were released about Strategic

Rocket Forces concentrations in the Maritime Provinces of the PRC and subsequent ballistic missile tests. The PRC increased its Taiwan-directed coercive rhetoric in both intensity and frequency. Significant speculation took place over whether the PRC would carry out its threat to reunify Taiwan by force. The United States decided to respond to the PRC military activities by dispatching two aircraft carrier battlegroups to the area. The crisis subsided without exchanging fire. Japan had no verbal or physical involvement in the crisis. When the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration was issued weeks after the crisis, the PRC charged that the United States and Japan were now identifying China as a threat. While a connection cannot be discounted, the PRC's accusation begs the more obvious explanation of the requirement to redefine the alliance for the post-Cold War era.

c. Ideals and Interests

The U.S. homeland defense interest was peripheral because the Taiwan issue does not threaten the United States directly. The specific U.S. interests in Taiwan include a world order interest in maintaining the physical security of Taiwan from the mainland Communist threat, an economic interest in the mutual benefits of trade with Taiwan and the accompanying support it provides to a strong Taiwanese state, and an ideological interest in containing communism and advancing American ideals of liberty and democracy.

Japan's actions demonstrate its peripheral interest in the Taiwan issue. Japan's greatest interest in Taiwan is economic, but it cannot qualify as a major interest. Japan will seek to continue trade with Taiwan whether it is separate from the PRC or not. Japan would view its defense and world order interest as increasingly threatened only if a

reunified Taiwan was a step toward further expansion by the PRC. Because that scenario is not yet clear, Japan does not see those interests directly threatened in the Taiwan case.

d. Evaluation and Outcome

Interests predominated over ideals for the United States and Japan during this crisis. The legacy of U.S. military involvement in the protection of Taiwan, particularly in the 1950s, demonstrates that the United States historically has a vital interest in Taiwan. This interest diminished with the collapse of global communism and the increasingly robust Taiwanese democratic government and market economy. The United States maintains a policy of strategic ambiguity guided by the 1979 Joint Communique with the PRC that “acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China”¹⁴¹ and by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 which holds “the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.”¹⁴² Because of that ambiguous interest, it is not clear whether the United States would actually have come to the aid of Taiwan if directly attacked by the PRC. Many U.S. policymakers are concerned that involvement in a military exchange with the PRC might quickly escalate or result in a difficult protracted conflict. Because of this, the U.S. world order and ideological interests in Taiwan must be evaluated as major, but possibly vital. Although the Cold War is history at the global level, PRC-Taiwan differences remain much the same as they did during the time of global superpower frictions.

¹⁴¹ U.S. Embassy Beijing, Political Affairs Section. *The 1979 Joint Communique*. Available [Online] <<http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/english/politics/index.html>> [14 June 2000].

¹⁴² American Institute in Taiwan. AIT Overview. *The Taiwan Relations Act*. Available [Online] <<http://ait.org.tw/ait/trt.html>> [14 June 2000].

Similarly, Japan's interests guided its policy in the Taiwan crisis. As one of the four "Asian Tiger" economies, Taiwan has played a significant role in meeting Japan's economic interest. Japan's interest in this economic link with Taiwan is greater than Japan's concern over the type of regime that governs Taiwan. If Taiwan were reunified by the PRC and the PRC government appeared to be contented, then Japan would not feel threatened in its other interests. If Taiwan were reunified as a stepping stone toward expansion by the PRC, then Japan would feel significantly threatened in its other interests.

Despite clear lack of Japanese ideals and interests at stake in the Taiwan Straits crisis, some U.S. policymakers were surprised by Japan's lack of cooperation in the crisis. The "Nye Initiative" process that led up to the April 1996 Joint Declaration caused some American analysts to believe that Japan was willing to assume a greater military role in the alliance for potential crises in Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula.¹⁴³ The subsequent 1997 Defense Guidelines Review included an introduction that seemed to support this conclusion but has become controversial:

The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more effective and credible U.S.-Japan cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in *situations in areas surrounding Japan*. The Guidelines also provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ A parallel process took place in Japan to develop a policy for the post-Cold War Japanese security situation. See Advisory Group on Defense Issues. *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century*. August 1994.

¹⁴⁴ U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian Affairs. The Office of Japanese Affairs. *Completion of the Guidelines of the Review for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation*. Available [Online] <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/japan/rpt-us-jpn_defense_970923.html> [10 June 2000].

Many in the United States felt that Japan has a duty under the Guidelines Review to support the United States in “areas” such as Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. Many in Japan interpreted the statement differently and focused on the context of “situations.” According to a “situational” interpretation, Japanese cooperation in the surrounding areas would not be automatic in any “area,” but would depend on the interests at stake in any given “situation.”¹⁴⁵ This misunderstanding by the United States is due to a weak perception of the ideals and interests that Japan has in its foreign policy.

The national interest matrix will continue to be used as a template in the next chapter. Four major turning points from the 20th century in U.S.-Japan relations have been selected to investigate the comparative weight of ideals and interests in the policies of these periods. The policies will show a close cause and effect relationship between United States and Japanese national interests. A recurring pattern of trends and constants will become apparent that can be used to understand the present relationship and to then look into the future.

¹⁴⁵ Samuels, Richard J. and Christopher P. Twomey, “The Eagle Eyes the Pacific: American Foreign Policy Options in East Asia after the Cold War,” in Green, Michael J. and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999) 20. Emphasis added.

V. IDEALS AND INTERESTS IN MAJOR TURNINGS OF UNITED STATES AND JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

Four major turning points are observable in the U.S.-Japan relationship in this century. These turnings demonstrate the dynamic nature of world events and the way that the relationship has been involved in them. The first period was in the 1910s and 1920s when economic globalization occurred rapidly creating a relatively benign and mutually beneficial situation between the United States and Japan. Next, the 1930s and 1940s were quite the opposite with the advent of the Second World War. The third period was in the 1950s and 1960s when U.S. hegemony and Japanese recovery made the new alliance a generally cooperative relationship. Finally, the 1970s and 1980s demonstrated another turn for the worse as trade relations created much hostility in the relationship.

A significant turning point in each of these periods has been selected as representative for that particular period. Each turning point is examined in a consistent pattern of preconditions, events, ideals and interests, evaluation and outcome. The turning points are examined in a sequential manner: first, addressing the United States, and then Japan. This is done to demonstrate the significant degree of dependence that Japanese foreign policy has on U.S. foreign policy, particularly since the Second World War. This will illuminate several insights into the character of Japanese foreign policy. Pyle describes it as “passive” and “reactive”¹⁴⁶ while Mendl adds that “broad objectives

¹⁴⁶ Pyle, Kenneth B. *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*. (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1996) 110.

exist.”¹⁴⁷ The national interest matrix is used to determine the comparative contribution of ideals and interests in each series of events. Evaluation is then conducted as to how the case measures up against the tradition of norms in that country and the historical swings that have been demonstrated.

A. POST-WORLD WAR I IDEALISM: THE UNITED STATES IN THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

1. Preconditions

The Washington Conference of 1921-1922 represented the first significant collaborative effort between the United States and Japan since both had achieved “great power” status. Although the relationship was developing slowly since Commodore Perry’s 1853 initial visit to Japan, this act of diplomacy to establish a new world order was a major development. The security environment preceding this step was dominated by the impact of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles.¹⁴⁸ Both countries achieved positions of relative strength: the United States because of military, economic, and political strength, and Japan because of growing military and economic strength plus German colonial gains. Japan was also buoyed by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, a matter of significant discomfort to the United States.

¹⁴⁷ Mendl, Wolf. *Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interests*. (London: Routledge, 1995) 164. For another overview of general characteristics of Japanese foreign policy see Scalapino, Robert, “Perspectives on Modern Japanese Foreign Policy,” in Scalapino, Robert A., ed. *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) 391-412. A comparable Japanese perspective is found in Sato, Seizaburo, “The Foundations of Modern Japanese Foreign Policy,” in Scalapino, Robert A., ed. *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) 367-389.

¹⁴⁸ The U.S. confrontation with Japan at the treaty talks in Paris is detailed in LaFeber, Walter. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997) 120-127.

The idealistic promise of the League of Nations to deliver a new security environment based on collective arrangements did not materialize for which the United States was mainly responsible.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the wave of liberal internationalism spreading at this time continued in intellectual circles around the world, while the U.S. government began to be characterized by a more tempered idealism under the Harding Administration. The international security condition of this time created a sort of power vacuum that necessitated the action taken at the Washington Conference.¹⁵⁰

2. Events

Under Congressional pressure, the Harding Administration initiated the Washington Conference through the leadership of the Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes. Japan also was interested in a conference, but it expected the conference to deal exclusively with naval arms issues rather than the important geopolitical issues that arose. In attendance were the European nations with Asian interests, Japan, and China. The showpiece of the conference was the Five-Power Treaty. This agreement established naval arms limitations between the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. It declared a holiday on new capital ship construction, the destruction of many ships already built by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, and the establishment of the 5:5:3:1.7:1.7 tonnage ratio. Japan rejected this inferior status until the United States and Great Britain conceded a condition for no further fortification enhancements in the Western Pacific. The United States and Great Britain persuasively argued that their

¹⁴⁹ Schulzinger, Robert D. *U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 104-124.

¹⁵⁰ Schulzinger, Robert D. *U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 134-139.

navies were required to patrol two oceans where Japan had only one. This resolution gave Japan effective sea control of its home waters.

The Four-Power Treaty took care of the U.S. problem with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by creating an agreement between the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan to respect each other's possessions in Asia. Japan had desired to maintain the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but it was not opposed to finding a suitable replacement for it.¹⁵¹ Importantly, this was not a collective security arrangement for mutual defense. The last of the agreements was the Nine-Power Treaty to respect the China Open Door Policy. This made official the U.S. policy to combat exclusive spheres of influence with equal trade privileges. It also required the various nations to respect the "sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial integrity of China."¹⁵² These three treaties together composed the Washington Conference and effectively became the security arrangement governing the world order until the Second World War.

3. Ideals and Interests

The basis for U.S. foreign policy toward Japan in the post-World War I era is portrayed in Table 3. The Washington Conference represented an effort by the United States to make the transition from excessive idealism to more of a balance between ideals and interests in concrete policy. In a highly charged partisan atmosphere, the Senate had recently defeated the Treaty of Versailles with the League of Nations proposal attached. Notably, the Washington Conference treaties contained some provisions that were not

¹⁵¹ Rōyama, Masamichi. *Foreign Policy of Japan: 1914-1939*. (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1973) 29.

¹⁵² Yale University. The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School. *Treaty Between the United of States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Signed at Washington February 6, 1922*. Available [Online]

entirely dissimilar in their ideology from the Treaty of Versailles or even the more idealistic spirit of Wilsonianism.

Japan had similar intentions at the Washington Conference because of the ambiguity in the Northeast Asian security environment caused by Germany's defeat in the First World War. The West had begun to pay less attention to Asia at that time because of the war and Japan's entry on the side of the victors.

<i>Basic Interest at Stake</i>	<i>Intensity of Interest</i>			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland	U.S.	...
Economic well-being	U.S.	...
Favorable world order	U.S.	...
Promotion of values	U.S.	...

Table 3. The Washington Conference.

a. Defense Interest

The U.S. defense interest at this time was major. The indecisive First World War had just passed, but security concerns lingered. Bagby states:

A war fought in the name of democracy had been won, but victory had not made the world safe for democracy. Instead, from the war and its aftermath would arise communism in Russia, fascism in Italy, and Nazism in Germany. The war to end war produced a treaty of conquest that set the stage for World War II.¹⁵³

The Five-Power Arms Limitation treaty was aimed at addressing this security concern, particularly in the face of a healthy postwar economy in Japan and a concurrent naval arms buildup there. This treaty also furthered the U.S. defense interest by superseding

<<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/1922v1/tr22-01.htm#1>> [13 June 2000].

the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Prior to that time there were fears that the United States would be put in a situation where it might face war with Great Britain because of that alliance. In fact, the U.S. Navy leadership prepared war plans at the Naval War College for just such a possibility.

Japan's defense interest was in transition. It had started from a major defense interest before the war because of the competing powers in the region. It appeared to be headed to the peripheral intensity because of the lack of a competitive threat, but it foresaw the risk of a naval arms race with the United States and Great Britain, and consequently, maintained its defense interest at major to avert this danger.

b. Economic Interest

The U.S. economic interest was major. Secretary of State John Hay first articulated the Open Door Policy for trade in China in 1899. It was designed to counter the exclusive nature of the imperialist spheres of influence in China with the equality of trade principle. The Nine-Power Treaty was the first time the Open Door Policy was officially agreed upon among the interested nations. To a lesser degree, the Five-Power Treaty also addressed U.S. economic interests. The naval arms race that began in Europe before the First World War recommenced after the war's completion, but at a global level with Germany. The high costs of this impending arms race were averted by this treaty, which had broad public support.

¹⁵³ Bagby, Wesley M. *America's International Relations Since World War I*. (New York: Oxford University Press: 1999) 49.

Japan's economic interest at the Washington Conference was major. Politicians and the public both desired cuts in the substantial taxes being levied in the early 1920s. The Five-Power Treaty was the critical path Japan sought for this purpose.

c. World Order Interest

The major U.S. world order interest was seen in both the Nine and Five-Power Treaties. In the Nine-Power Treaty the United States sought to prevent any nation from assuming a preponderant influence in China. In the Five-Power Treaty the United States took leadership of a world order based on the naval forces ratios. With a debt to the American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, naval forces reached the peak of their influence during this period in modern history. This treaty essentially created a balance of power to mitigate the threat of a spiraling naval arms race.

Japan's world order interest was also major. Japan had received territorial concessions after the First World War that it could begin consolidating and exploiting. The Shantung Peninsula in China and a number of former German islands north of the equator gave Japan de facto hegemony in the Western Pacific because of its naval sea control capabilities. Japan acknowledged the Nine-Power Treaty provisions, but it did not fully understand the significance placed on the treaty by the United States until the 1931 Manchurian Incident.

d. Ideological Interest

The U.S. ideological interest was evident in both the Nine and Four-Power Treaties. The Nine-Power Treaty allowed the United States to continue the moralistic idea that it was not really an imperialistic country. The development of this norm in U.S. society became a powerful force at both the elite and mass level. The difference between

the involvement in China by the United States and other nations was to some extent more of degree than of kind. The kind of Japanese involvement in China would soon change this, however. This treaty also contained an element of idealism associated with free trade. In the American tradition, free trade almost takes on the character of a civil liberty because of the impact John Locke's writings had on the importance of free trade for liberal democracy. The Four-Power Treaty forwarded an ideal to preserve peace in the Pacific by making an agreement to respect the other powers' possessions and to consult one another in the event of a crisis. The ideal of peace through consultation is closely associated with democratic theory. This group of theories asserts that nations have rational capabilities to negotiate differences and come to mutually agreeable solutions in order to avoid war.

The Japanese ideological interest at the Washington Conference was peripheral and uncertain. The delegation was caught off guard by the sweeping proposals made at the conference. Japan at that time also seemed to be in the process of questioning what its new role was in the world. Before the Meiji Restoration, Japan generally made no attempt to assert itself beyond its borders. Once Japan achieved "great power" status, it sought to redefine itself and to identify a new purpose for the country's power. Despite the disagreement over the naval arms ratio, Japan was content to fulfill a new role that made it a qualified equal to the other "great powers."

4. Evaluation and Outcome

The U.S. approach in the Washington Conference favored interests significantly over ideals, but the approved treaties remain an example of moral idealism. The idealistic content was most apparent in the Nine-Power Treaty. There is a stark

difference between the Washington Conference treaties' approval and the disapproval of the Treaty of Versailles. The varied normative content and packaging of the two treaties in tandem with traditional partisan politics account for the difference in end result. The Treaty of Versailles was negotiated in March to June 1919 by Woodrow Wilson's exclusively Democratic Party team, but it was presented to a hostile Republican Party-dominated Congress with Senator Henry Cabot Lodge as the Foreign Relations Committee Chairman. Although the public's enchantment with Wilsonian idealism was diminishing, there was still broad, but lukewarm, support for the treaty. Much of the intellectual elite was also divided between those supportive of the liberal internationalist ideals being advanced through the treaty, and those who felt the treaty was unfair. The end result of this divisive issue was that the Senate defeated the Treaty in November 1919 and again in March 1920.¹⁵⁴

The Washington Conference treaties were handled by the Republican Harding Administration and a Republican Party-dominated Congress. The public and the intellectual elites were also generally supportive in this case. These treaties were quickly ratified. These differences suggest that although partisan politics was a factor, the varied normative content and packaging of the different treaties helps to explain the opposite end results. Additionally, the moralism of Wilson's "Progressive" generation was now being replaced by the cynicism of the war veteran "Lost" generation. This new generation had little confidence in the idealistic crusade waged by President Wilson. Although the idealism of the Fourteen Points had to be watered down for the compromises necessary to produce the Treaty of Versailles, the Versailles Treaty still

¹⁵⁴ Bagby, Wesley M. *America's International Relations Since World War I*. (New York: Oxford 93

contained more idealistic concepts than the Washington Conference treaties. The Washington Conference treaties remain an example of moral idealism through their strong idealistic content.

B. JAPANESE AWAKENING: UNCERTAINTY AND THE “SHIDEHARA DIPLOMACY” RESPONSE

1. Preconditions

Japanese foreign policy in the period during and after the Washington Conference took place in the atmosphere of the 1910s and 1920s “Taisho Democracy.” It was a period of awakening in Japan when the centralized government diminished and competitive party politics flourished.¹⁵⁵ A strong middle class grew with the post-World War I economic boom; popular involvement in government developed with increased suffrage, opposition political movements, and labor unions. Prior to the Washington Conference, Japanese leadership was hesitant to accept the conference invitation because of concern that the meeting would be a forum for the Europeans to gang up on Japan.¹⁵⁶ Japan was forced into compromises at the conference, but it came away with several significant items. First, Japan gained naval superiority in the Pacific through the Five-Power Treaty provisions and the freeze on fortification enhancements. Second, the Nine-Power Treaty made a provision to recognize Japan’s claim to Manchuria that was reinforced by the basic premise of the Four-Power Treaty. Japan, consequently, came out of the Conference in a good position that met with relatively positive reviews at home. The Conference vision of the Asia-Pacific order set the stage for the 1920s “Shidehara diplomacy.”¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ Keylor, William R. *The Twentieth-Century World: An International History*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) 220-231.

¹⁵⁶ LaFeber, Walter. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997) 136, 142.

¹⁵⁷ Rōyama, Masamichi. *Foreign Policy of Japan: 1914-1939*. (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1973) 37-39.

2. Events

Shidehara Kijuro was the Japanese ambassador to the United States in the early 1920s and the head representative to the Washington Conference. He also served as Foreign Minister for much of the decade. His role in applying principles of Wilson's "new diplomacy" to Japan resulted in the 1920s Japanese foreign policy becoming known as "economic" or "Shidehara diplomacy."¹⁵⁸ Because of the impact of the First World War, the Russian Revolution, and the parallel anti-imperialist ideals of Wilson and Lenin, Shidehara came to embody a new consensus in Japan on the conduct of foreign policy. The prevailing concept until that time was that Japan should have an imperialist foreign policy to develop colonies. This would all come under the umbrella of seeing Japan's role as the regional leader in a way that was somewhat similar to the U.S. regional influence of the Monroe Doctrine. Japan continued to see itself as a leader in the 1920s, but it now sought to do so in a more cooperative way with the other powers, particularly the United States. Japan's willingness to participate in the Washington Conference treaties demonstrated that it sought an autonomous defense but did not yet see it necessary to pursue the independent course of the 1930s and 1940s.

During this period of democratic consolidation, international trade increased and military influence decreased.¹⁵⁹ Japan was well positioned after the First World War because it chose to side with the victorious side and was required to make little contribution to the war effort. This success was dampened significantly by the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, but the decade overall was a prosperous one. Shidehara diplomacy

¹⁵⁸ Duus, Peter. *Modern Japan*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998) 204-209.

¹⁵⁹ Nish, Ian. *A Short History of Japan*. (London: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968) 141-156.

reflected the dominant concepts of liberal internationalism and the residual effect of the old American “dollar diplomacy.” Increasing hostility in the United States toward Japanese immigration provided setbacks to Shidehara’s strategy, but the basic blueprint designed by him would remain until the economic crisis looming ahead. In general, the implementation of these policies made the 1920s in Japan a decade of political openness and cultural innovation.¹⁶⁰

3. Ideals and Interests

Japan demonstrated major defense, economic, and world order interests and a peripheral ideological interest through its participation at the Washington Conference and its openness in the years immediately following, as displayed in Table 4. While the ideological interest remained peripheral, it was still a focus of policy as leaders devised new interpretations of traditional ideals during this period. Shidehara diplomacy represented a continuation of Japan’s ideals and interests demonstrated at the Washington Conference.

<i>Basic Interest at Stake</i>	<i>Intensity of Interest</i>			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland	JAPAN	...
Economic well-being	JAPAN	...
Favorable world order	JAPAN	...
Promotion of values	JAPAN

Table 4. Shidehara Diplomacy.

¹⁶⁰ Storry, Richard. *A History of Modern Japan*. (New York: Penguin Books, 1983) 157-181.

a. Defense Interest

Japan had a major defense interest in avoiding war during this period of rapid growth. The Japanese withdrawal from Siberia made war less likely with the new Soviet Union and the Washington Conference eased prevalent fears over war with the United States. Japan supported its defense interest at this time with a slow, but steady, buildup of small naval vessels, particularly submarines. It also consolidated its military position on mainland Northeast Asia.

b. Economic Interest

Japan also had a major economic interest in taking further steps to catch up with the other great powers. It continued to see its colonies as the main way to do this, but the methodology changed in the 1920s away from traditional mercantilism to a more international trade oriented approach. The Four and Nine-Power Treaties guaranteed Japan its foothold in Manchuria and created an atmosphere of equal trade that would last for a brief time.

c. World Order Interest

Japan had a major world order interest that was closely related to the economic interest. Japan's interest was to establish itself as the predominant regional power. All three of the Washington Conference treaties enhanced this interest. Shidehara diplomacy was conducted in this spirit, and it attempted consolidation of that position.

d. Ideological Interest

Japan's ideological interest at this time was peripheral, but increasing. Despite this, Japanese ideals were achieved at the Washington Conference and in the

Shidehara diplomacy. The treaties were a consensus for a new harmony in the Asia-Pacific. They established a greater role for Japan that was not yet equal with the great powers, but significantly increased from what it had been. This period in modern Japan was also when the early foundations were laid for a tradition of the ideals of freedom, democracy, and human rights. These budding institutions and ideals would soon unravel in the prewar period.

4. Evaluation and Outcome

The Japanese approach in Shidehara diplomacy addressed both ideals and interests, with the balance in favor of interests. Evaluated against the history of modern Japan until that time, the 1920s were a period of relative introversion and disengagement. The younger generation that grew up after the crisis of the Meiji Restoration and the following atmosphere of conformity desired to experiment with new ideas and institutions at this time. This period was a brief respite in the often violent changes that characterized much of Japanese history, both before and after. Although Japan was generally inward looking at this time, it remained outwardly aware. During this time of introspection Japan borrowed significant foreign concepts for adaptation. This openness would quickly change in the following decade.

The degree to which it favored interests is evident by looking at the two major events that occurred immediately before the foreign policy changed in the early 1930s. Both the 1927 establishment of Nationalist China under Chiang Kai Shek and the wave of global trade protectionism that followed the 1929 U.S. stock market crash threatened all of Japan's basic interests. Both the standing up of Nationalist China and the global depression severely strained Japan's ability to meet its demand for natural resources and

to consume its supply of processed goods. The major intensity placed on the economic and world order interest caused Shidehara diplomacy to be deemed a failure upon the occurrence of these two events. The country determined that it needed to pursue its interests in a new and more independent way. Japanese foreign policymaking criteria then shifted significantly from outward awareness to outward activism through events such as the 1931 Manchurian Incident where Japanese influence significantly expanded on the mainland.

The strategy of autonomous defense found in the 1920s Shidehara diplomacy continues to serve as a prototype in the Japanese debate that developed in the 1980s, and continued in the 1990s. The Shidehara diplomacy had an internationalist orientation that provided Japan with significant freedom of action, but it took place under the dependence on a collective security agreement formed at the Washington Conference. Promoters of autonomous defense in the current debate are advocates of a Japan that demonstrates more assertive leadership. This proposed vision of Japan would be very similar to the characteristics of Japan during the Shidehara diplomacy period. It can be simplified in contrast to the other strategies as, “more Japanese defense effort, more U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.” Those supporting autonomous defense generally advise revision of the Constitution, emphasis on the strengthening of the SDF, and reliance on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to supplement the SDF. These groups are slowly gaining in popularity since the Persian Gulf War. This position could become a policy of moral uncertainty similar to the Washington Conference arrangement where Japan was both strong militarily but still committed to an agreement with the United States. Broad public support is not yet behind this group, but its adherents tend to be more vocal than the other

groups. A low profile debate is presently underway over the merits of this option, as is demonstrated by the establishment of the Constitutional Review Committee.

C. PRE-WORLD WAR II SKEPTICISM: THE UNITED STATES' NEUTRALITY ACTS

1. Preconditions

The 1930s in the United States brought the nascent isolationist, sometimes called non-interventionist, impulse of the 1920s into full bloom. The immediate cause of this development was the onset of the Great Depression and the subsequent protectionist trade barriers. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930 set tariffs at record levels in order to prevent cheap imports from underpricing domestic goods. In addition to this, anti-immigration sentiment that had led to the passage of quota laws in the 1920s was becoming even more vocal. However, at the same time isolationist ideas were becoming widely accepted, liberal internationalist cross currents remained, particularly among the elite. The dominant cynicism of the time was reinforced by world events that were telling the public that the First World War had not, in fact, made "the world safe for democracy." More and more people questioned the necessity of U.S. involvement in world affairs as they observed treaty violations such as the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and similar events in Germany and Italy. Many academics came to believe that the "merchants of death" caused the First World War and that Germany was not solely responsible as stated in the Treaty of Versailles.

2. Events

The views above expressing disdain for the U.S. role in the First World War achieved preeminence in the Neutrality Acts passed into law in the mid-1930s. Senator

Gerald Nye headed a select committee that investigated the causes of the First World War and formulated its conclusions in the bills presented to Congress. Three main provisions were included in the original 1935 Act that was renewed in 1936: "...a ban on travel by Americans to a war zone (to avoid another Lusitania incident), a ban on loans by Americans to belligerents, and most important of all, an impartial embargo on arms to belligerents."¹⁶¹ The 1937 renewal of the Law made it permanent with a major addition--war belligerents would only be able to conduct trade with the United States on a cash-and-carry basis. This principle allowed the United States to remain economically involved in the world, but politically isolated. President Roosevelt did not agree with the prevalent isolationism of the time, but he maintained his views in reserve while looking for ways to support countries such as Great Britain, short of war.

It is important to note that the Neutrality Acts were adopted in the atmosphere of the "Stimson Doctrine" of foreign policy.¹⁶² The nascent isolationist sentiment that began growing after the First World War was particularly reinforced by the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria in direct violation of the Washington Conference arrangements and the Kellogg-Briand Treaty. President Herbert Hoover's Secretary of State Henry Stimson developed a policy of non-recognition of territorial changes caused by Japan's aggression in Manchuria that became known as the Stimson Doctrine.¹⁶³ Stimson hoped that a multilateral response of non-recognition would be sufficient to

¹⁶¹ Schulzinger, Robert D. *U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 159.

¹⁶² William Nester discusses the impact of the Neutrality Acts and Stimson Doctrine in Nester, William R. *Power across the Pacific: A Diplomatic History of American Relations with Japan*. (New York: New York University Press, 1996) 105-142.

¹⁶³ LaFeber, Walter. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997) 160-174.

inhibit Japan. He also desired to back the policy with force but there was no public support to do so at that time. The net result was a form of appeasement. The League of Nations followed suit with a policy similar to the Stimson Doctrine after much division over the issue. Japan responded that its actions were similar to those of the Europeans in Asia and the United States in Latin America. The idealist Stimson Doctrine continued to influence U.S. foreign policy for the rest of the 1930s under President Roosevelt, but it was rendered ineffective by the moral skepticism dominant in that period.¹⁶⁴

3. Ideals and Interests

U.S. policymakers in the 1930s believed that few of the nation's basic interests (and certainly not its values) needed to be pursued in the international arena. The intensity of those ideals and interests found in Table 5 is significantly less than in the periods before or after this era. Isolationism at that time was significantly reminiscent of the character of U.S. foreign policy prior to the United States' arrival as a great power.

<i>Basic Interest at Stake</i>	<i>Intensity of Interest</i>			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland	U.S.
Economic well-being	U.S.	...
Favorable world order	U.S.	...
Promotion of values	U.S.

Table 5. Neutrality Acts.

¹⁶⁴ Bagby, Wesley M. *America's International Relations Since World War I.* (New York: Oxford University Press: 1999) 82-87.

a. Defense Interest

The defense interest was peripheral. The Manchurian Crisis, Nazi expansion in Europe, Spanish Civil War, and Italian invasion of Ethiopia all made the United States uncomfortable, but the cynical isolationist mindset prevented any significant action in response to these events. A modest arms buildup began in the mid-1930s as the Japanese withdrew from the Washington Conference treaties and the League of Nations, but a significant increase in military personnel and resources did not commence until the late 1930s.

b. Economic Interest

The economic interest was major. The Neutrality Laws sought to preserve U.S. economic markets despite the great turbulence sweeping the globe. In fact, the United States continued to trade with most of the nations in conflict until it entered the war. The President selectively applied the Neutrality Laws as he saw fit politically. The use of the Laws was complicated by the conflicting policy goals of peace and security. The impact of the Great Depression was still in full force so that the desire to trade grew in reaction to the earlier protectionist impulse. The United States did not stop trade with Japan after this until the invasion of Indochina in July 1941.

c. World Order Interest

The world order interest was major. The United States' main world order interest in Asia at this time was that Japan's influence over China would not become complete. It sought to maintain the status quo as established by the Washington Conference.

d. Ideological Interest

The ideological interest was peripheral. Part of the isolationist mentality in the 1920s and 1930s was a backlash against the moralism that was trumpeted at the time of the First World War. When the reality of the inconclusive war met the ideal that propelled the country into war, the result was a profound pessimism among the public. Although Roosevelt successfully used ideals to motivate the public over the continuing domestic crisis, this strategy was not viable among the population for issues of foreign policy until Roosevelt proclaimed the “day of infamy.”

4. Evaluation and Outcome

The balance of ideals and interests in the 1930s foreign policy is significantly in favor of interests. The Neutrality Laws are clearly a case of moral skepticism. Although the nation lamented the injustices of the Japanese invasion of China, its official response was the Neutrality Laws. Americans saw the norms of democracy, freedom, and human rights at risk around the globe, but they were ultimately unwilling to take action until their own defense interest was threatened in combination with a readily apparent world order threat. The Neutrality Laws made official the national attitude of pragmatism and cynicism. The liberal internationalism of the 1920s transitioned to an economic interest driven policy of isolation. In this sense, the Neutrality Laws recalled the older “dollar diplomacy” with a more pessimistic bent.

D. JAPANESE IDEALISM: THE CHINA INVASION AND DRIVE TOWARD AUTARKY

1. Preconditions

Japan's much analyzed path to the Second World War is acknowledged by most scholars to have begun with the Manchurian Incident in 1931. The government had lost effective control of the military from that point onward. Although the 1930s are sometimes referred to as Showa fascism, the decade maintained the form of representative government throughout, while displaying an internal clash of varied political forces. The dominant influence of the internationalist groups passed in the late 1920s. The first half of the 1930s was highly divisive with multiple assassinations and attempted coups. The radical right gained significant control of the government through revolutionary military and civilian groups. Their influence drove the national political consensus to the right. An important difference existed between Japan and Germany at this time, however. Whereas in Germany popular nationalism fueled the military, in Japan the nationalistic military fueled the populace. In spite of this, as late as 1937 there was still significant party opposition to the military dominated government. The events of 1937 in Japan owed a significant debt to the United States' lack of responsiveness in world affairs as indicated by the Neutrality Laws.

Japan's important response to the global depression in the early 1930s was to take the country off the gold standard. Although this helped Japan to recover faster than other countries, it was insufficient to support continued party politics as in the 1920s. As military influence increased, the Army faced a type of "Catch-22" situation where further resources were needed to fuel the imperialist agenda, but the empire needed to expand

more to provide the resources. Because much of Japan's mainland holding was too underdeveloped to provide both the quantity and quality of resources needed, Japan had to turn to the United States. The United States was willing to play this role for most of the 1930s, but Japan was preparing itself for self-sufficiency.¹⁶⁵

2. Events

Japanese generally remember the Second World War as the Pacific War, and they mark its beginning on 7 July 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Japan demonstrated in the 1931 and 1937 events that it was unwilling to remain in the institutions of the Washington Conference treaties and the League of Nations.¹⁶⁶ Japan, consequently, chose an independent path. In a way that was similar to the 1931 Manchurian advance, Japan in 1937 sought increased security and resources for the empire it already held.¹⁶⁷ This became a vicious cycle that led to the wider war, first with China, and then the United States. With the combat beginning in 1937, Japan sought to enhance its North China buffer against Soviet power. This objective expanded to include neutralizing the nagging Chinese Nationalist threat. Expansion of the North China sphere came relatively quickly, but destroying the Chinese threat became a goal that eluded Japan for the duration of the war.

¹⁶⁵ Michael Barnhart examines Japan's development toward self-sufficiency and its impact on internal and external policies. He concludes that internal dynamics in Japan had a greater role in precipitating the war than is often thought. See Barnhart, Michael A. *Japan Prepares For Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

¹⁶⁶ Rōyama, Masamichi. *Foreign Policy of Japan: 1914-1939*. (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1973) 73-76.

¹⁶⁷ John Toland studies Japan's progression toward war and comments on the United States' failure to see that it was fighting a war "...in Asia which was not only a struggle against an aggressive nation fighting for survival as a modern power but an ideological contest against an entire continent." See Toland, John. *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945*. (New York: Random House, 1970) xxxv.

3. Ideals and Interests

Japan's decision to invade China and pursue a greater follow-on conflict with the Chinese had a strong basis in both ideals and interests. The alignment of these ideals and interests is displayed in Table 6.

<i>Basic Interest at Stake</i>	<i>Intensity of Interest</i>			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland	...	JAPAN
Economic well-being	...	JAPAN
Favorable world order	...	JAPAN
Promotion of values	...	JAPAN

Table 6. China Invasion.

a. Defense Interest

The defense interest was vital. There was no overwhelming threat posed directly to the home islands, but the imperial gains were under pressure from different directions. Frequent conflicts were taking place with the Soviet Army near the Manchurian border. The Chinese Nationalist Army was also threatening the Japanese Kwantung Army in North China. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident started as a skirmish, but the overwhelming Japanese advance and decisionmaking shows that this offensive could be viewed as a preemptive attack designed to protect its defense interest by increasing its perceived security.

b. Economic Interest

The economic interest may have been viewed as more vital than the defense interest, particularly in the eyes of the Army. Further imperial advances were

lured by the continuing promise of more raw materials to supply the resource-poor country. The vicious economic cycle Japan faced got worse as more war material was produced. The consequence of this trend was that Japan had fewer goods to export in order to receive the capital that was critically needed to sustain the country.

c. World Order Interest

The world order interest was vital. Japan's world order interest was to create for itself a secure empire with ample natural resources. As the German Nazi and Italian Fascist world order visions became more apparent, Japan began to see itself in similar terms to some extent. Japan developed a view in which the Eurasian landmass would be partitioned between the Tripartite Powers, with Japan controlling most of South and East Asia. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS) became the cornerstone of this view.¹⁶⁸

d. Ideological Interest

The ideological interest was vital. Japanese ideals are seen especially in GEACPS and its development. Japan decided through a largely Army-based consensus that the “old” harmony in East Asia based on European spheres of influence needed to be replaced with an “Asia for Asians.” The concept of “Co-Prosperity” also evoked images of a new consensual based order. Although the language in which GEACPS was packaged seemed appealing and even promising for some of the hopeful, indigenous Asian peoples, the GEACPS was generally something much different in practice. Japan saw itself as racially superior to the other nations it invaded in a way that was suggestive of the contemporary European justification of Social Darwinism. For this reason, Japan

saw its role as being on top of the GEACPS in which operations would have a mercantilist orientation designed to support Japan, and in which it was the other countries' responsibility to support Japan. GEACPS was also designed to be ideologically anti-Communist. The threat of Soviet communism to the north certainly was a real threat to Japan, but this threat was elevated to an ideology in the groupthink that developed in the 1930s.

4. Evaluation and Outcome

Japan achieved a broad balance of ideals and interests in the 1937 China Invasion and following operations. All of Japan's basic ideals and interests were vital at this time. Japan shifted from the inward looking and adaptive nature of the Taisho period to the extroversion that characterized the war. The consequences of this combination of vital basic interests meant that Japan was prepared to use military force to fulfill the perceived needs of each of the basic interests. This alignment of interests continued throughout the Second World War, and only changed as the defense interest rose to the level of survival during the progression of the war. In this case, the ideals of consensus, harmony, and role are all evident to a great extent. The war would destroy Japan's foreign policy. Their subsequent foreign policy would be pragmatically founded with a significant skepticism of the kind of ideals that assisted in propelling the country into war.

The independent path of autarky still serves as a prototype for Japanese debates. While virtually no Japanese will suggest World War II-type militarism as a policy prescription, the general idea of an independent course is becoming more popular. It can

¹⁶⁸ LaFeber, Walter. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997) 191-196.

be simplified as “more Japanese defense effort, less U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.”

These types of groups support revision of the Constitution, a self-sufficient SDF, and continuation or revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty with future Japanese autonomy in mind. This could become a policy of moral idealism similar to the situation in prewar Japan in which the country seeks complete self-sufficiency. Supporters of this view are small in number but highly vocal. In the past, this group often faced forced retirement if they made their views public, but this condition is changing slowly. There is little public support as yet for this group but they may be influencing the direction of the debate.

E. PRUDENCE IN THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN: REFORM TO RECOVERY

1. Preconditions

The immediate cause of the U.S. entry into the Second World War was the attack on Pearl Harbor, but a combination of vital interests came together that caused the United States to pursue the war once involved. Upon Japan’s defeat the Allied Occupation began under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.¹⁶⁹ The United States saw the Occupation as an opportunity to rebuild Japan in its own image.¹⁷⁰ The first objective was to seize Japanese territory and property while destroying the war-supporting industry. The reformation would include transforming the government to a liberal representative democracy, and the economy to open market capitalism.¹⁷¹ With the war

¹⁶⁹ For an analysis of the Occupation see LaFeber, Walter. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997) 262-282.

¹⁷⁰ For a detailed account of the Occupation see Schaller, Michael. *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.

¹⁷¹ The changes in Japan mandated by the Occupation authorities constituted another revolution “from above” that shows similarities to the Meiji Restoration changes in Japan. For a discussion see Dower, John W. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. (New York: W.W. Norton Company, Inc., 1999) 65-80.

over, the United States was at the peak of its international power and, the world was secure and at peace. For the United States, Japan was mainly a peripheral interest. Major U.S. interests continued to be in Europe, but the spread of communism would quickly change that view.¹⁷²

2. Events

After the war ended, it became apparent that there would be an antagonistic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Winston Churchill in 1946 observed an “iron curtain” descending over Eastern Europe. Early in 1947, President Harry Truman announced what later became known as the Truman Doctrine:

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.¹⁷³

Soviet advances in Turkey and Greece were the proximate cause of this address; the President effectively made a declaration of “cold” war.¹⁷⁴ To add to this, Nationalist

¹⁷² John Dower details the dramatic shift Japan made in the eyes of America from “savage” enemy to “freedom-loving” ally during the Occupation. See Dower, John W. *Japan In War & Peace: Selected Essays*. (New York: New Press, 1993) 155-207.

¹⁷³ <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/funddocs/truman.txt>.

Chinese forces were losing ground to the Chinese Communists in their protracted Civil War. As their impending defeat became more visible, the U.S. policy of anti-Sovietism shifted to anti-communism.¹⁷⁵ The Cold War had begun in Asia.¹⁷⁶ For the Allied Occupation of Japan, this meant that Japan was expected to be part of the barrier of containment against communism according to the new doctrine found in NSC-68. This would require Japan to become self-sufficient and able to be integrated with the other non-Communist Asian countries as rapidly as possible. For the Occupation leadership this meant a transition from reformation to recovery.¹⁷⁷ This transition was most evident in the economic sphere. Trust-busting ended and support for radical labor movements subsided. The shipping of local factories out of Japan to the United States for reparations ceased, and significant relief and investment money began to flow into Japan. Politically the Japanese were given increased responsibility quickly. Many individuals who were originally put on purge lists were restored and permitted to participate in public life.

3. Ideals and Interests

The realization by the United States that the Cold War existed in Asia resulted in the American Occupation “reverse course” change from a policy of reform to one of recovery.¹⁷⁸ What started as relatively peripheral interests in Japan increased in intensity

¹⁷⁴ For the development of the Truman Doctrine and containment see Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. *America's Foreign Policy Since World War II*. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998) 36-50.

¹⁷⁵ Yahuda, Michael. *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995*. (New York: Routledge, 1997) 116.

¹⁷⁶ Schulzinger, Robert D. *U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 207-210.

¹⁷⁷ Schaller, Michael. *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 7-30.

¹⁷⁸ Duus, Peter. *Modern Japan*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998) 278-282.

when the threat of communism was perceived in Asia. U.S interests at the beginning of the Cold War are summarized in Table 7.

<i>Basic Interest at Stake</i>	<i>Intensity of Interest</i>			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland	U.S.
Economic well-being	U.S.	...
Favorable world order	U.S.	...
Promotion of values	U.S.	...

Table 7. Reverse Course.

a. Defense Interest

The defense interest was peripheral. The advance of the Cold War into Northeast Asia did not directly threaten the U.S. homeland. The containment wall was threatened, but this was at a distance.

b. Economic Interest

The economic interest increased to the major level when a potential risk to open market capitalism developed in communism. Roosevelt had envisioned in the Yalta Conference that China would play the major power role in East Asia after the war. China's integration into the open market would strengthen it and would defend against the growing threat of communism. China's fall to communism meant that Japan was now the capitalist center of gravity in East Asia. The United States had intended for China to assume a role as one of the postwar "four policeman" taking on a mutually beneficial trade relationship with the United States. The new center of gravity for the U.S. economic interest shifted to Japan in the reverse course.

c. World Order Interest

The world order interest was major. The United States had to plan for Japan to become a stable and democratic brick in the wall of containment. The reasons for this were explained in NSC-68 and George Kennan's Long Telegram. Even further back was the British strategist Sir Halford MacKinder who conceptualized the "Heartland" theory, which contributed to Nicholas Spykman's concept of a Eurasian "Rimland" that, in turn, formed the basis for containment. These concepts became the widely accepted way to deal with expansionist communism.¹⁷⁹

d. Ideological Interest

The ideological interest was major, but it shifted. In the reform phase of the Occupation, American ideals were projected directly at Japan with efforts toward immediate institutionalization. The clearest example of this was the new 1946, or "MacArthur," Constitution.¹⁸⁰ This document is a combination of Founding Father and New Deal ideology; the ideals of freedom, democracy, and human rights are contained in it. In the recovery phase of the Occupation, American ideals changed because of the interest in containing the growth of communism.

4. Evaluation and Outcome

The period from the late 1940s to early 1960s was a time when the United States was both outward looking and engaged in world affairs. The "reverse course" is a good

¹⁷⁹ Christopher Fettweis discusses the early concepts of geopolitics and demonstrates their continued relevance in the 21st century. See Fettweis, Christopher J., "Sir Halford MacKinder, Geopolitics, and Policymaking in the 21st Century," *Parameters*, (Summer 2000): 58-71. Available [Online] <<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/00summer/fettweis.htm>> [18 June 2000].

¹⁸⁰ The Constitution was announced in 1946 and approved in 1947. See Hanover College Department of History. Texts and Documents. *The 1947 Constitution*. Available [Online] <<http://history.hanover.edu/texts/1947con.html>> [11 June 2000].

example of U.S. involvement in this fashion. It is an example of moral prudence because of its guarded, but confident, assertion of American ideals. Because of the rapid transformation that took place in U.S. policy, it also provides a special example of ideals and interests in foreign policy. During the reform phase of the Occupation, the ideological interest held a relatively large place within the policy. As the economic and world order interest became dominant with the new Cold War threat, the ideological interest continued at the major intensity level but for a new reason. The concept of remaking Japan in the image of American ideals was replaced with the concept of combating a new threat that was the antithesis of American ideals. Although containment started out as a relatively rational endeavor under the influence of Kennan's analysis, containment soon grew into an ideologically charged project during and after the "loss of China" accusations and the 1950s Red Scare. The Occupation reverse course contains a balance of ideals and interests through a pragmatic policy based on objective shifts in international relations combined with a confident application of American ideals that avoided the extremes of moralism and cynicism.

F. JAPANESE POSTWAR RECOVERY AND SKEPTICISM: A NEW CONSENSUS IN THE YOSHIDA DOCTRINE

1. Preconditions

The tumultuous experience in Japan following the developments of the GEACPS hierarchy resulted in its decisive defeat in the Second World War. The Japanese military and economy were destroyed by the war, and the polity was disassembled by the Occupation. The Reform phase of the Occupation focused on reorienting the political and economic institutions of Japan. The country's immediate interest in the postwar period was merely economic survival. Shocked by the level of devastation in the aftermath, General MacArthur declared to Washington, "Give me bread or give me bullets."¹⁸¹ The Japanese expected a harsh and vengeful Occupation, but instead they generally found the Americans to be firm, but fair. Prejudice similarly diminished among the Americans as well; General MacArthur developed a sense of duty toward the Japanese as he observed the respect they paid toward him. When the Occupation shifted from reform to recovery, the United States found an eager ally in Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru.¹⁸²

2. Events

Yoshida became Prime Minister in 1946 after the sequential collapse of several cabinets. He earned favor with the Occupation authority for several reasons based on his previous experiences: he was a member of the Anglo-American political faction that

¹⁸¹ LaFeber, Walter. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997) 257-262.

¹⁸² John Dower explores the interaction between Prime Minister Yoshida and the Occupation authorities in, Dower, John W. *Japan In War & Peace: Selected Essays*. (New York: New Press, 1993) 208-241.

opposed the dominant German faction before the war; he supported the Japanese holdings in Korea and Manchuria, but opposed the militarist government and continental expansion; and he was arrested late in the war for advocating active peace negotiations toward a surrender. Yoshida came to personify the new consensus among the Japanese elite for the nation's postwar direction. Although the Yoshida Doctrine was never formally articulated in the sense of the Truman Doctrine, the distilled essence of the concept was that Japan was now a merchant nation focused on economic development while under the security protection of the United States. The policy developed over a period of time, roughly from 1946 to 1955, and it is sometimes described as "unarmed neutrality." The immediate cause of the policy was the changed course from reform to recovery.¹⁸³ While this transition to recovery placed Japan on a new course to economic development, the subsequent Korean War provided the fuel to put Japan in motion. The Yoshida Doctrine had both an economic and political thrust. The economic thrust was toward the development discussed, and the political thrust was toward the idea of Japan as a "pacifist nation" under the guidance of the Constitution Article Nine "Peace Clause."¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ For a broad overview of Japanese postwar security policy see Hellman, Donald C., "Japanese Security and Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy," in Scalapino, Robert A., ed. *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) 321-240. For a similar discussion with a Japanese perspective see Momoi, Makato, "Basic Trends in Japanese Security Policy," in Scalapino, Robert A., ed. *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) 341-364.

¹⁸⁴ In discussing "A Role Japan Should Plan in International Affairs as an Advanced Nation of the Free World in Asia," Kajima Morinosuke identifies Japan's principle of "love for freedom and total dedication to peace." See Kajima, Morinosuke. *Modern Japan's Foreign Policy*. (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, Inc., 1969) 95.

3. Ideals and Interests

Amidst the ruin of postwar Japan, it was not difficult for the nation to establish a main priority. Economic survival and recovery was the overarching goal.¹⁸⁵ There was debate over how to accomplish this, and whether other objectives should be pursued, but consensus emerged over the Yoshida Doctrine as the means to that end. Table 8 portrays the basic interests of that time.

<i>Basic Interest at Stake</i>	<i>Intensity of Interest</i>			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland	JAPAN	...
Economic well-being	JAPAN	...
Favorable world order	JAPAN
Promotion of values	JAPAN

Table 8. Yoshida Doctrine.

a. *Defense Interest*

The defense interest was major. Significant historic antagonisms with China and the Soviet Union presented an important threat that risked Japan's security. While the United States viewed that threat in more ideological Cold War terms, Japan was subject to the threat in a more geopolitical sense. That the Allied Occupation was monopolized by the United States, in sharp contrast to the situation in Germany, was convenient and reassuring to Japan. The United States did not seek to provide Japan with long-term defense by design, but it became clear that such a policy was logical based on

¹⁸⁵ Edwin Reischauer describes the immediate postwar period in terms of "national survival" in, Reischauer, Edwin O. *Japan: The Story of a Nation*. (New York: McGraw Hill Publishing Company, 1990) 203-223.

the progression of events. The Korean War was most important in sealing the relationship in this context. Yoshida is noted for having remarked that the Korean War was “a gift from the gods.”

b. Economic Interest

The economic interest was major. Again the interest was based on varied motivations between Japan and the United States. Japan’s rationale for focusing on economic recovery and development was naturally self-interest. The United States, however, was more concerned with Japanese economic development as a means to enhance containment. This was to happen through a strong pro-U.S. Japan and the positive side effects of Japanese economic integration with the rest of non-Communist Asia. American protections combined with Japanese hard work allowed this to be a relatively effective Cold War strategy.¹⁸⁶

c. World Order Interest

The world order interest was peripheral. This interest collapsed with the redistribution of Japan’s imperial gains. Japan’s vision of an autonomous self-supporting empire was dashed as it was coercively integrated into the international community of democratic, market-oriented nations. Through its subservience in the Occupation, Japan did not openly communicate any desire for world order interests.¹⁸⁷ In private, though,

¹⁸⁶ James Fallows addresses the development of postwar Japanese economic interests in Fallows, James. *Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System*. New York: Vintage Books, 1995.

¹⁸⁷ For a discussion of the subtle nature of Yoshida’s foreign policy see Hosoya, Chihiro, “From the Yoshida Letter to the Nixon Shock,” in Iriye, Akira and Warren I. Cohen, eds. *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World*. (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1989) 21-35.

Yoshida admitted “history provides examples of winning by diplomacy after losing in war.”¹⁸⁸

d. Ideological Interest

The ideological interest was peripheral. The Yoshida Doctrine was both a domestic and foreign policy. On the foreign side it was passive and subordinate to U.S. policy. Because the Doctrine was, in this sense, inactive, it is difficult to identify ideological interests. Japan recognized that its aspirations for a leading role in the hierarchy of nations were to be put off. The Occupation force expected the Japanese to be hostile and resistant to change. Instead they were bound by duty and honor to assume a role of subordination that resulted in a mainly cooperative effort to repair Japan. In the same way, Japan at the national level contributed to a sort of international harmony in the new Cold War environment by assuming a low position.

4. Evaluation and Outcome

The Yoshida Doctrine was a highly interest based policy for Japan in the postwar era. The ideological contribution to this policy is visible, but minimal. Hunsberger and Finn summarize the Doctrine as one to “rebuild the nation, promote economic growth, and avoid big spending on rearmament....”¹⁸⁹ Seen from this angle, the Doctrine was almost a policy of necessity. After the war, Japan became highly critical of the prewar spiritual mobilization of the country that was effected by the military. Japanese felt victimized by the military and, consequently, cynical about the type of idealistic

¹⁸⁸ Fairbank, John K., Reischauer, Edwin O., and Albert M. Craig. *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, Revised Edition*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989) 286.

¹⁸⁹ Hunsberger, Warren S. and Richard B. Finn, “Japan’s Historical Record,” in Hunsberger, Warren S., ed. *Japan’s Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect*. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997) 26.

campaign that was waged previously by the government. With a low tolerance for this moralism, the economic aspects of the Yoshida Doctrine was a relatively “easy sell” to the public because of its realistic underpinning. However, the Doctrine was not without dissent. Various political groups in the 1950s supported the reinterpretation of, or amendment to, the Constitution for an actual military to be established. The evolving Self Defense Force did not technically qualify for this role.¹⁹⁰ Yoshida himself was not truly opposed to Japan having a military. His critical concern was the rate at which it developed and the security of civilian control over it. By 1957, a critical mass developed for consensus on this issue through the Basic Policy for National Defense.¹⁹¹ Following the contentious 1960 renewal of the Mutual Security Treaty, a broad and stable consensus in the government set in for the future of the Yoshida Doctrine concepts. The Yoshida Doctrine was a shift back toward a Japan that was inward looking, but outwardly aware. The country identified the internal things that needed to be fixed, imported solutions, and adapted them for local use. The ideals of democracy, freedom, and human rights in today’s Japan have their present roots in this period because of the transplants provided by the American Occupation.

The original, unarmed neutrality conceptualization of the Yoshida Doctrine continues to serve as a prototype in current Japanese defense debates. It can be simplified as “less Japanese defense effort, less U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.” The ideas of this approach include support for the Constitution, abolishment of the Self-

¹⁹⁰ For a look at the development of the military dimension of U.S.-Japan relations see Smith, Sheila A., “The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” in Green, Michael J. and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999) 69-93.

Defense Forces (SDF), and discontinuation of the Security Treaty.¹⁹² Those supporting this position were dominant in the immediate postwar period from 1945 until 1970. Postwar cynicism meant that the majority of the public was supportive of this position as well. Debate during the period was between the dominant pacifists and the rising political realists.¹⁹³ This school of thought supporting unarmed neutrality diminished significantly in the post-Cold War era.

G. FOREIGN POLICY AWAKENING: UNCERTAINTY AND THE “NIXON SHOCKS”

1. Preconditions

U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s demonstrated remarkable continuity considering the variety of personalities and parties represented in the White House. The constraints created by the formidable threat of the Soviet Union greatly restricted the freedom of action available to the President. The policy of containment articulated in NSC-68 was applied throughout this period with various degrees of nuance and success. While the Korean War resulted in a stalemate, it reinforced the perceived threat of global communism in the minds of the U.S. leadership. The United States had this in mind when the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed in 1954. Other cracks in the containment wall were effectively stopped in Malaysia and Indonesia, but when the French were defeated in Indochina, the United States saw that it had to stand up

¹⁹¹ Satoh, Yukio. *The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy*. (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982) 3.

¹⁹² Mendl, Wolf. *Japan’s Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interests*. (London: Routledge, 1995) 34.

¹⁹³ Kajima Morinosuke observes this transition progressing in a discussion entitled, “1969: A Year of Mounting Crises.” See Kajima, Morinosuke. *Modern Japan’s Foreign Policy*. (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, Inc., 1969) 301.

and support the wall. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson all played a role in U.S. entry into Vietnam. When Johnson realized that the war effort was unsustainable based on results in the field and domestic opinion, he set the stage for the dramatic shift in policy that would be declared by the soon-to-be President Nixon. Early during his administration, Nixon faced several crises for which his combined policy responses became known in Japan as the “Nixon Shocks.”¹⁹⁴

2. Events

The Nixon shocks were composed of three major series of policy changes that spanned a range of national interests.¹⁹⁵ The first one dealt with the most pressing foreign policy problem of the time, Vietnam. Johnson had ceased escalation in 1968, and Nixon quickly announced de-escalation and a new approach to the Cold War in a July 1969 speech made in Guam that became known as the Nixon Doctrine. In it he stated that the United States could no longer, “undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world.”¹⁹⁶ The United States would continue to provide a “nuclear shield” as well as military and economic aid to nations threatened by communism.¹⁹⁷ The nations would be required to supply their own personnel with the United States in a supporting role. The first application of this Doctrine took place in the form of “Vietnamization.” These steps and the concurrent end of the draft caused great concern in Japan. Concerned Japanese

¹⁹⁴ LaFeber, Walter. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997) 352-358.

¹⁹⁵ The latter two “shocks” are the events most commonly discussed by academics. The introduction of the Nixon Doctrine is grouped together with the other shocks because of its significant impact within a short chronological distance from those events.

¹⁹⁶ Bagby, Wesley M. *America’s International Relations Since World War I*. (New York: Oxford University Press: 1999) 284.

feared that the new policy was designed for Asians to fight Asians with the goal of furthering U.S. interests. Some even anticipated that Japan was to play a leading role under this concept.

The second Nixon shock took place in response to the economic relationship between the United States and Japan.¹⁹⁸ The U.S. economy had experienced a long boom since the Second World War, but it was slowed in the late 1960s in response to the exorbitant military expenditures of the Vietnam War, increasing oil prices, inflation, and inefficiency. U.S. attention turned to Japan because of its prolonged double-digit growth rates and the flood of Japanese goods causing rapidly growing trade deficits. The President came to see Japan as a rival in an economic war. The first step taken in response was to remove the dollar from the gold standard and let it float in the international currency market. This had the effect of increasing the yen's value and decreasing Japanese imports because of their higher price. Nixon then applied temporary wage and price controls to combat inflation and followed up with an import tariff of ten percent. The effect the President sought to achieve is brought home by the fact that these steps were announced on V-J Day in 1971.¹⁹⁹

The third and final Nixon shock occurred with announcement of the secret arrangement made in Beijing by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger for Nixon to

¹⁹⁷ Tokinoya Atsushi discusses the Japanese perspective of the defense "free ride" issue in Tokinoya, Atsushi. *The Japan-US Alliance: A Japanese Perspective*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986.

¹⁹⁸ Schaller, Michael. *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 210-244.

¹⁹⁹ LaFeber, Walter. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997) 354.

visit China in 1972.²⁰⁰ This visit opened a door in U.S.-China relations that had been shut since 1949.²⁰¹ The newly thawed relationship placed the Soviet Union at a significant disadvantage because the object of the trilateral superpower rivalry was no longer the United States. The other major effect was that Japan was blindsided by this development. Japan desired to open up trade and diplomatic relations with China early in the Cold War but was unable to do so because of the United States policy. As time progressed, Japan quietly took this step unilaterally and unofficially. By officially opening talks with China, the United States forced Japan to play political and economic catch-up. Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was ultimately unable to recover politically from the Nixon shocks.

3. Ideals and Interests

The Nixon shocks signified an overall downgrading of the intensity of U.S. national interests in the region. U.S. military forces fought in Vietnam during most of the 1960s for all four of the relevant basic interests. The U.S. national interest in Japan decreased as part of this broader strategy. Nixon's alignment of these basic interests is represented in Table 9.

²⁰⁰ Schulzinger, Robert D. *U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 296-298.

²⁰¹ For an overview on China's role in U.S.-Japan relations see Cohen, Warren I., "China in Japanese-American Relations," in Iriye, Akira and Warren I. Cohen, eds. *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World*. (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1989) 36-60.

<i>Basic Interest at Stake</i>	<i>Intensity of Interest</i>			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland	U.S.
Economic well-being	U.S.	...
Favorable world order	U.S.	...
Promotion of values	U.S.

Table 9. Nixon Shocks.

a. Defense Interest

The defense interest was peripheral. The Doctrine decreased the intensity of this interest from the major level in the Vietnam War back to the peripheral level found immediately after the Second World War.²⁰² Nixon declared that the United States would no longer carry the lion's share of combating communism in all of the brushfire wars around the world. He added, "we must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent on us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam."²⁰³

b. Economic Interest

The economic interest was major. Economic interest did not play the driving role for U.S. involvement in Vietnam, but it was a factor. The stagnating U.S. economy and Japan's relative strength caused the U.S. leadership to interpret Japan as

²⁰² For a discussion of the Nixon shocks and the shifting U.S. interests evidenced by the concurrent Ryukyu Islands reversion issue see Buckley, Roger. *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 115-137.

²⁰³ Bagby, Wesley M. *America's International Relations Since World War I*. (New York: Oxford University Press: 1999) 284.

conducting an economic struggle with the United States.²⁰⁴ The Nixon Administration's manipulation of macroeconomic tools indicates the major interest in this area.

c. World Order Interest

The world order interest was major. The Vietnam War was a demonstration of a vital interest in this area, but the Nixon Doctrine toned down the global containment of communism. The new détente relations with the Soviet Union also supported the diminished interest in Japan. The Presidential visit to China communicated a major world order interest as well. Although the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam was an admission of weakness, the budding relationship with China was a major gain to counteract this. The U.S. presence in Japan decreased accordingly at this time.

d. Ideological Interest

The ideological interest was peripheral. Henry Kissinger earned a reputation for his skepticism over the potential policy role of norms in any form. The ideals of democracy, freedom, and human rights held center stage in the Vietnam War through the concept of the Domino Theory. Pursuit of these values through foreign policy was significantly discredited in the failure of the Vietnam War. However, their deep roots in the American mind would cause them to quickly return.

4. Evaluation and Outcome

The early post-World War II period displayed a tempered idealism in U.S. foreign policy. The policy became progressively more idealistic with the succeeding Presidents. The Nixon shocks were thus an ideological reset to a more realistic foreign policy. This

²⁰⁴ U.S.-Japan economic conflict is detailed in Bergsten, C. Fred and Marcus Noland. *Reconcilable Differences?: United States-Japan Economic Conflict*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1993.

foreign policy was cynical, but it took place in a period of moral uncertainty demonstrated by the mismatch between the national leadership and public support. Nixon was followed by Presidents who were more idealistic than he was. This swing and the alternating support for ideals in foreign policy are indicators of moral uncertainty.

Still involved in the nominally ideological conflict of the Cold War, the U.S. ideological interest after Vietnam might have been major, but support was hollow because of Vietnam and societal changes in the United States. Public opinion in the United States at this time was characterized by an introspective attitude that contributed to the mismatch between national interests and will. This created a great incertitude in foreign policy because the national leadership attempted to dead reckon from the original vision of NSC-68 while the public had, in the meantime, changed course. The legacy of this turning point in foreign policy was a marked lack of consensus and resulting indecisiveness that remained for most of the Cold War. Ideals in foreign policy were to have a widely varied role after this, as seen by the contrast between the Carter and Reagan foreign policies.²⁰⁵

H. JAPAN'S POSTWAR HIGH: PRUDENCE THROUGH "COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY"

1. Preconditions

The postwar sense of crisis from Japan's national mobilization for recovery began to diminish by the late 1960s. By that time Japan was beginning to become known as a

²⁰⁵ John Spanier and Steven Hook characterize the transition from Carter to Reagan as "The Triumph of Realism Over Idealism" in Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. *America's Foreign Policy Since World War II*. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998) 209-210.

significant industrial power.²⁰⁶ That internally turbulent period resulted in double-digit economic growth for about a decade.²⁰⁷ The slogan of “growth at any cost” was reminiscent of ideologically charged language of the Meiji Restoration period. The dramatic success of the Yoshida Doctrine and the complementary economic growth resulted in a slowly increasing public support for the Mutual Security Treaty and the Self Defense Forces. Prime Minister Sato’s 1967 Three Non-Nuclear Principles were a good example of these trends in Japanese foreign policy.²⁰⁸ The appropriately named Nixon shocks became the first challenge to this carefully crafted balance in Japan. During the Vietnam War Japan was concerned that the United States would pressure it into the conflict. The announcement of the Nixon Doctrine and “Vietnamization” caused the opposite concern that the United States was now less committed to Japan’s security. The abandonment of the Bretton Woods system by taking the dollar off the gold standard had a similar effect. Trade friction at this time heated up dramatically and Japan was accused of taking a “free ride” on defense. Japan began to fear that the economic greenhouse available during the postwar Pax Americana might not last much longer. The “opening” of China likewise made Japan ask fundamental questions about the treaty relationship. They were concerned that the United States was attempting to renew its traditionally Sinocentric approach to Asia with Japan on the periphery. The Nixon shocks had their greatest impact in the Japanese political and business communities. The event that had

²⁰⁶ Keylor, William R. *The Twentieth-Century World: An International History*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) 428-434.

²⁰⁷ Borthwick, Mark. *Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998) 262-270.

²⁰⁸ Beasley, W. G. *The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic and Social Change Since 1850*. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995) 236-242.

the greatest effect on the public and the nation as a whole was the 1973-1974 oil shock caused by OPEC. Middle East oil dependency forced Japan to reevaluate the priorities and structure of its economy. Japan's overall concept of its own security would change in a similar fashion.

2. Events

When the 1973 Oil Crisis began, Japan was forced to seek other ways to enhance its "economic security," particularly through dramatic diplomatic advances.²⁰⁹ The country pursued other trade relationships to supply its resource requirements and undertook new methods of energy production such as nuclear power. Because of rapid fiscal austerity measures enacted by the government and the increasingly competitive cheap exports from domestic industry, Japan recovered relatively well in the 1970s. This series of events served as a reminder to Japan of its dependence on trade particularly for energy. This became an area of prime importance in the country's national security policy thereafter.

In 1975 after the fall of Saigon, the diminished presence of the U.S. military in the Asia-Pacific region became more apparent. It was also widely believed at that time that the superpowers had achieved strategic parity. Japan responded with the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) which was a sort of "bottom-up review" of Japan's defense capabilities.²¹⁰ The Outline concluded that Japan needed to boost its force structure with particular emphasis toward submarine and air defense. The NDPO

²⁰⁹ Satoh, Yukio. *The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy*. (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982) 4.

²¹⁰ Emmerson, John K. and Harrison M. Holland. *The Eagle and the Rising Sun: America and Japan in the Twentieth Century*. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1988) 119-139.

established a consensus for the concept of a “basic defense capability” that Japan needed to maintain. Because of its heightened sense of security, Japan saw an opportunity to assert itself with the concept of “omnidirectional diplomacy” and the announcement of the Fukuda Doctrine in 1977.²¹¹ According to Mendl, “[omnidirectional diplomacy] simply meant maintaining relations of mutual trust with countries in all directions, regardless of their political systems, size and geographical distance from Japan....”²¹² This policy was an incremental step away from the previous Prime Minister Takeo Miki’s “equidistant diplomacy,” which described the character of Japan’s earlier Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union and the PRC. Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo conducted a tour of the five ASEAN nations and made a pronouncement of Japan’s intention to work cooperatively with them. Japan’s effort to help stabilize Southeast Asia was foiled mainly by the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978. Soviet advances into Afghanistan and Vietnam caused Japan to look harder at its defense. As early as 1978 this trend was evident in Japan’s willingness to establish the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. This document was the first major step in making Japan an active partner in the defense element of the Treaty relationship. At the same time, the foundation for the concept of “comprehensive security” was being laid.²¹³

The Defense Agency director Sakata Michita appointed a “comprehensive security committee” in 1975 in order to respond to the recent shocks and to convince the

²¹¹ LaFeber, Walter. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997) 366-370.

²¹² Mendl, Wolf. *Japan’s Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interests*. (London: Routledge, 1995) 159.

United States that Japan should enhance its security through means other than defense.²¹⁴

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry quickly responded to the oil shocks by seeking “economic security” through the commencement of diplomatic initiatives to address the energy crisis. Under the influence of a 1978 report made by several public policy think tanks, the concept of “comprehensive security” entered the mainstream discussion of academics and policymakers.²¹⁵ The essence of comprehensive security was that Japan should work to enhance its security within the Yoshida Doctrine assumptions about security: self-defense and the US-Japan Security Treaty. Appended to this were the additional concepts of security through economics and diplomacy. Additionally, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei had acknowledged the need in 1972 for cultural diplomacy through the establishment of the Japan Foundation.²¹⁶ This step was an effort to promote an international understanding of Japanese culture. By the time Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi produced the 1980 Comprehensive National Security Study Group, the concept of comprehensive security had evolved to the degree that it encompassed defense, economic, political, and cultural components.²¹⁷ In this process Japan had identified the same four basic national interests used by Nuechterlein’s theory.

²¹³ For a detailed discussion of comprehensive security and foreign policy trends of the 1970s and 1980s see Akaha, Tsuneo. “Japan’s Comprehensive Security Policy: A New East Asian Environment.” *Asian Survey* Vol. 31, No. 4 (April 1991): 324-340.

²¹⁴ Bendahmane, Diane B. and Leo Moser. *Toward a Better Understanding: U.S.-Japan Relations*. (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1986) 113.

²¹⁵ Akaha, Tsuneo. “Japan’s Comprehensive Security Policy: A New East Asian Environment.” *Asian Survey* Vol. XXXI, No. 4 (April 1991): 324.

²¹⁶ Iriye, Akira. *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations*. (Chicago: Imprint Publications, Inc., 1992) 373.

²¹⁷ Katzenstein, Peter J. and Okawara Nobuo, “Japanese Security Issues,” in Garby, Craig C. and Mary Brown Bullock, ed. *Japan: A New Kind of Superpower?* (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994) 53.

In the 1980s the comprehensive security concept received official endorsement and wide public approval that endures as of this writing.

3. Ideals and Interests

The development of the comprehensive security doctrine was the first recognition by Japan that its narrow definition of security under the Yoshida Doctrine needed to be expanded. The array of interests that composed this doctrine is found in Table 10.

<i>Basic Interest at Stake</i>	<i>Intensity of Interest</i>			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland	JAPAN	...
Economic well-being	JAPAN	...
Favorable world order	JAPAN	...
Promotion of values	JAPAN	...

Table 10. Comprehensive Security.

a. *Defense Interest*

Japan's defense interest was major. The threat that caused the greatest concern was the expansionist Soviet Union of that time. Besides the discussed advances into Afghanistan and Vietnam, Soviet forces were stationed on the disputed Northern Territories islands immediately off the coast of Hokkaido.²¹⁸ In response, the comprehensive security doctrine shifted Japan away from its more insular policy of the 1950s and 1960s to a policy that was aligned with the West. After the "partnership" of the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S.-Japan relationship was first described officially by Japan

²¹⁸ Satoh, Yukio. *The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy*. (London: Internaitonal Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982) 7.

as an “alliance” in 1981 during a summit meeting between President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko.²¹⁹ Most of the rest of the decade was characterized by defense buildup and Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s description of Japan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” for the United States. These were significant changes in the formerly rigid Yoshida Doctrine.

b. Economic Interest

The economic interest was major. Economic interests drove the gradual shift in foreign policy following the Nixon and oil shocks in the early 1970s. Economic interests had led the Yoshida Doctrine when it developed early in the Cold War and they continued through the 1970s into the “bubble economy” of the 1980s. Turbulence developed in the economic aspect of Japan’s relationship with the United States throughout this period. Japan’s response was to only make slow, incremental course changes so as to preserve its major economic interest.

c. World Order Interest

Japan’s world order interest was major. In this period the world order interest continued to be a means for Japan to reach its economic interests. This was reflected in the gradual shifts that took place. The shift from equidistant to omnidirectional foreign policy under Prime Minister Fukuda enabled Japan to open official economic ties with China. When the defense interest increased to major with the Soviet advances, the omnidirectional concept was discarded. The Soviet threat similarly increased Japanese sensitivity toward its world order interest.

²¹⁹ Mendl, Wolf. *Japan’s Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interests*. (London: Routledge, 1995) 35.

d. Ideological Interest

The ideological interest was major. Japan recognized that it needed to improve its public relations effort in the early 1970s as a direct result of the Nixon shocks. The establishment of the Japan Foundation and similar measures were a completely new step in Japanese foreign policy. In this way the government was actually trying to foster international understanding for Japanese norms, interests, and institutions. Japan's desire for a role to establish harmony through consensus was readily apparent in the Fukuda Doctrine. Fukuda in his Southeast Asian tour promoted "heart to heart" diplomacy in order to build peace and prosperity in Asia.²²⁰ The importance of Japan's role was apparent also. Japan perceived both the United States and the Soviet Union to be superpowers in decline so it increased its international role through comprehensive security. Japanese foreign aid, known as Official Development Assistance (ODA), came into being in the 1970s and it played a prominent part in the new diplomatic efforts.²²¹

4. Evaluation and Outcome

Japanese foreign policy in the 1970s and 1980s was a reverse from the introversion of the postwar crisis toward openly outward involvement in the world. The economic interest continued to play the leading role, but the other interests were not far behind in the major intensity. Unease over the security of Japan's place in the postwar system was the leading cause. Comprehensive security was a type of innocent response

²²⁰ Iriye, Akira. *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations*. (Chicago: Imprint Publications, Inc., 1992) 374.

²²¹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Official Development Assistance*. Available [Online] <<http://www.infojapan.org/policy/oda/index.html>> [8 June 2000].

to the shocks administered to Japan.²²² It was a policy of measured ambiguity that created the flexibility for a wide range of policy options based on the changing global security environment. Ideological interests were present in this policy, but they appeared to play a significant but trailing role. Japan's policy actions demonstrate that its economic interest was at the major intensity level at a minimum. During the oil shocks, Japan used diplomacy to exchange relations with Israel for expanded negotiations with the Arab states.

The original conception of comprehensive security continues to serve as a prototype for a basic defense capability in the current debates in Japan. It can be simplified in contrast to unarmed neutrality as “less Japanese defense effort, more U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.” This movement included groups supporting maintenance of the Constitution and amendment of the Constitution, establishment of a minimum defense capability for the SDF, and expanded cooperation with the United States under the Security Treaty. Those advocating amendment of the Constitution in this group typically desired to maintain the Article 9 renunciation of war but wanted to assert the right of collective defense. The group supporting this position achieved dominance in the 1970s and 1980s. This position was a policy of moral prudence that was characterized by the Comprehensive Security policy. Public support for this position slowly increased during that period. The passage of the 1976 NDPO and 1978 Defense Guidelines signified the

²²² This period in Japanese history is sometimes described as “economic nationalism.” This form of nationalism is significantly different from wartime nationalism in Japan. This form of subdued nationalism is apparent in the *nihonjinron*, or “discussions on Japaneseness”, that took place in the 1970s and 1980s. For a detailed analysis see Yoshino, Kosaku. *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological Enquiry*. London: Routledge, 1992.

preeminence of this view.²²³ Debate during this period occurred between the dominant political realists and the rising military realists.

I. SUMMARY

Analysis of the four major turning points of this century in U.S.-Japan relations provides a macro-level look at the defining characteristics of each country and their application in the relationship. Presentation of these turning points within the periods that they helped to define illustrates the context of the events. Preconditions and outcomes show the way in which there is continuity between the events that still is marked by differentiation. Examination of the ideals and interests present in the events through the framework demonstrates the relative contribution they make in the policymaking process. In all cases, interests were the determining factor in the policy actions taken. Ideals acted as a lens through which interests were interpreted and then as a guide that shaped the policies in their execution. Ideals also served to amplify or dampen interests perceived to be involved in a specific issue.

A brief summary of the two countries' application of norms in foreign policy is provided below. Emphasis is placed on the characteristic normative tone of the policies of the respective periods. Differing opinions within the society are noted by focusing on both the policy elites' and the public's attitudes toward norms. The turning points are classified into one of four options: moral idealism, moral prudence, moral skepticism, or moral uncertainty. The selection of the policies' moral character is performed by assessing the completed evaluation in this chapter of the complex interaction between the

²²³ The incremental step made in 1970s Japanese defense policy by the NDPO and U.S.-Japan defense cooperation by the Guidelines was paralleled by the post-Cold War NDPO and Guidelines. For the 1996

perceived interests at stake and the normative views of the policy elite and public opinion. When the turning point periods were characterized by differing views between the policymakers and the population, the group with the more unified and coherent voice drove the moral quality of the policy. The policy outcome represents the net result of the synthesis between ideals and interests and their evaluation by the policymakers and the public.

1. U.S. Application of Norms

a. A Policy of Moral Idealism: The Washington Conference

The national leadership was characterized by a relatively strong and coherent *moral idealism*. The ostentatious idealism of the “spirit of Wilsonianism” continued among the elites but at a somewhat more subdued level. Liberal internationalism achieved predominance among much of the policy elites during the 1920s. The public was generally passionate about following this kind of leadership into the First World War but it shifted toward skepticism as the war dragged on longer than popularly expected. The public division over U.S. involvement in the war was eclipsed by the assertive policymakers who sought to enshrine idealist principles into postwar treaties and institutions. Public groups *arguing* the different sides created strong cross currents in the society and a compromise in the Washington Conference treaties. Nevertheless, the overall outcome was a morally idealistic set of treaties.

b. A Policy of Moral Skepticism: The Neutrality Acts

The leadership continued to be moralistic but was restrained by a *morally skeptical* population. The public confidence in government actions and institutions was

NDPO see The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Policy. *National Defense Program Outline*.

shattered by the unraveling of the agreements formed by the Versailles Treaty, Paris Peace Pact, and Washington Conference treaties. The Stimson Doctrine effort to respond to the Manchurian Incident and Roosevelt's desire to take sides in the Second World War were proscribed by a unified public sentiment against these steps. The relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches was dominated by *fighting* over the direction of policy. Congress particularly responded to public opinion at this time creating a division between it and the President. The Neutrality Acts were a policy that came out of a strong upwelling from the public. This marked cynicism developed into pragmatism as the crisis of war approached.

c. A Policy of Moral Prudence: The Reverse Course

The leadership was cautiously skeptical in the developing Cold War. President Truman especially was not willing to give the Soviets the benefit of the doubt to the degree that Roosevelt had in years prior. However, the robust public sense of accomplishment in the high of the postwar period created an unassuming *moral prudence* that was characterized by the desire to build U.S.-led institutions in the postwar order. In a minor postwar debate over the proper U.S. response to communism, policymakers decided that the United States should not build a massive propaganda machine and grand ideology to counter the efforts of the Soviets at the time. The consensus among the U.S. public was that the American victory and values spoke for themselves and needed no concerted sales effort. This general moral *consensus* helped to fuel the rapid demobilization but it was adaptive to the new threat. The reverse course in Japan was a

responsive policy that applied the new Cold War period ideology to the circumstances there based on these factors.

d. A Policy of Moral Uncertainty: The Nixon Shocks

The leadership was pragmatic after having participated in the Second World War and seeing the strengths and weakness of U.S. foreign policy since then. The public was passionate about issues of the day but the wide diversity of opinion resulted in an atmosphere of *moral uncertainty* characterized by general *questioning*. Cross currents over the place of norms were beginning to be seen again. The “establishment” and the “military-industrial complex” represented the more matter-of-fact view of American ideals while the “silent majority” deferred to the new “baby boomers”’ outspoken views against those ideals. The Nixon Administration responded to this shift and acted accordingly. The uncertainty of the era is especially noticeable in the ideological swings that took place from Kennedy-Johnson to Nixon and then later, Carter-Reagan.

2. Japanese Application of Norms

a. A Policy of Moral Uncertainty: Shidehara Diplomacy

The leadership was resistant early on in this period but adaptive and conforming in the Shidehara diplomacy because of the course change the society seemed to be making. The Shidehara diplomacy was a policy that characterized a Japan that was inward focused but outwardly aware. The policymakers became responsive both to the public drive for reform and the changing international environment. This created an atmosphere of pragmatism particularly among the policy elites and made them receptive to the influential liberal internationalist ideals of the period. The public was becoming increasingly concerned about the world situation and was developing an internal

atmosphere of *questioning*. The recent national accomplishments left the society wondering, “what next?” Cross currents began to be seen between progressivism and traditionalism as the seeds of conservative nationalism were slowly sprouting. Taken together these factors enhanced a sense of *moral uncertainty* as the country began to wonder about its place in the world.

b. A Policy of Moral Idealism: The China Invasion

The leadership was characterized by *moral idealism*. The public was skeptical over the country’s leadership resulting in general *arguing* and divisive social trends before the war. The China Invasion and GEACPS was a policy of extroversion carried out by the powerful traditional forces that controlled Japanese society in the 1930s. Voting patterns demonstrated the lack of social cohesion over the direction of the country.²²⁴ However, the military-controlled government coerced a forced consensus over the country’s direction. GEACPS, an “Asia for Asians,” and State Shinto were all products of the militaristic idealism in the 1930s. Although there was division within the government during of the war, moral idealism was the defining trait of the majority of the elites.

c. A Policy of Moral Skepticism: The Yoshida Doctrine

The leadership was highly divided about policy formulation. New constellations of political parties were rapidly shifting to adapt to the new postwar structure of government. The Yoshida Doctrine was a policy of introversion that was manifested by an inward looking society that was actively borrowing and adapting foreign concepts for the national recovery. There was agreement about future civilian

control of the military, but *fighting* over most other issues. For much of the early postwar period, Prime Minister Yoshida fought off opposition to his concepts of economic development, demilitarization, and reliance on the United States. The public mood was based on a powerful cynicism with no tolerance for the idealism that led the country into the war. This skepticism was sufficient to overcome the lack of consensus among the policymakers, and the resulting policy was a product of these forces. The early arguing after the war over the specific direction for the country transitioned into a new consensus in the late 1950s through the coalescing of a new political spectrum. *Moral skepticism* characterized the resultant policies.

d. A Policy of Moral Prudence: Comprehensive Security

The leadership was cautiously skeptical because of the changing security environment. Comprehensive security was a policy of extroversion that involved increased Japanese involvement in the world. The Nixon and oil shocks caused them to doubt the stability of the course they had earlier charted for the country. Caution prevented the government from make a major course change through a new policy. Comprehensive security was a careful, incremental adjustment to the foundation laid by Prime Minister Yoshida. The population had an outlook of *moral prudence* defined by a conforming and unpretentious sentiment over its economic accomplishments. This view combined with the policymakers' desire to develop a constructive, practical policy resulted in the concept of comprehensive security. The "economic miracle" created a postwar high that attracted broad policy *consensus* throughout the society. The masses

²²⁴ Fairbank, John K., Reischauer, Edwin O., and Albert M. Craig. *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, Revised Edition*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989) 712-713.

became very attached to the concept of a “pacifist nation.” The *nihonjinron* discussions “on being Japanese” were a forum that aired the society’s moral prudence. Norms were present in the policy of comprehensive security through a basic application of this *moral prudence*.

3. Evaluation of Analysis

The important points shown through this chapter’s analysis are summarized as follows:

1. The balance between ideals and interests in policy differs over time and by country.
2. The balance in the cases of the United States and Japan is decisively in favor of interests determining policy. Ideals inform the perception of interests at stake and shape the actions taken in response. Ideals also act as a magnifier or a muffler to interests perceived to be involved in a particular issue.
3. The United States demonstrates the enduring values of freedom, democracy, and human rights in foreign policy through concerns for civil liberties, rule of law, and the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. These norms are present in U.S. foreign policy to varying degrees over time.
4. Japan demonstrates the enduring values of freedom, democracy, and human rights in foreign policy through the characteristic Japanese concerns for harmony, rule by consensus, and responsibility. The Japanese application of ideals is not readily apparent to the outside

observer because the ideals are distinctively Japanese. Because of this, the potential for misunderstanding is high, and this factor is the source of a significant amount of friction in the U.S-Japan relationship. These norms are present in Japanese foreign policy to varying degrees over time.

5. The exploration of both the U.S. and Japanese worldviews provides a static structure that responds with dynamic behaviors when faced with problems that require decisionmaking responses. The static definitions of national ideals are insufficient to explain their basis in policy because they are applied in different ways depending on the circumstances.
6. The United States demonstrates significant swings in policy between the moral categories of idealism and realism. Both are dynamically displayed in two different ways. The tradition of idealism is present in moral idealism and moral prudence. The tradition of realism is present in moral skepticism. Moral uncertainty is a special case that can exhibit a variety of the other applications of morality to policy.
7. While they are less apparent, dynamic policy swings between idealism and realism also occur in Japan through the forces of progressivism and traditionalism. A contextualized understanding of the different moral basis in Japan is the necessary foundation to see this characteristic.
8. In both the U.S. and Japanese cases, the enduring norms and their dynamic application when combined have a synergistic effect that results in a pattern of constants and trends. Present events can be held up to this pattern for analysis upon which to look into the future.

The pattern of constants and trends is the recurring demonstration of four applications for morality in foreign policy. This cycle is summed up as follows: *Moral idealism* is the application of norms in a moralistic and overbearing way. It is commonly accompanied by significant disagreement in the country over which norms should be applied in policy. At some point, policymakers and the public become frustrated with the inability to realize these norms through foreign policy and enter a stage of *moral skepticism*, choosing not to promote norms through foreign policy. This stage of moral skepticism then devolves to where there is conflict because of the unraveling of the moral order that previously held consensus. Out of this conflict emerges a new moral agreement and *moral prudence* where morals are applied in foreign policy in a way that is free from affectation and excess. After the new moral order has been in existence for a time, it begins to be questioned. This results in new cross currents in society and a *moral uncertainty* where norms are applied in varied ways consecutively within policy. As the moral uncertainty increases it develops into a resurgent *moral idealism* in foreign policy that is highly vocal and immodest but not characteristic of a consensus in society. These four moral categories will next be used to look at present policy and then to analyze several common policy proposals for the future.

VI. IDEALS AND INTERESTS IN THE PRESENT AND FUTURE

The establishment of a synthesis between enduring, static values and their transient, dynamic application lays a solid foundation for viewing the U.S.-Japan relationship. It provides a balanced understanding of the past, a broad perspective for the present, and a contextual basis from which to look into the future. An examination of the four major turning points in modern U.S.-Japan relations creates a baseline of four archetypes from which to view the present and future relationship for comparison and contrast. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that a look at the present circumstances of the relationship should generate important similarities to one of the past cases. If a correlation exists between a pair of cases, then its potential to develop into the following archetype must be closely scrutinized. When this is done, the basis for looking into the future will be much stronger. Pyle comments on the importance of this approach and gives a taste of what may be expected,

Without a long-term historical perspective, we may be inclined to view Japan's future as an incremental adjustment to the recent past. This is not the case. Japan is entering a wholly new historical phase. Not only is the cold war era at an end. Not only will the Yoshida strategy be replaced. The end of the cold war unsettled all major countries. But the change that Japan is experiencing goes beyond this. The dynamics that shaped Japan's development over the past 125 years have changed. For more than a century, Japan's late development and its ambition to catch up with the Western world, to become a "first-rank country," were the critical factors in determining Japan's institutions and policies. Japan was driven by an intense late-development nationalism. Today Japan is becoming a status quo country in that it has a great stake in the preservation of the existing international order.²²⁵

²²⁵ Pyle, Kenneth B. *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era.* (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1996) 150.

As of this writing, the most recent event that marks Japan's transition into this new historic phase, or turning point, is the Persian Gulf War. The suggestion that the changed dynamic of Japan's transformation from a non-status quo power to a status quo power will be of great importance to this analysis.

A. THE PRESENT CONTEXT: AMERICAN IDEALISM AND JAPANESE UNCERTAINTY IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

The Persian Gulf War is the most important recent event that determines the current form and substance of the U.S-Japan relationship.²²⁶ Like each of the preceding turning points, the war was an external shock to Japan. Japan's response to the shock created significant tension with the United States, and it ushered in a new period in the relationship.²²⁷

1. Preconditions

The Persian Gulf War was prefaced by a mixed period in U.S.-Japan relations. The intensification of the Cold War drew the countries closer together but rising trade friction was simultaneously driving them apart. In the United States, President Ronald Reagan's two-term administration oversaw an economic recovery out of the "stagflation" that characterized most of the 1970s and a major defense buildup. President George Bush inherited a foreign policy of idealism through the strong anti-communism of the Reagan Doctrine. In Japan, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro oversaw the 1980s economic giant known as the "bubble" economy and a smaller defense buildup under the auspices of comprehensive security. This foreign policy had a large consensus backing in

²²⁶ Spanier, John and Steven W. Hook. *America's Foreign Policy Since World War II*. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998) 275-278.

Japan when the Gulf War took place. The 1978 Defense Guidelines provided a more solid foundation for military cooperation within the recently anointed “alliance.” U.S.-Japan cooperation on the controversial Strategic Defense Initiative is cited by many observers as having a decisive impact on the Soviet Union. The late 1980s was dominated by trade battles. Heated rhetoric was exchanged amongst the leadership of both countries. The United States charged Japan with having a closed market to support mercantilist policies while Japan charged the United States with fiscally unsound deficit spending and low personal savings. These issues soon paled in comparison to the sense of historic awe that accompanied the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union. The U.S.-Japan relationship had little time to react to these events before the world’s attention was redirected to Iraq.²²⁸

2. Events

Iraq initiated action by invading Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Saddam Hussein’s rhetoric preceding the invasion indicated that Iraq saw an opportunity in the immediate post-Cold War transition period to increase its sphere of influence. His primary accusation toward Kuwait was to charge them with stealing Iraqi oil revenues. Diplomatic exchanges between Iraq and the United States prior to hostilities led the Iraqi leadership to believe that the planned invasion would go unopposed.²²⁹ The Gulf

²²⁷ Roger Buckley describes this post-Cold War Japanese uncertainty in foreign policy as “minimalism: hesitancy abroad.” Buckley, Roger. *Japan Today*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 93-133.

²²⁸ The Persian Gulf War is presented as a case study in U.S.-Japan relations by Walter LeFeber in LaFeber, Walter. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997) 385-388.

²²⁹ Schulzinger, Robert D. *U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 363-366.

Cooperation Council was also unable to assemble a sufficient unified front to oppose the increasingly belligerent Iraq. Once the invasion commenced a sense of panic spread because at it was not clear whether Iraq was content to stop in Kuwait or would continue into Saudi Arabia. Israel was also alarmed because of the hostile rhetoric used by Saddam Hussein toward it. Although Israel later came extremely close to taking unilateral action against Iraq, it showed by its deference to the U.S.-led coalition that its interests remained in the major intensity level.

The initial shock experienced by the U.S. government was followed by some uncertainty over what the invasion meant and whether the United States should respond. After significant deliberations, President George Bush asserted that the Iraqi invasion “will not stand.” In an attempt to rally the American public, the U.S. leadership followed incremental successive strategies of communicating the economic and world order interests held by the United States in the situation. It was not until the Bush Administration articulated the ideological interest the United States held in the formerly “free and democratic” Kuwait that public support for Operation Desert Shield increased.²³⁰ It is unlikely, however, that alone this moral interest would have been sufficient to carry out the operation.

In its deliberations over the Iraqi invasion, Japan determined that it was not willing to support Operations Desert Shield and Storm with combat forces for the enforcement of United Nations (UN) resolutions. U.S. pressure for Japan to participate in

²³⁰ Texas A & M University. Index to Speeches by Bush. *Iraqi Aggression in the Persian Gulf*. Available [Online] <<http://www.tamu.edu/scom/pres/speeches/gbaggress.html>> [11 June 2000].

the coalition was met with stiff resistance in the Japanese government.²³¹ Isolated support was overwhelmed by the desire to maintain the current interpretation of the Constitution which would not allow such an operation. The government consecutively promised a limited peacekeeping force, medical support, medical logistics, and money as the crisis developed. None of these promises were substantially realized until the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill to begin withdrawing 5000 U.S. troops from Japan per year unless Japan assumed the full cost of U.S. forces in Japan.²³² Shortly thereafter, the Diet begrudgingly passed spending bills adding up to \$9 billion dollars to support the coalition. This process was criticized by many nations as “checkbook diplomacy,” and it resulted in a loss of prestige for Japan in the international community. Japan later contributed minesweeping vessels to the follow-up operations, but this was not enough to recover the credibility that was lost in the eyes of many nations.²³³

In anticipation of the UN resolution deadline for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, Allied Coalition war planners were uncertain of the Iraqi military’s intentions if forcible ejection became necessary. As a result, they planned for a worst-case scenario in which Iraq was expected to fight. The reality of combat resulted in the operationally decisive “100 hour war” and successful liberation of Kuwait. The scope of the UN resolution was primarily limited to the sovereignty of Kuwait so that it influenced the Allied Coalition from advancing deep into Iraq. The Iraqi military put up little resistance as it was ejected

²³¹ Armacost, Michael H. *Friends or Rivals? The Insider’s Account of U.S.-Japan Relations*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) 98-106.

²³² Pyle, Kenneth B. *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*. (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1996) 128.

from Kuwait, but whether fighting would have intensified if it approached Baghdad is a matter of speculation. It is reasonable to project that it would have as the Iraqi defense interest became vital near its capital city. A major lesson learned from the Persian Gulf War is that both Iraq and the United States misperceived the other side's calculation of the intensity of interests at stake. The United States did not think Iraq was willing to forcibly take over Kuwait, and Iraq did not think the United States would be willing to use force to protect Kuwait once it was invaded.

3. Ideals and Interests

The Persian Gulf War was a major shock to Japan's sense of comfort under the bubble economy and Comprehensive Security. The alignment of the major powers' interests upon the time of the invasion is portrayed in Table 11. As put by Nuechterlein, "Use of the matrix becomes more interesting when two or more countries' interests are compared in relation to the same issue."²³⁴

<i>Basic Interest at Stake</i>	<i>Intensity of Interest</i>			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland	KUWAIT SAUDI ARABIA	...	IRAQ ISRAEL	ALLIED COALITION JAPAN
Economic well-being	...	IRAQ KUWAIT SAUDI ARABIA	ALLIED COALITION ISRAEL	JAPAN
Favorable world order	...	IRAQ KUWAIT SAUDI ARABIA	ALLIED COALITION ISRAEL	JAPAN
Promotion of values	...	IRAQ KUWAIT SAUDI ARABIA	ALLIED COALITION	JAPAN ISRAEL

Table 11. The Persian Gulf War.

²³³ For a Japanese view of the impact of the Persian Gulf War on Japan see Funabashi, Yoichi, "Introduction: Japan's International Agenda for the 1990s," in Funabashi, Yoichi, ed. *Japan's International Agenda*. (New York: New York University Press, 1994) 2-4.

²³⁴ Nuechterlein, 81.

a. Defense Interest

The Allied Coalition and Japan had only peripheral defense interests because Iraq did not pose a direct threat to their nations. Japan, however, experienced an indirect threat to its defense interest not from Iraq, but the United States. U.S. coercion influenced the Japanese defense interest so that the government was willing to make a contribution to the effort. Nonetheless, Iraq started the chain of events but did not directly threaten Japan's defense interest. The mixed response from the international community prior to the invasion meant that the Iraqi homeland was not significantly threatened. Their defense interest was only major. The Iraqi homeland defense interest did not reach the vital level during combat with the Allied Coalition because of the limitations imposed by the UN resolution.

b. Economic Interest

Iraq had a vital economic interest in Kuwaiti oil revenue. Once the Allied Coalition demonstrated a willingness to fight, Iraq reassessed that interest as only major. In the consultations between the United States and Iraq prior to the invasion the United States communicated a major economic interest by its desire to negotiate and compromise. By developing a crisis response force in Saudi Arabia after the invasion, the U.S.-led Allied Coalition communicated that they actually held a vital interest in the previous economic status quo of the Middle East oil supply. Japan's rejection of a role in the Allied Coalition meant that it did not have a vital economic interest. Its hesitance to financially contribute to the Allied Coalition until the United States applied pressure appears to indicate that it only held a peripheral economic interest despite the efforts of those in Japan that wanted to become involved. However, it may be that rather than

joining the Allied Coalition in the Persian Gulf, Japan felt that it was smarter to buy its way out of the crisis by either paying the coalition to defend the oil supplies or to pay Iraq for the oil if it had won the war. The diplomatic flexibility Japan demonstrated during the 1970s oil shocks indicated that it was more committed to maintaining its supply of oil than maintaining principle based relationships.

c. World Order Interest

Iraq had a vital world order interest in invading Kuwait. Saddam Hussein communicated visions of a new order in the Gulf region that would be supervised by himself. Iraq's continued occupation of Kuwait for the duration of Operation Desert Shield and the bombing that followed caused the Allied Coalition to perceive that it still held vital interests in Kuwait, but when the war began they found that this was not the case. Iraq's massive retreat shows that the intensity of their interests had diminished. The Allied Coalition demonstrated the opposite orientation of interests by apparently appeasing Saddam Hussein up until the invasion, but then responding in force once he was there. The new reality of the world's fourth largest army demonstrating both the capability and intent to seize a monopoly on the majority of the world's oil reserves shocked the United States in action and leadership of a coalition. Japan, however, was not especially concerned with the Persian Gulf political order as long as its economic needs would still be met. In this way, Japan's response was similar to its Middle East diplomacy during the 1970s oil shocks when it broke away from U.S. support for Israel and began developing relations with the oil producing states.

d. Ideological Interest

Saddam Hussein conducted an aggressive ideological campaign prior to and following the invasion. Iraq's vital ideological interest in conquering Kuwait involved Iraqi nationalism with religious overtones. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia consequently held a vital ideological interest in countering Saddam Hussein's ideas. The United States initially was uninterested in the ideological stakes involved in the invasion. As President Bush progressively mobilized the public, the ideological interest raised to the vital level as the population became concerned with the violation of Kuwaitis' freedom and human rights atrocities. Moral idealism was employed by the U.S. government to enhance support for the war. The other members of the Allied Coalition certainly were less interested in the ideological issue at stake than the traditionally more morally-minded United States. If the economic and world order interests were not sufficient to motivate the American public, it seems that a combination of those interests together with the ideological one were therefore necessary. Japan's ideological interest in the war was characterized by uncertainty. The majority view held that Japan's ideological interest was irrelevant, but increasingly vocal groups in Japan asserted that the country had a duty to serve in a role with the coalition that fit Japan's status.

4. Evaluation and Outcome

The U.S. approach in the Persian Gulf War favored interests significantly over ideals. The U.S. leadership made the appeal to an ideological interest after articulation of the other interests did not work. Public support for the action then increased. The Japanese approach also significantly favored interests over ideals. The first concern was to observe its own interest as understood by the Comprehensive Security doctrine and the

second was to live up to the international community's expectations of it. When the international community expected Japan to act in a way that contradicted the principles of Comprehensive Security and the whole postwar security concept it was built on, a dilemma resulted. Japan solved the problem by making as small a commitment as it could in order to satisfy minimum international expectations. Some discussion of Japan's possible action centered on the country's role as a world class power, but the resulting interpretation focused on Japan's pacifistic character.

The Persian Gulf War had a dramatic effect on the U.S.-Japan relationship--given the war's remarkable outcome, unexpected nature, and great distance from both countries. Frustration was the general sentiment that described the relationship after the war. U.S. expectations for Japan to assume a role more appropriate to its status were disappointed. Since the Persian Gulf War, U.S.-Japan relations have slightly degraded to where the alliance seems to have entered an atmosphere consisting of uncertainty.²³⁵ Official proclamations assert the strength of the alliance, but unofficial statements and observations from academics lament the growing weakness of the alliance. Despite the Joint Declaration and Defense Guidelines Review, the United States is uncertain about Japan's willingness to assume an increased military role in the alliance, and Japan is uncertain about the United States' willingness to continue providing the bulk of Japan's defense.

²³⁵ Funabashi Yoichi laments a "drifting" alliance in Funabashi, Yoichi. *Alliance Adrift*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999. Michael Green expresses concern for "just how 'mutual' the treaty really is" in Green, Michael. "The Security Treaty at 40-Strong but with Complaints about Back Pain." *Comparative Connections*. April 2000. Available [Online] <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/001Qus_japan.html> [5 June 2000]. Steven Clemons makes comparable evaluations in Clemons, Steven C., "Japan Adrift Without Moral Mission," *JPRI Critique*, Vol. 2, no. 6, (June 1995). Available [Online] <<http://www.jpri.org/jpri/public/crit2.6.html>> [13 April 2000].

B. COMPARISON OF PRESENT EVENTS WITH PAST ARCHETYPES

The impact of the Persian Gulf War on ideals within the U.S. and Japan, the foreign policy of both countries, and the U.S.-Japan relationship is similar in many ways to the impact of the First World War on these factors.

International Security Environment

1. The wars were operationally decisive but strategically indecisive. Both wars created ambiguity in the security environment for the period that followed.
2. The wars marked a transition into a new global order that was characterized by relative uncertainty as compared with the stability that preceded them.
3. The wars were followed by new international security arrangements designed to minimize the uncertainty. The Treaty of Versailles and Washington Conference treaties followed the First World War, the enhanced NATO and updated U.S.-Japan relationship followed the Persian Gulf War. The League of Nations also shows some resemblance to the budding European Union.
4. The wars were followed by similar idealistic conventional wisdom about the nature of war. The First World War produced spiral theory and arms control, the Persian Gulf and end of the Cold War produced democratic peace theory and more arms control.

United States

1. The U.S. entered the wars under leadership using ideologically charged language. The public generally was motivated to follow along and very supportive of the wars. A shallow and controversial nationalism accompanied both periods.
2. Shortly after the completion of the wars, a new generation (the “Lost” and “X”) expressed increasing cynicism over the war and social issues. Societal cross currents resulted.
3. The wars were followed by developing concern over growing isolationist sentiment in the United States.
4. The United States made significant arms cuts after the wars.

Japan

1. Japan was ideologically subdued and sought to avoid participation in both wars but benefited greatly by both of them. Uncertainty was a common sentiment in both occasions.
2. Japan experienced a societal awakening in both periods where it questioned the dramatic accomplishments of its recent industrialization/recovery.
3. The wars were followed by developing concern over growing nationalism in Japan.
4. Japan continued a military buildup after the wars.

U.S.-Japan Relations

1. Both periods contained important but incremental turning points in the U.S.-Japan relationship short of the paradigm shifts that occurred with “opening” of Japan and the Second World War.
2. The wars were immediately followed by relative internationalism in the foreign policy of both the United States and Japan, creating a temporary convergence in economic and world order interests.
3. The wars were followed by a slowly unraveling world order where the past global hegemon’s power was questioned. The United States and Japan were powers that saw a common defense interest in preventing a spiraling arms race, thus creating the Washington Conference treaties in the 1920s and the updated U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 1990s.

As the preceding analysis demonstrates, a strong correlation exists between the present era and the post-First World War era. For ideals and interests, the U.S. exhibited moral idealism in both periods and Japan exhibited moral uncertainty in both periods. These similarities in aggregate suggest that recurring forces are at work in the security environment that can be used to better understand general timing, change, and continuity. A pattern of trends and constants develops that can be harnessed to study the U.S.-Japan relationship. A common basis between the two eras charts a course from which navigation into the future can be conducted more confidently. Predictions for incremental change in the U.S.-Japan relationship made after the First World War would have been wildly inaccurate. While it will not be suggested here that the United States is

headed for another total war with Japan, the pre-World War II period is important to investigate here for potential similarities to the immediate future. Pyle's suggestion to avoid future predictions of incremental change based on the recent past is solid advice from which to advance.

C. CONTEXTUALIZED LOOK INTO THE FUTURE

In keeping with the outline of this thesis, probable U.S. strategy options for the future will be examined first. This will provide a perspective to see the more reactive and dependent Japanese strategy options.

1. U.S. Policy Options

Immediately following the Cold War, a significant dialogue ensued attempting to determine what the U.S. role should be in the new international security environment. Although many ideas were proposed and discussed, those for Asia could generally be grouped into several major approaches for an appropriate U.S. security strategy. This overview draws several of those major options from Joseph S. Nye, Jr's "The Case for Deep Engagement." The various options will be described, analyzed, and then evaluated for likelihood given the past pattern of trends and constants in the U.S.-Japan relationship. Particular attention will be paid to the normative content of each of the options. A solid foundation for the U.S.-Japan relationship must be built on a greater integrated strategy for the region.²³⁶

²³⁶ For another overview of general U.S. policy options for East Asia see Samuels, Richard J. and Christopher P. Twomey, "The Eagle Eyes the Pacific: American Foreign Policy Options in East Asia after the Cold War," in Green, Michael J. and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999) 3-20.

a. A Strategy of Extreme Moral Skepticism: Isolationism

The first option is “to withdraw from the region and pursue a hemispheric or Atlantic-only strategy.”²³⁷ This in essence would represent a unilateral disengagement from the region. Proposals of this sort are generally labeled “isolationism.” This option in its extreme form would include a withdrawal of U.S. forces, discontinuation of the alliances in the region, and disavowal of other U.S. commitments articulated in the region. It argues that U.S. security and prosperity would be enhanced by disengagement. This is a strategy of extreme moral skepticism which asserts that the U.S. should evaluate all of its basic national interests in the region as peripheral.

Nye sets this option up as a strawman and simply concludes that it does not cohere with reality. Since the second manifest destiny brought the United States into the Pacific in the 1800s, the United States has maintained some level of engagement in the region. As Nye notes, “History, geography, demographics, and economics make the United States a Pacific power.”²³⁸ Because of this, at a minimum, the United States must stay involved in the region and find an appropriate strategy.

b. A Strategy of Tempered Moral Skepticism: Neo-Isolationism

“A second option would be for the United States to withdraw from its alliances in the region on the grounds that the Cold War is over. This strategy would let normal balance-of-power politics take the place of American leadership.”²³⁹ Although this option presumes that the United States intends to remain engaged in pursuing its

²³⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Case for Deep Engagement,” *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 74 (July/August 1995): 92.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, 92.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, 93.

interests in Asia, it would be a step toward “isolationism.”²⁴⁰ Richard Samuels and Christopher Twomey describe this as the “ally-free option: construct a standoff force” where “the United States could elect to sever its Asian alliances and abandon its bases abroad, yet retain the ability to intervene in Asian contingencies.”²⁴¹ This option also would involve a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan and maintenance of a standoff force. Relative to the post-World War II U.S. posture, this is a strategy of tempered moral skepticism. It recognizes limited U.S. interests in the region and assesses them mainly at the peripheral/major intensity level. This option is similar to the U.S. strategy in the 1930s with the Stimson Doctrine and Neutrality Acts.

Its promoters argue that the Soviet Communist threat was the reason for U.S. presence, and that threat is gone. It adds that South Korea has won the ideological and economic war with North Korea, and that its military is sufficient to deter an invasion from the North. It is not clear, however, that the region would remain stable if the United States departs. Many observers argue that this would spark a regional security dilemma and cause an arms race with possible nuclear implications. In addition, the eagerly anticipated decreased costs of not operating forward-deployed forces would be followed by increased costs of operating continental based forces. Furthermore, burden sharing would be lost and previous regional concerns could develop into full-blown threats.

²⁴⁰ Ted Galen Carpenter argues for such a strategy by withdrawing forward deployed forces in Japan in Carpenter, Ted Galen. “Paternalism and Dependence: The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship.” *Policy Analysis* No. 244. 1 November 1995. Available [Online] <<http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244es.html>> [14 June 2000]. Carpenter’s emphasis on the theme of dependence is reminiscent of Takeo Doi’s discussion of the concept of *amae*. See Doi, Takeo L, “*Amae*: A Key Concept for Understanding Japanese Personality Structure,” in Lebra, Takie Sugiyama and William P. Lebra. *Japanese Culture and Behaviour: Selected Readings, Revised Edition*. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986) 121-129.

Although this option contains significant risks, it hedges for the possibility that the U.S. alliances could become unsustainable or even undesirable at some point.

c. A Strategy of Moral Uncertainty: Collective Security

“A third option would be for the United States to try to create loose regional institutions to replace its structure of alliances in East Asia.”²⁴² This proposal would substitute the United States’ current alliances with Australia-New Zealand, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines with a form of collective security organization.²⁴³ According to Samuels and Twomey, “It would aim to create an inclusive security community with primary emphasis on established traditions in international law.”²⁴⁴ This type of multilateral organization might resemble the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and it could have the ability to promote transparency, build confidence, and integrate regional powers. It is based on the idealistic premise that security can be maintained through multilateral collective security organizations. For the United States it would also be based on some cynicism that U.S. involvement in the region should not be in the role of the over-involved hegemon.

U.S. interests in this option would likely be placed at the major/peripheral intensity. This option shows some similarities to the proposed Open Door Notes

²⁴¹ Samuels, Richard J. and Christopher P. Twomey, “The Eagle Eyes the Pacific: American Foreign Policy Options in East Asia after the Cold War,” in Green, Michael J. and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999) 15.

²⁴² Nye, “The Case for Deep Engagement,” 93.

²⁴³ Policy recommendations that combine some of the aspects of collective security and neo-isolation are provided in Mochizuki, Mike, ed. *Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997.

²⁴⁴ Samuels, Richard J. and Christopher P. Twomey, “The Eagle Eyes the Pacific: American Foreign Policy Options in East Asia after the Cold War,” in Green, Michael J. and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999) 9.

arrangement at the turn of the century. Driven mainly by economic interest, Secretary of State John Hay tried to create an agreement among the European powers in Asia and Japan. This option also shows some similarities to the Nixon Doctrine and Carter approach. President Nixon desired for the Asian nations to take an increased role in defense. The young ASEAN appeared to be heading for such a role with Japan's Fukuda Doctrine. President Carter continued this approach by proposing U.S. withdrawal from South Korea.

Nascent security organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have laid the precedent for this type of arrangement in Asia. The League of Nations experience suggests that this type of arrangement would not work, but promoters would argue that the League was not done right. The case of the CSCE would suggest that this type of organization requires a relatively stable balance of power institutionalized in a military alliance. This option may or may not involve U.S. forces withdrawal from Japan; Japan would probably be a cornerstone of this collective organization. The traditions of idealism and realism are both visible in this option and it is resultantly a strategy of moral uncertainty with idealistic leanings.

d. A Strategy of Moral Prudence: Regional Alliance

“A fourth hypothetical alternative would be to create a NATO-like regional alliance.”²⁴⁵ According to Samuels and Twomey, this “strategy looks to the example of NATO and suggests that American interests in East Asia can best be pursued through a tight, formal, militarized alliance aimed against the threatening power or

²⁴⁵ Nye, “The Case for Deep Engagement,” 93.

powers.”²⁴⁶ They propose a possible “Pacific Treaty Organization” (“PaTO”) for this purpose. This option requires a threat orientation or hegemonic promoter to distinguish it from the somewhat ambiguous collective security proposal.²⁴⁷ The alliance would most likely be promoted by the United States and be directed against a China or Russia threat. This option is a strategy of moral prudence where the United States seeks to actively pursue its ideals and interests in a pragmatic way. U.S. interests in this option would remain at the major/peripheral intensity. It shows similarity to U.S. intentions for the post-World War II order in Asia. A NATO-type alliance was sought but the weak Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) had to suffice.

It is debatable whether the potential threats of China or Russia can be characterized as “clear and present.” Although NATO currently exists without a definitive threat, it originally required one to be established. The threat orientation for this type of alliance would result in a containment-like strategy that could transform an undetermined threat into a determined one, thus creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. U.S. forces may or may not be withdrawn from Japan under this option; Japan’s participation in this type of organization would be tenuous because of its legal restrictions, perhaps it would assume an observer status.

e. A Strategy of Moral Idealism: The Nye Initiative

Nye concludes that the preferred option is U.S. leadership. The security framework developed by Nye became known as the “Nye Initiative,” which was later

²⁴⁶ Samuels, Richard J. and Christopher P. Twomey, “The Eagle Eyes the Pacific: American Foreign Policy Options in East Asia after the Cold War,” in Green, Michael J. and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999) 9.

codified into official policy through the government's 1995 East Asia Strategy Report. "The Clinton administration has decided that this is by far the best alternative for both the United States and countries in the region. Indeed, that is the message we receive from countries there."²⁴⁸ The three parts to this strategy include: 1. Unilaterally maintaining a domestic consensus for the forward-based troop presence, 2. Bilaterally reinforcing our alliances, and 3. Multilaterally developing regional institutions. The essence of the US leadership approach is that the United States is a status quo power that seeks to prevent hegemonism and to maintain stability among the great powers of the region. It will do this by the means of the ideology of "engagement and enlargement" found in the Clinton Administration National Security Strategy documents. This philosophy has realistic overtones but it contains several idealistic assumptions about the international system:

1. The free market is universally attractive because it inevitably yields greater economic benefits. Except for tyrannical regimes whose power might be threatened by the free markets, nations tend to gravitate toward the free market.
2. Even inherently tyrannical regimes will tend to adopt the free market in order to maintain a position within the international system. When encouraged with investment and trade, these regimes will liberalize and increase democratic tendencies.
3. In a corollary assumption, societies that are democratized will tend to defend both market reforms and human rights. Democracy, market reforms and human rights are mutually reinforcing concepts.
4. Countries that are democratic and have free markets will not be political and military competitors with other democratic, market-oriented countries because the risks outweigh the benefits.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁷ David Richardson investigates these types of options in Richardson, David J. "US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Possibilities for Regional Stability." *Parameters*. (Summer 2000): 94-104. Available [Online] <<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/00summer/richards.htm>> [3 June 2000].

²⁴⁸ Nye, "The Case for Deep Engagement," 94.

²⁴⁹ Stratfor. "Retrieving the Irrecoverable: The Clinton Foreign Policy Legacy." (5 June 2000). Available [Online] <<http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/060500.ASP>> [6 June 2000].

This idealism has been prominent in the execution of U.S. foreign policy in this area through the communication of concepts such as “strategic partnership,” democratic peace theory, Cold War triumphalism, unilateralism, and human rights pressure.

This option involves continued U.S. forces present in Japan and an increasing but still marginal role for Japan in the alliance. The consequence is the creation of an important, incremental shift in U.S.-Japan relations. U.S. interests in this option remain at the major intensity. The option is a strategy of moral idealism because it seeks the best of all the other options and to some extent pursues them, but runs the risk of producing a result that would be worse than any one of the other options pursued alone. Its three-part strategy is similar to the strategy pursued in the Washington Conference treaties.

1. The United States in the 1920s-1930s unilaterally maintained forward presence in the Philippines and Guam. The U.S. fleet was also moved to Hawaii in the late 1930s.

2. The Five Power treaty created a multilateral arms limit, but the focus was on bilateral relations with Japan. This treaty also enhanced informal bilateral relations between the United States and Great Britain.

3. The Nine Power treaty multilaterally developed the regional institution of the Open Door policy.

The Four Power treaty multilaterally developed a regional institution of consultation among the powers. With the various approaches of extreme isolationism and multilateralism discredited or inappropriate for the current situation, Nye sees that United States leadership is the right option.

f. Policy Proposal Evaluation

All of the policy options show varying degrees of similarity to major paradigms of past United States foreign policies. The correspondence between the Nye Initiative, which became official U.S. policy, and the Washington Conference treaties reinforces basic comparison made between the two periods. The likelihood of the other policy options is insightful for projecting future U.S. policy. The details of the future U.S.-Japan relationship will be determined by future U.S. policies.

The extreme moral skepticism of isolationism is not taken seriously yet as an option. While it does have its proponents, the proposal does not appear likely in the near term (the next 5 to 10 years). For this option to be discussed seriously, a global economic crisis on the order of the Great Depression and following protectionism would probably be required. However, the United States maintained forward-deployed forces even throughout the height of isolationism in the 1930s and would likely do so during any such future economic downturn.

The tempered moral skepticism of neo-isolationism has become a common discussion point in the post-Cold War period. Despite appeals to a "new economy," U.S. fortunes of the 1990s are bound to experience a recession sometime in the near term. Because of the close linkage demonstrated since 1970 between U.S. economic woes and a poor quality of U.S.-Japan relations, this option will become more attractive in the near term after a U.S. economic downturn. This situation will be strengthened if relations on the Korean Peninsula continue to improve, thus creating a less apparent need for U.S. forces there and in Japan.

Moral uncertainty about the U.S. role as hegemony, among other factors, has motivated much discussion in the post-Cold War era about a collective security arrangement. Enhancement of the capabilities of ARF is a popular proposal particularly among U.S. observers of the region. Methods to create confidence-building measures between nations are a fundamental building block in this option. Despite these factors, relations between East Asian nations are still weak, and historic rivalries appear to be growing since the Cold War rather than receding. This option cannot be considered likely until the long term (the next 25-50 years). Its potential development could resemble the evolution of NATO and CSCE out of opposing regional alliances in a similar future Asian security environment.

The moral prudence of a regional alliance is not a common policy prescription in the post-Cold War era. The United States has neither the unassuming, tempered idealism required nor the persistent, persuasive realism to form such an institution. The actual regional security environment also seems unfit for such an arrangement. This option is unlikely in the near term because of the strong unilateral sentiment common in East Asia at present, but it would become a strong possibility after a global or major regional war. The possible PaTO could become a reality after a major war in a like manner to the post-World War II NATO in 1949. This option is thus a distinct possibility in the mid term from 10-25 years.

The moral idealism of the Nye Initiative is an option that is likely to be continued for the near term. Uncertainty in the East Asian security environment and ambiguity over the strong but shallow support for U.S. involvement in Asia make this option probable to continue. The next U.S. economic crisis or Asian security crisis will

reveal the depth of support for this option. The general Nye Initiative approach will continue for the near term and likely be updated with a form of neo-isolationism afterward. The Washington Conference treaties were in force until the mid-1930s but were effectively shattered by the Manchurian Incident in 1931. Moral idealism about the potential of the treaties to maintain security and peace gave way to the cynical Neutrality Acts that defined the 1930s. The Nye Initiative has been in force since the 1996 Joint Declaration and following Defense Guidelines. An aggressive interventionist foreign policy in the post-Cold War era shows signs of straining the U.S. public's confidence in that type of role for the United States in the world. The cumulative effect of low/medium intensity military actions taken with indecisive results is affecting the national psyche. This includes operations in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The alleged unwillingness of the U.S. public to tolerate personnel casualties or "collateral damage" is demonstrative of this growing skepticism. These factors show a growing trend toward isolationist sentiment in both the public and many of the policy elites. Neo-isolationism in the United States will have a great impact on future Japanese security policy. This assumption will be the basis of analysis for projections in Japanese policy.

2. Japanese Policy Options

For an investigation into the future prospects for the U.S.-Japan Japanese security policy, the prospects advanced in the 1993 RAND study, *The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in Japanese Security Policies* will be used.²⁵⁰ In this study the authors see four alternatives for Japanese security policy based on the general strategy prototypes of unarmed neutrality, basic defense capability, autonomous defense, and independence.

Description of the policies will be followed by analysis of their likelihood given several assumptions. The preceding evaluation of the similarities between the present and the 1920s demonstrated a pattern of trends and constants that will serve as assumptions for examining the potential Japanese policy options. The likelihood of these policies will be analyzed using these assumptions and a bias against linear projection of current conditions. These assumptions are: 1. Progressive unraveling of the global security environment characterized by increasing regional instabilities. 2. Slight increase in regional stability in the near term with improvements on the Korean Peninsula but decreased stability in the mid term with emergence of Chinese threat. 3. U.S. continuation of present policy in the near term. 4. U.S. policy shift toward neo-isolationism in the mid term and strained relations with Japan pending next U.S. economic downturn.

a. *Option One: “A Continuing But Troubled Partnership”*

The most likely policy path identified by the authors of the RAND study's a continuation of the status quo: basic defense capability. “Barring a major rupture in U.S.-Japan relations over economic or other tensions, current trends suggest a continuation of Japan's general policy direction.”²⁵¹ Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. alliance while slowly developing its military. This view holds that Japan has successfully balanced a defense dilemma described by Chalmers Johnson as that between

²⁵⁰ Levin, Norman D., Mark Lorrell, and Arthur Alexander. *The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in Japanese Security Policy*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993) xiv.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 106.

“revived militarism” and being a “free rider.”²⁵² Japan’s consensual approach to public policy lends itself to a fundamentally conservative outlook that explains the incremental steps taken in security policy. Three major factors will reinforce current trends. First, the instability in Japan’s region will continue to cause it to rely on U.S. defense because of its own defense weaknesses. Second, the convergence of national interests in both countries remains strong. Third, the growth of shared values in democracy, liberty, and the rule of law enhance development of a tradition of common experience between the countries. In sum, Japan’s security policy will continue to make iterative changes within the greater paradigm of post-Cold War relations.²⁵³

b. Option Two: “New Global Partnership: Expanded US-Japan Cooperation”

This option fits in the category of basic defense capability and moves toward the autonomous defense. The authors state,

A new global partnership orientation would involve a continuation of Japan’s basic defense buildup approach and maintenance of close defense ties with the United States. The principal added element would be a newly developed security concept that would rationalize expanded Japanese military cooperation with the United States in the interests of maintaining international and regional security.²⁵⁴

This would potentially include Japanese participation in collective security or similar steps. “Such a development assumes a continued sense of vulnerability, successful management of U.S.-Japan economic tensions, and establishment of a wider basis of

²⁵² Chalmers Johnson, *Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State*. (New York: Norton and Company, 1995), 269.

²⁵³ Saito Toshio describes the basic characteristics of the security policy that would likely constitute process in Saito, Toshio, “Japan’s Security Policy,” *National Defense University: Strategic Forum*, No. 163, (May 1999). Available [Online] <<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum163.html>> [13 April 2000].

political support within Japan.”²⁵⁵ This new defense concept would likely be adopted in a similar fashion to the growth of Comprehensive Security in the 1970s.²⁵⁶

c. Option Three: “Détente Defense: Defense Cutbacks and Policy Equidistance”

This option fits in the category of basic defense capability but is a redirection to some of the “omnidirectional” security concepts of the 1970s. This alternative emphasizes the diminished Russian regional military capabilities and an interpretation of decreased regional tensions.²⁵⁷ The Japanese response to these conditions would constitute a “détente defense” where Japan would maintain its basic defense capability and cutback on modernization and buildup. “Increased efforts would probably also be made to fashion Japanese concepts of international security, with stepped-up efforts to provide regional and global leadership aimed at arms control, nonproliferation, and a non-dominationist approach to the resolution of international disputes.”²⁵⁸

²⁵⁴ *The Wary Warriors*, 113.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Sasae Kenichiro addresses the potential for Japan to seek a wider role in Sasae, Kenichiro. *Rethinking Japan-US Relations*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994.

²⁵⁷ The Russia factor in Japanese foreign policy is largely a function of the Kuril Islands issue. For Russia’s involvement in the security relations of the region see Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. *The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995.

²⁵⁸ *The Wary Warriors*, 115.

d. Option Four: "Autonomous Defense: Nationalism and Military Buildup"

This option fits in the category of autonomous defense and can move toward independence.²⁵⁹ Three conditions are required for Japan to move toward a more self-reliant posture. First, there must be a significant rise in the perception of military threat. Second, there must be a significant decrease in the perception of U.S. commitment. Third, there must be a new political consensus for an enhanced military capability. "Japan would maintain its security alliance with the U.S. (assuming the U.S. agreed to keep it) but would place greater emphasis on strengthening Japan's indigenous military capabilities than on defense cooperation with the U.S."²⁶⁰

e. Policy Proposal Evaluation

The first alternative of "a continuing but troubled partnership" is the course that the relationship has taken since the study was published in 1993. While the US-Japan economic relationship is significantly improved over the tensions of the early 1990s there is still unease. The factors described in this alternative that reinforce the alliance are still present. However, increased U.S. isolation would prevent this option from enduring into the mid term. Increased regional stability will reinforce this option in the near term but decreased regional stability will hinder it in the mid term. This option represents the continuation of present conditions for basic defense capability into the future. It will be attractive in the near term with slight adjustments.

²⁵⁹ In 1998, former Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro recommended a reformation of the alliance that could be a potential model for movement toward an autonomous defense policy. See Hosokawa, Morihiro, "Are U.S. Troops in Japan Needed?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 4, (July/August 1998): 2-5.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 116.

The second alternative for “expanded US-Japan cooperation” has not come to pass. Although there remains a Japanese sense of security vulnerability, and economic tensions have been managed, there is no new consensus in Japan for a greater security role than presently.²⁶¹ This enhanced version of the basic defense capability seems to have been the desire of many U.S. policymakers in the Nye Initiative, but it was frustrated by Japanese unwillingness to significantly alter the established comprehensive security doctrine to the post-Cold War security environment. Increased U.S. isolation may cause this option to be a brief transient state toward autonomous defense. Increased regional stability in the near term will hinder this option but decreased regional stability in the mid term will reinforce this option.²⁶² This option is an incremental change from the present, and it is evaluated as somewhat possible in the near to mid term.

The third alternative for “defense cutbacks and policy equidistance” has not come to pass either. Decreased regional stability has largely inhibited this option although Japan shows some signs of attempting some of the ideas formulated here. Increased U.S. isolation will prevent Japan from reversing its course in self-defense trends. Increased regional stability in the near term would reinforce this option but decreased regional stability in the mid term would hinder it. This option involves a regression of the basic defense capability and is thus unlikely in the future.

The fourth alternative “nationalism and military buildup” has gained ground since the 1993 study. There is an increased threat perception in Japan and a

²⁶¹ Hunsberger, Warren S., “Japan’s International Role, Past, Present, and Prospective,” in Hunsberger, Warren S., ed. *Japan’s Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect*. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997) 206-224.

lingering concern over US commitment in the alliance. However, a new consensus has not been reached for a greater military capability. Increased U.S. isolation will make this option attractive as Japan feels increasingly insecure. Increased regional stability in the near term will hinder this option but decreased regional stability in the mid term will reinforce it. This option for Japanese autonomy is the most likely in the mid term. The RAND study does not project a specific policy option for an independent defense capability, but this cannot be ruled out in the mid term.²⁶³

There are signs in post-Cold War Japan that a debate over the country's fundamental security concept is beginning again. The high period of the 1970s and 1980s were relatively uniform intellectually in terms of security debate. The dominant interpretation of Japan's identity during that period is encapsulated by a 1970 white paper statement, "Japan is a great power economically, but it will not become a great power militarily. Rather it will become a new kind of state with social welfare and world peace as its goals."²⁶⁴ Although the statement speaks of where Japan was headed, this view achieved orthodoxy for most of the period since the war. Because of the broad appeal for these views, they represent traditionalism in the developing discussion. The new seeds of

²⁶² Victor Cha investigates the potential of the Korea factor in U.S.-Japan relations in Cha, Victor D. *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.

²⁶³ A different perspective on Japan's direction is presented in Lincoln, Edward J. *Japan's New Global Role*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993. For a Japanese view see Sato, Ryuzo. *The Chrysanthemum and the Eagle: The Future of U.S.-Japan Relations*. New York: New York University Press, 1994.

²⁶⁴ Fairbank, John K., Reischauer, Edwin O., and Albert M. Craig. *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, Revised Edition*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989) 854.

progressivism are found in many different areas now.²⁶⁵ The most prominent announcement of this type has come from political leader Ozawa Ichiro in his *Blueprint for a New Japan*.²⁶⁶ Ozawa proposes that Japan become a “normal” nation where its military, political, and economic capabilities are balanced.²⁶⁷ This theme has struck a chord in Japan and it is being discussed with increasing frequency.²⁶⁸ This developing debate between traditionalism and progressivism is complicated by the fact that “progression” to a normal Japan is in some sense a return to a balanced prewar Japan. Therefore, this currently progressive trend is also in some sense traditional. Other progressive trends in Japanese foreign policy include increased attention to multilateral organizations and arrangements. Proposals for an Asian Monetary Fund and Japanese cooperation in combating seagoing piracy are examples of these new directions. These issues are only beginning to be discussed in Japan; it will be quite some time for they are resolved.

²⁶⁵ For an alternative view on Japan’s intentions during its transition period beginning in the late 1980s see Burstein, Daniel. *Turning the Tables: A Machiavellian Strategy for Dealing with Japan*. New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1993.

²⁶⁶ Ozawa expresses particular concern for a potential cycling of history, “If we remain unable to make decisions, we will simply be dragged along by events; we will fail to make even humanitarian contributions to the outside world, and Japan will find itself isolated from the international community. Isolation is where the true danger lies. The ‘history’ we dread repeating would be Japan’s failure to cooperate with Britain, the United States, and the other nations of the world. We must not forget this history.” See Ozawa, Ichiro. *Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation*. (New York: Kodansha America, Inc., 1994) 26.

²⁶⁷ Japan as a “normal nation” is contrasted with the prevalent view of Japan as a “civilian power.” For an analysis of Japan as a “civilian power” see Drifte, Reinhard. *Japan’s Foreign Policy*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990.

²⁶⁸ The developing debate is addressed in Fukuyama, Francis and Kongdan Oh. *The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993.

3. Evaluation of Trends and Constants into the Future

The Washington Conference treaties and Shidehara Diplomacy serve as archetypes for the near term in the U.S.-Japan relationship. The 1920s were a period of unraveling and uncertainty in international relations that closely resembles the current period. The United States and Japan in the 1920s attempted to establish a degree of order through their political, economic, and military arrangements. The choices made by countries at that time sped up the crumbling world order and led to the Second World War.

The near term in Japanese security policy will be characterized by an incremental continuation of the present conditions.²⁶⁹ Japan will maintain its relative internationalist approach to foreign policy, minimalist stance on self-defense capability, broad consensus for gradually enhanced U.S.-Japan cooperation, and slow approach to Constitutional Review.²⁷⁰

The Neutrality Acts and China Invasion serve as archetypes for the mid term. The 1930s were a period of contention and crisis in international relations that will mirror the future in the mid term. There is an important difference in the alignment of the security environment between the 1930s and the upcoming crisis for the U.S.-Japan relationship, however. In the 1930s, the United States was a status quo power, Japan was a non-status quo power, the Soviet Union was a status quo power, and China was a

²⁶⁹ For a brief overview of several of the projected external factors in the U.S.-Japan relationship see Watanabe, Akio and Hisayoshi Ina, "Changing Security Environments and Their Impacts on U.S.-Japan Relations," in Hosoya, Chihiro and Tomohito Shinoda, eds. *Redefining the Partnership: The United States and Japan in East Asia*. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1998) 15-28.

²⁷⁰ Mike Mochizuki places special emphasis on the change factors of domestic politics, public opinion, and generational shifts in Mochizuki, Mike. *Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy*. Santa Monica,

peripheral power. Seventy years later, the United States and Japan are status quo powers, Russia and China are non-status quo powers.²⁷¹ This increases the likelihood of a major war in Northeast Asia in the mid term. Japan's new role as a status quo power will be the difference in preventing the extremely aggressive militarism of the 1930s and 1940s. However, this does not mean that Japan will not become a military power. China and perhaps Russia's likely future belligerence will make Japan feel very insecure.

The mid term will be characterized by a significant shift in policy that may question the assumptions of the Yoshida Doctrine paradigm. Japanese foreign policy will become increasingly insular and oriented toward Asian regionalism as U.S. commitment decreases. Potential regional crises will heighten Japan's sense of insecurity. Defense autonomy and possible independence will characterize the midterm with decreased reliance on the U.S.-Japan relationship.²⁷²

CA: RAND, 1995. Reinhard Drifte also focuses on domestic factors of change in Drifte, Reinhard. *Japan's Foreign Policy*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990.

²⁷¹ Abramowitz, Morton, I., Funabashi, Yoichi, and Wang Jisi. *China-Japan-U.S.: Managing the Trilateral Relationship*. (New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998) 21-36. For another look at China's impact on Japan see Iriye, Akira. *China and Japan in the Global Setting*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.

²⁷² Okazaki Hisahiko sees increasing tensions in U.S.-Japan relations approaching in the same time frame but bases his conclusions on slightly different assumptions. See Okazaki, Hisahiko, "A National Strategy for the Twenty-first Century," *Japan Echo*, Vol. 26, No. 5, (October 1999). Available [Online] <<http://www.japanecho.com/docs/html/260512.html>> [4 April 2000].

VII. CONCLUSION

The United States-Japan alliance is undergoing a change. The change is evident in the shifting security environment, changing Japanese behavior, and an altered understanding of the alliance relationship. This thesis examined the relationship's foundation in "shared values and interests." It found that policies are made primarily based on interests with values shaping the perception of interests involved and actions taken in response. In a similar fashion, international security system level factors that were external to the state generally initiated the policymaking process. Factors including economic crises, wars, or shifts in global or regional balances of power had this effect. Domestic state and sub-state level factors generally shaped the interpretation of the problem and influenced the way the response was carried out. In particular, the political philosophy of the leadership and public opinion had this effect.

A number of other conclusions can be drawn from the study:

1. Norms do play a role in foreign policy that changes over time.
2. Even when norms are based on agreed upon terms, they still have a different meaning in different countries. Application of these norms into policy further complicates this issue.
3. Systematic analysis of foreign policy can be conducted through the use of a framework designed around basic national interests observable in all countries.
4. Clear-headed thinking about the contribution of ideals and interests in foreign policy can be done through the use of a framework designed around the quantitative intensity level of a basic national interest.

The alliance's current groundwork on "shared values and interests" is a potentially shaky one. The United States' and Japan's defense and world order interests are the basic interests that demonstrated the strongest overlap during the Cold War.

Economic interests, on the other hand, were frequently the source of the greatest friction. Ideological interests played a secondary role behind the other basic interests. Importantly, ideological interests showed a cyclical character where their intensity fluctuated in a pattern over time. The historian John Toland offered an explanation for these cycles in his study of Imperial Japan, "...if any conclusion was reached, it was that there are no simple lessons in history, that it is human nature that repeats itself, not history."²⁷³ Academics and policymakers need to develop a greater understanding of the rhythms of history and their basis in human nature.

U.S. attention to Northeast Asia is likely to increase in the future. America's increased concerns over the PRC and events in Korea will continue. This necessitates a greater understanding for the United States' main alliance partner in the region. As is common in all cultures, the U.S. and Japan have a tendency to view each other through their own societal framework of norms. A better understanding of the ideals and interests seen from the other side's perspective will increase communication and the quality of partnership.

Both countries have demonstrated a historical alternation in their application of norms to policy. In the United States, this took place through broad forms of idealism and realism. The well-documented and applied nature of these approaches made their distinction relatively easy to identify in actual policy. In Japan, alternations took place between progressivism and traditionalism. Japan's strong traditional character makes it

²⁷³ Toland, John. *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945*. (New York: Random House, Inc., 1970) xxxv.

harder to identify these distinctions. The politician Ozawa Ichiro describes this subtlety in his comment that, “we need to change in order to remain the same.”²⁷⁴

As a result of these broad swings, four categories of applied norms to policy were visible in the same order in both countries. They create a cyclical pattern of trends and constants for morality in policy and are listed here in the order of sequence observed. *Moral idealism* is the application of norms in an excessive and ostentatious manner. It is commonly accompanied by argument in society over which morals should be applied in policy. At some point, policymakers and the public become frustrated with the inability to realize these norms through foreign policy and enter a stage of *moral skepticism*, choosing not to promote norms through foreign policy. This stage of moral skepticism then devolves in the ongoing debate to where there is a crisis because of the unraveling of the moral order that previously held consensus. Out of the crisis emerges a new moral consensus and *moral prudence* where morals are applied in foreign policy through an unpretentious but assertive manner. After the new moral order has been in existence for a time, it begins to become questioned. This creates new cross currents in society and a *moral uncertainty* where norms are applied in varied ways consecutively within policy. As the moral uncertainty intensifies it gives way to a resurgent *moral idealism* in foreign policy that is highly vocal but not representative of a consensus in society.

The values of freedom, democracy, and human rights are the norms pursued by the United States and Japan through their alliance. For the United States, these norms include civil liberties, rule of law, and the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Japanese policymakers, in contrast, promote the norms of harmony, “rule by

²⁷⁴ Ozawa is quoted in Pyle, Kenneth B. *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*.

consensus,” and the responsibilities of duty, honor, and role. The diverse interpretation of these “shared values” is a potential source of friction in the U.S.-Japan relationship. These differences must be studied more closely because of this, particularly by policymakers.

The national interest matrix offers policymakers a systematic way to examine the ideals and interests at stake in a given circumstance. All nations must address four basic interests through their policies. The defense interest is concerned with national survival and homeland defense. The economic interest is focused on the nation’s economic well-being in both absolute and relative terms. The world-order interest deals with creating an international system in which the nation is comfortable. The ideological interest involved advancing values considered important in the country. Policymakers must determine the intensity of the basic interests in an issue and formulate policy that is appropriate to those interests.

While illustrating the passive and reactive nature of Japanese foreign policy, the alternating analysis of sequential U.S. and Japanese foreign policies of four major turning points demonstrated a pattern of constants and trends in the relationship. The recurring interpretations of morality in the United States and identity in Japan set the stage for observing a strong correlation between the 1990s security environment and that of the 1920s. Use of the cyclical analysis suggests that future U.S. policy will be increasingly isolationist and morally skeptical. For Japan it suggests policy that will be increasingly varied and morally uncertain. This is a dangerous situation. Because the United States plays the leading role in the alliance, it is important for policymakers on both sides to

recognize that increased U.S. isolation will result in an increased Japanese perception of insecurity. This condition would very likely cause Japan to seek greater self-reliance in security. This would most probably have a destabilizing effect on the alliance relationship and on regional security.

Given these assumptions and the additional one that the formal alliance cannot be presumed to be indefinite in length, policymakers on both sides should work to slowly wean Japan away from dependence on the United States for security. This should be done with the understanding that the alliance does not need to be completely broken in an atmosphere of ill feelings, but a pragmatic view of human nature that can help promote a mutually beneficial partnership beyond the formal security alliance. Japan will not indefinitely enjoy being dependent on another nation for its security, nor will the United States continue to accept the responsibility of providing security to another nation. If this recognition is made and followed by slow incremental steps toward a relationship that is more “balanced” in security, then this condition is less likely to create problems. If a sudden realization of this condition occurs on either side without preparations being made in the relationship through policy changes, then significant friction will likely result in both the relationship and the region.

Application of ideals to foreign policy is a difficult task. Statesman Dean Acheson captures this sentiment well: “The discussion of ethics or morality in our relations with other states is a prolific cause of confusion.”²⁷⁵ As a consequence, the application of ethics to foreign policy has often been done poorly. It must be noted,

²⁷⁵ Acheson is quoted in Finn, James. “Morality and Foreign Policy,” in Cromartie, Michael. *Might and Right After the Cold War: Can Foreign Policy Be Moral?* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1993) 37.

however, that it does not follow from these pitfalls that moral reasoning and application to foreign policy should not be done at all.²⁷⁶ If the application of ethics is difficult, then we should try harder. If the application of ethics has been done poorly, then we must do better. In the case of the United States, it must be impelled to do so as a nation under “Nature’s God” through the “self evident truths” identified in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble of the Constitution. In the case of Japan, it must be moved to do so out of respect for its forebears and a commitment to society. Ideals must be applied to policy in a prudent fashion that navigates the difficult hazards of extreme moralism or cynicism.

This can be started in the United States by gaining an understanding of the historical swings of morality in foreign policy that have occurred. The next step is to learn a prudent application of ethics in policy. The same logic applies to Japan; it must understand the historical swings of identity in foreign policy that have taken place. The next step is to learn a prudent application of its identity in policy. A synthesis of the extremes is necessary to achieve these steps. The term “university” comes from the idea of “unity in diverse knowledge.” Nothing short of this is necessary to address the rupture of extremes that has developed.

²⁷⁶ Nye, Joseph S. Jr. *Ethics and Foreign Policy*. (Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1985) 1.

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